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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examInes the strategic character of South Africa's regional and 
multilateral trade strategies. It looks at the interplays between the domestic, regional 
and multilateral levels during the period from 1994 to 2004. The regional focus is on 
Southern Africa, looking in particular at the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) Protocol on Trade; and the multilateral/global backdrop is the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations from Seattle to Doha 'Development' 
Round. The question at the core of this research is how regionalism is appropriated by 
state actors to respond both to domestic and global imperatives? 
The central question is framed around analysing the extent to which South Africa uses 
regional and multilateral trade strategies to address its domestic developmental 
concerns and to build capacity for effective articulation at the global level. These 
developmental concerns encompass both social equity objectives and strategic 
competitive needs of domestic capital. For South Africa, the region's importance is 
linked to its strategic response to domestic growth challenges and exigencies linked to 
external forces. 
Drawing on the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) and Competitive Strategic 
Regionalism Approach as analytic frameworks, this thesis argues that South Africa 
uses regionalism as a strategy to address its domestic growth challenges, extend 
political influence in the sub-region and project power at the global level. However, 
due to structural disarticulation between South Africa and the region, a crucial 
paradox in South Africa's overall regional and multilateral trade strategies is apparent. 
The thesis sets out to examine this paradox, concluding that it undermines the 
coherence of South Africa's post-apartheid regional and multilateral trade strategies. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction: South Africa as a Global Actor: Regional and 
Multilateral Trade Strategies 
The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed a headlong rush towards 
regionalism in both the developed and the developing world. This development has 
since generated an intense and inconclusive debate amongst economists and political 
scientists on the relationship between regionalism, globalism and multilateralism. 
This has also generated varying interpretations on the meaning of regionalism, with 
different emphases on its various dimensions: informal regionalist processes; micro-
regions; those that are engaged in by non-state actors; as wel1 as formal processes 
taking place at the state or inter-state level. The latter form has been dominant in the 
literature on regionalism and multilateral ism (see discussion in Chapter 2). 
How regionalism is appropriated by state actors to respond both to domestic and 
global imperatives is at the core theme of this research. What has increasingly become 
clear in the last decade or so is that regionalism and the process of regional is at ion are 
not singular developments following a certain pre-determined path. On the contrary, 
different actors, experiencing differential impact of globalisation and domestic forces, 
collectively fashion a sense of regional identity and evolve set of strategies to engage 
with what arc perceived to be common challenges. One of the major themes that this 
dissertation explores is intra-regional interactions amongst state actors, with emphasis 
on both ideational and structural forces that shape regionalism. 
Although this research examines inter-state dynamics, it acknowledges the fact that at 
the broader theoretical level, the study of regionalism is not limited to state actors or 
empirical processes. It can be initiated by non-slate actors, and unlike old forms of 
regionalism, the current wave is multidimensional and comprehensive, and involves a 
plurality of actors including state, market and society actors, as well as diverse set of 
issues: economic, security and environmentaL l The focus of the thesis on state actors 
is mainly due to the role that these actors play in driving policy processes, as well as 
the relatively low-density of non-state actors in initiating or participating in regional 
processes. 
States, as Clark and Edwards have suggested, 'remain primary brokers between 
international, transnational and domestic pressures in establishing new regulatory 
regimes but they are far from being the only actors. ,2 In their earlier work on 
regionalism, Shaw and Nyangoro have bemoaned the fact that, 'relatively few 
regionalist structures on the continent to date embrace or reflect the dynamics of civil 
societies, even if they build on shared cultures, ethnicities, identities, music, sporting 
interests, and so forth.'3 It is difficult to study regionalism in Africa without some 
reference to the state given its over-extension across various facets of social life, 
however weak it is in organisational form. 
I See Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organi=ation and 
international Order, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.4; Michael Schulz, Fredrik 
Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, Regionaf=ation in a Glohalbing World: A Comparative Perspective 
on Forms. Actors and Processes, (London: Zed Books, 2001), p.6; Fredrik Soderbaum, 'Introduction: 
Theories of New Regionalism', In Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New 
Regionalism, (Basingstoke: Pal grave, 2004), pp.I-2; Bjorn Hettne, 'The New Regionalism Revisited', 
In Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 2004), pp.22-42; Morten Boas, Marianne H. Marchand and Timothy M. Shaw, 'The Weave-
World: The Regional Interweaving of Economies, Ideas and Identities', In Fredrik Soderbaum and 
Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism, (Basingstoke: Pal grave, 2004), p.20 I. 
2 John N. Clarke and Geoffrey Edwards (eds.), Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p.l O. 
3 Timothy M. Shaw and Julius E. Nyangoro, 'African Renaissance in the New Millenium: From 
Anarchy to Emerging Markets? In Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey RD. Underhill (eds.), Political 
Economy and the Changing Global Order, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.279. 
2 
1.1 Southern Africa in the Broader African Context: A Brief Overview 
Africa's place in the global order has hitherto been marginal and characterised by 
uncertainties. Even though the scope of this work is limited to examining the domestic 
forces shaping the nature of regionalism in Southern Africa, a brief allusion to the 
broader context of regionalism in Africa is important if we are to properly situate 
Southern Africa. An important point to emphasise is that the significance of 
regionalism in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular is linked to the state 
of underdevelopment and marginality that characterises the region in relation to 
global structures of production and trade, as well as in relation to core and semi-
peripheral countries in the world economy. 
In Africa, the current processes of regionalism build on existing structures which date 
back to the 1960s when the notion of Pan-Africanism was largely in vogue. 
Regionalism, however narrowly defined, was from the outset a politically inspired 
project drawing inspiration from Pan-Africanist ideals. Indeed, it was, until the early 
1980s, instrumental in the post-colonial state consolidation and serving as a force to 
mobilise Africa's elite towards the ideal of African unity. It sprung from a desire to set 
Africa free from external dependence and serve as an instrument for socio-economic 
development and continental unity.4 
Deepening intra-African links was seen as an important step towards replacing 
external linkages. Peter Robson argued in the early 1960s that, 'Aspirations towards 
unity and cooperation in Africa currently find institutional expression in a variety of 
4 Peter Robson, Economic Integration in ,1ft-ica, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), pp.9-23. 
3 
organizational arrangements for co-operation and in initiative for others.,5 
Regionalism was. during this period, also a notion that was predicated on the need for 
protection through import-substitution industrialisation in order to force structural 
transformation in regional economies and allow for industrial development behind 
protective barriers. Even in Southern Africa, when the force of regionalism took hold 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a particular stress was laid on self-sufficiency. 
The period 1980-1990 provides an interesting land-mark in tracing Africa's changing 
position in the world economy and its developmental dilemmas. It is in making a 
critical observation of Africa's developmental trajectory during this period that the 
powerful forces that gave rise to the evolution of new regionalism in the continent can 
be properly located and understood. Not only was the infrastructure of governance 
weakening - in some instances due to ethnic conflicts, domestic policy failure, 
corruption and poor institutional capacity - but the economies were also on a steady 
decline. 
Many countries In Sub-Saharan Africa were (and still are) dependent on a few 
primary exports and these are highly susceptible to price fluctuations, with adverse 
effects on foreign exchange earnings.6 Since the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, the world 
recession that it generated and the onset of debt crises in the 1980s, Africa has 
struggled to fully recover. This was a period which most African scholars 
, ibid" p.14. 
6 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the 
Juridical in Statehood', In Ahtul Kohli (ed.), The Slale and Development in the Third rForld, 
(Princeton: Princeton: University Press, 1986), p.269; See also Michael Barratt and Pauline Tiffen, 
Shorl Changed: Africa and World Trade, (London: Pluto Press, 1992), p.129. 
4 
characterised as a 'lost decade'. 7 
Against this background, and in the context of stunted growth in Africa's economies, 
the key chaIlenge faced by a majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Southern Africa in particular, had to do with social development in all its facets, 
including economic growth and development of productive supply capacity, food 
security, public health concerns, literacy and employment. State actors therefore 
viewed economic development as a lens through which political strategies are 
conceived. 
Apart from the poor resource base and weak productive capacities, the majority of 
countries in the continent had to also contend with institutional weakness of the state, 
absence of regulatory mechanisms, and the absence of strong forces for change, for 
example entrepreneurial class, grassroots social movements, and private sector 
agents.S According to Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, 'Black Africa's forty-odd 
states are among the weakest in the world. ,9 
Sub-Saharan Africa's economies remain very small, and during the world recession 
7 Timothy M Shaw, 'Revisionism in Africa's Political Economy', In Shaw Timothy Shaw and Julius E 
Nyangoro, Beyond Structural Adjustment in Africa: The Political Economy of Sustainable and 
Democratic Development, (New York: Praeger, 1992); Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, 
'Towards Governance in Africa', In Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton (eds.), Governance and Politics 
in Africa, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992); Adedeji Adebayo, 'Marginalisation and 
Marginality: Context, Issues and Viewpoints', In Adedeji Adebayo (ed.), Africa within the World: 
Beyond Dispossession and Dependence, (London: Zed Books, 1993); Bade Onimode, 'The State of the 
African Political Economy', In Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), South Africa and Africa: Within or Apart?, 
(London: Zed Books, 1996); Fantu Cheru, African Renaissance: Roadmaps to the Challenge of 
Glohali=ation, (London: Zed Books, 2002). 
8 See Christopher Clapham, .~frica and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.175. 
9 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, op.cit., p.259. 
5 
they were subjected to external shocks. 10 Thc inward-looking strategies that were 
adopted in the early 1960s proved unsustainable in the face of persistent economic 
crisis, in which Africa was the worst casualty. Such accumulation strategies, for 
example, the import-substitution industrialisation (lSI) strategies had to be 
reconsidered towards the end of the 1980s. In the early 1990s most of Sub-Saharan 
Africa had begun to make a gradual shift away from inward-looking strategies 
towards externally oriented trade strategies. This was an important element that 
presaged the onset of new regionalism in the continent. 
A number of developments influenced this shift. Firstly, there was a demonstration 
effect of East Asian Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs). The success of NICs 
forced most African countries to playa catch-up role. According to the African 
Development Report (2004), trade has generally been viewed by African countries as 
having propelled the success of Asian economies ll and that it could perhaps work the 
same miracle for Africa more especially when countries are pulling together via 
integration schemes, and this is established within a framework that stresses outward-
orientation. 
What is often omitted in the literature extolling the success of Asian NIC is the fact 
that these also started out on an lSI trajectory from the end of World War II until early 
1960s, the state played a very active role in driving development, and that these 
countries thrived at the height of Cold War and were most favoured by the US and 
10 Christopher Clapham, op.cit., p.168. 
II African Development Report, Africa in the Global Trading System, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p.118. 
6 
surfeited with external aid and open markets. 12 It is therefore important to emphasise 
that these favourable conditions were not equally available to all Third World 
countries. 
Nonethcless, as latc comers, the majority of Africa countries sought to playa catch-up 
role and to integrate themselves into the global economy. The views of Iddi Simba, 
Tanzania's former Minister of Trade are instructive in this regard: 
'We, in the SA DC regIon, realise that integration is fast becoming a 
global trend. Countries in different regions of the globe are organising 
themselves into closer economic and political entities. These 
movements towards stronger regional blocs will transform the world 
both economically and politically.' 13 
Secondly, the role of the International Financial Institutions, including IMF structural 
adjustment packages and World Bank's policy prescriptions also swayed the 
pendulum of regional policy in Africa in favour of external-orientation. Indeed the 
discursive shift in World Bank's emphasis from state intervention to market 
approaches l4, and supported by its array of studies suggesting that the economic 
performance of the export-oriented countries was superior to those of the inward-
looking economies seem to have had an effect on how policy makers in Africa 
12 TJ Pempel, 'The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy', In Meredith Woo-
Cumings (ed.), The Derelopmental State, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p.174. Pempel 
futher highlights that US consideration was with diffusing the appeal of anti-capitalist ideologies. 
IJ Iddi Simba, Trade and Industry Minister, Republic of Tanzania, a presentation to an UNCTAD 
symposium: 'Regional Integration and the Global Economy', (UNCT AD Publications, Geneva, 
October 2000), p.22. 
7 
conceive of regional integration strategies. 
Thirdly, the political elite realised the acute limits of import-substitution 
industrialisation policies, which biased against exports - much of the effect was 
evident in the contraction of the domestic market and the declining growth in the 
domestic economy.15 These considerations set off a gradual shift towards adoption of 
export oriented growth strategies and ensured their fusion with the notion of regional 
economic integration. Indeed, as Mshomba aptly observe, regional economic 
integration was as popular in the 1990s as import-substitution was in the 1970s.16 
It was against this background, and in the context of persistent underdevelopment, 
that Sub-Saharan Africa rode the wave of market-oriented regional integration 
process. Although this brand of regionalism is struggling to be fully manifest, 
nonetheless its outlines are evident, and there are growing signs of its embrace in 
most of the continent. This dissertation is an empirical examination of regionalism as 
facilitated by state actors in Southern Africa, and utilises the analytic tools of 
International Political Economy. 
In examining regionalism in Southern Africa, this thesis will use the concept of region 
and sub-region interchangeably. Grant and Soderbaum note for example that, 
'Southern Africa is most frequently considered a macro-regional space in its own 
right, thereby encompassing distinct sub-regions, such as the Southern African 
14 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government 
and the Market Place that is Remaking the Modern World, (New Yark: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 
p.150; Christopher Clapham, op.cit., p.l69. 
IS See Richard E. Mshomba, Africa in the Global Economy, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p.41; 
Anne O. Krueger, Trade Policies and Developing Nations, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution, 
1995), pp.3-30. 
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Customs Union.,17 So in relation to the larger African macro-region institutionalised 
through the African Union (AU) Southern Africa is a sub-region or a meso-level 
region; however, in relation to a small-scale regional integration process - SACU - it 
can thus be regarded as a region or macro-region. 
1.2 The Research Problem 
With the increased salience of globalisation and the emergence of new regionalism in 
the late 1980s, Sub-Saharan Africa was further pushed to the margins of the global 
political economy. As noted previously, this unenviable position was created by a 
confluence of factors emanating both from within the domestic sphere as well as 
generated externally. The examination of these factors will not be explored here, 
suffice to emphasise that Africa has struggled to recover from the world recession of 
the late 1970s and from the setbacks that emanated from internal policy failures 
during this period. The continent remained largely disembodied from the world 
economy and its growth has been declining over the decades. As Hoogvelt notes, 
'Africa has become structurally irrelevant to the present global economic order.' 1 8 
New regionalism as an empirical expression evolved in part as an outgrowth of neo-
liberal global order with its promise of greater prosperity. In developing countries and 
Africa in particular, developmental strategies were recast away from state-centred 
16 Richard E. Mshomba, op.cit. 
17 J. Andrew Grant and Frederik Soderbaum, 'Introduction: The New Regionalism in Africa', In 
J.Andrew Grant and Frederik Soderbaum, The New Regionalism in Africa, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 
p.6. 
18 Ankie Hoogvelt, Globali=ation and the Post-Colonial World: The New Political Economy of 
Development, (2nd ed.), (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p.175. 
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approaches that cmphasised autarky. Close integration with the world economy and 
export promotion bccame a new developmental creed. Looking at the case of 
Southern Africa, the particular form that regionalism initially assumed was that of 
oppositional, counter-hegemonic politics (see Chapter 3). This later changed as socio-
political conditions in South Africa took on a different shape in the early 1990s at the 
dawn of democracy. This also goes to demonstrate the sometimes unique shapes that 
regional initiatives assumed owing to different contexts that gave rise to them. 
In Southern Africa, the genesis of regionalism in the late 1970s culminated with the 
establishment of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference 
(SADCC) in 1980. This development followed a strongly state-centered paradigm of 
politics that privileged political diplomacy and security in a narrowly defined sense. 
This was influenced by two crucial factors: the obsession with state-building in the 
aftermath of independence; and the socio-political character of the region, shaped by 
South Africa's regional policies. 
Regionalism in Southern Africa initially emerged within a social milieu shaped by 
South Africa's security agenda in the region, and against the background of Cold War 
politics. In essence it was constructed on political opposition against South Africa and 
built on an urge to reduce dependence on the external world, although in practice the 
latter was never fully achieved (see Chapter 3). This preoccupation with 'autarky' was 
mainly a function of consolidating political and economic independence. 
However, in the early 1990s Southern Africa was to experience something of a 
seismic shift. The old regionalist forms had to be redefined in accordance with the 
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ideational and structural shifts that were shaping the global system. There was 
amongst state actors an increasing acceptance of the role of external markets in the 
domestic economy, and the role of the state had to be redefined to accommodate these 
largely externally generated realities. In the sub-region this began with the IMF and 
World Bank's neo-liberal prescriptions which were essentially aimed at caging the 
state-led developmental approach, and replacing it with market-oriented approaches. 19 
These changes at the global level also coincided with socio-political ruptures within 
South Africa in the early 1990s. Political developments, especially the eclipse of 
apartheid in South Africa ensured that the original agenda in SA DC would be 
redefined along more proactive set of objectives than on counter-hegemonic politics. 
This was indeed a major turning point in the transition from old to new regionalism 
(See Chapters 3 and 5). 
With the rising challenge of globalisation and continued marginalisation of poor 
developing countries, a common cause, broadly conceived, was not impossible to re-
establish. As state actors were contending with the domestic developmental 
challenges and the forces of globalisation, cooperation and integration at the regional 
level was seen by political elite as crucial in harnessing economic benefits of 
globalisation and building bargaining capacity in relation to the developed world. De-
linking from the world economy ceased to be the basis for a common agenda. Global 
Integration became a new obsession. 
19 ibid. 
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Effective articulation and meaningful integration in the global economy was seen as 
not only inevitable but necessary to pursue in order to bring about increascd growth 
and development; and that this would require enhanced market access in advanced 
industrial countrics.~o According to Ilurrell, this was partly driven by systemically 
induced pressures towards market-liberal policies which have increased the 
significance of export expansion and trade liberalisation both regionally and 
globally.2! For state elites, trade was also regarded as a necessary route towards 
achieving developmental ends. Hence this paper looks at the specific aspect of trade 
in regionalisation processes in Southern Africa. The theme of trade integration in 
Southern Africa is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
Rather than assuming an 'everything has changed' approach, this dissertation does 
acknowledge that there are important continuities between the old and new forms of 
regionalism; and these are markedly visible in Southern Africa where the states are 
still over-extended, but lack internal cohesion, and the endogenously generated 
market forces remain largely undeveloped. Moreover, regionalism as it currently 
exists in Southern Africa is in a transitory state: it is on the one hand struggling to 
shed its dirigste form, and yet on the other its normative commitments broadly 
converge with the neo-liberal developmental framework. 
Of particular importance is the role played by core countries or dominant states that 
have relatively developed productive capacities and competitive capabilities in the 
20 See Dani Rodrik, The Global Governance of Trade and if Development Really Mattered, United 
Nations Development Programme, 2001 (www.undp.org). 
21 Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', In Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, 
Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organi=ation and International Order, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p.57. 
12 
regionalisation process. Therefore, this thesis docs not look at the state disarticulated 
from society level processes.~2 Indeed, in Southern A frica a pattern of convergence of 
elite interests, for example between states and firms can be discerned. Hurrell argues 
that· ... regional integration ean be understood in terms of convergence of interests 
between state elites and firms in response to changes in the international economic 
structure. ,23 This theme is explored in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
In this connection, at the core of this research is the examination of the role South 
Africa plays in constructing the regional order and the extent to which this is pursued 
as part of achieving domestic 'social stability' and constructing competitive strategies 
for global assertion. Furthermore, domestic and global forces that shape cooperation 
at the regional level as well as how such relations are structured and institutionalised 
will be explored. Rather than taking the region as a truncated unit of analysis the 
thesis focuses on complex sets of interactions shaped by the combination of domestic 
level forces and global level processes. 
The state which is enmeshed in complex set of relations and reflects societal interests 
will, following Gamble and Payne, be assumed as a key level of explanation.24 
Regarding domestic level forces, South Africa's role as a regional and global actor 
will be examined. It must be emphasised that the state is not viewed as abstracted 
from society, but it does enjoy relative autonomy. Autonomy is defined as 'the extent 
22 Following Gramsci, the state can be seen as embodying the structural power of the dominant classes 
in civil society; See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Political Writings 1910-1920, (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), pp.73-74. 
2) Andrew Hurrell, op.cit .. p.SS. 
24 Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, 'Conclusion: The New Regionalism', In Andrew Gamble and 
Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order, (London: Macmillan, 1996), p.2S0. 
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to which leaders can insulate themselves from societal pressures and autonomously 
define national tasks.'25 
At another level the research looks at the relationship between the regional and the 
global or multilateral dimensions. The three levels: domestic, regional and global are 
taken as inter-related and co-constitutive and thus, at varying degrees, all have equal 
importance to state actors. In developing countries states face complex challenges 
from both the domestic and global levels, and find themselves under increasing 
pressure to re-assert their authority. The sub-regional level has thus emerged as a 
platform states use to re-constitute their significance, enter into competitive relations 
and articulate effectively at the global level. 
South Africa in particular has found itself contending with multiple crises: the global 
pressures resulting from oil crisis and world recession in the mid-1970s and early 
1980s had exposed the structural rigidities in the domestic economy, especially the 
atrophy experienced in the import-substitution industrialisation. In addition, South 
Africa's economy was generally ill-managed and socially oriented towards building 
and sustaining the apartheid edifice. 
Quite evidently, South Africa entered the 1990s at the most trying juncture. During 
this phase, the economy had to undergo fundamental restructuring and democratic 
reforms were simultaneously set in motion. The political elites were under pressure to 
25 Michael Shafer, 'The Political Economy of Sectors and Sectoral Change: Korea Then and Now', In 
Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider (eds.), Business and the State in Developing Countries, 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.94; See also Theda Skocpol, 'Bringing the State In: The 
Current Research', In Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing The 
State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.9. 
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adopt nco-liberal policies (see Chapter 4). Although South Africa's future foreign 
economic strategies would be embedded on an active developmental strategy, the 
essence of the economic reforms remained largely neo-liberal. 
In this context pursuing a strong regional policy has been for reasons related both to 
domestic crisis or considerations of 'social stability' as well as to respond to the 
forces of globalisation. It needs highlighting that the idea of 'region' was not new in 
Southern Africa or in Africa for that matter; and neither was South Africa's regional 
approach a novel development altogether. The evolution of South Africa's regionalist 
approach from apartheid to post-apartheid is discussed in great detail in Chapter 3. 
The significance of regionalism in the post-apartheid era was as a result of new set of 
circumstances that were unlike those that had existed during apartheid, although to a 
greater degree the regional strategy was conceived with the socio-economic order 
bequeathed by the apartheid system in mind. 
The regional configuration in Southern Africa witnessed profound changes in the 
post-1990 period, and these have assumed a comparably more offensive posture. As 
Breslin and Higgott suggested, the new regionalism unlike the old 'takes a more 
offensive response to the global economy. It is a way of securing greater competitive 
access to global markets under conditions of globalisation, not as a way of securing 
. I t k ,26 regJOna au ar y. 
There is little doubt that even though in the case of Southern Africa regionalism 
struggles to make strides from old to new forms, pressure for greater openness is 
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overwhelming. This is especially so in view of the fact that the majority of SADC 
countries have acceded to the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and 
are members of the World Trade Organisation since its establishment in 1995 
(Chapter 6). This has set them on a liberalising mode and locks their policies within a 
multilateral regulatory framework. 
The regional strategy that South Africa adopted in the post-1990 period evolved as 
part of 'stabilising' the domestic economy, facilitating regional economic 
development, and responding to new developments on the global front. These 
considerations are all inter-linked and reinforce each other in spurring South Africa's 
foreign economic strategies (see Chapters 5 and 6). For example one of the key 
objectives that define South Africa's foreign economic policy is expanding the export 
outlets for domestic production. 
This approach is linked to 'strategic' sectors that the state prioritises in its micro-
economic reform strategy. These sectors include agriculture, mining, tourism, cultural 
industries, information technologies, clothing and textiles, vehicle manufacturing, 
aerospace sector, call centre and back office business processes (Chapter 4). The 
focus of the strategy at the domestic level is to ensure greater value-add in ~roduction 
as well as gaining competitive advantage in the services sectors. The focus is sectoral, 
but the overall strategy is concerned with forcing a structural shift in comparative 
advantage in the economy, enhance the composition of exports, and improve leverage 
and bargaining capacity in global economic relations, in particular in multilateral 
trade. 
26 Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott, 'Learning from the Old, Constructing the New', New Political 
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This also enables the state to receive support for its foreign economic policy from 
those sectors whose predilections coalesce with state actors' strategic objectives. As 
Katzenstein observed: 
'The definition and implementation of foreign economic policies grow 
out of the nexus of state and society. Both state goals and the interests 
of powerful classes may influence national policy orientations. And the 
implementation of policies is shaped not only by the policy instruments 
available to the state, but also by organised support it receives from key 
societal groups. ,27 
South Africa, unlike India or Brazil for example, cannot build its bargaining capacity 
on the back of its internal market; it is comparably small. It therefore seeks to do this 
by maximising its producer activity. The sub-region presents itself as an important 
bridge-head for realisation of South Africa's ambitions with respect to nurturing the 
competitiveness of its domestic sector and increasing its exports of value-added 
manufactured products. In comparison to Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) and 
developed economies, South Africa lags behind in areas such as export growth and 
international competitiveness. In a sense, it is playing a catch-up via its regional 
'back-yard' . 
Much of the literature on regionalism or regional integration has given scant attention 
to the particular role dominant states in the developing regions play and how these 
Economy, Volume 5 (2) 2000, p.339. 
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states articulate at the various levels: domestic, regional and global. The competitive 
strategies of dominant countries within regions are often ignored. This thesis views 
the developments in Southern African sub-region through the unfolding of South 
Africa's regional and multilateral trade strategies, placing greater stress on South 
Africa's competitive strategies whose force derive from both domestic level tensions 
and exigencies created by the processes associated with globalisation. 
Thus a linkage between the domestic, regional and multilateral level is made. 
Regional outlet and security of global markets are of crucial importance in this 
strategy. The form of regionalism that is promoted by South Africa can thus be 
characterised as strategic competitive regionalism (see discussion below). 
1.3 Hypothesis/Argument 
The central question explored in this dissertation is framed around the extent to which 
South Africa uses regional and multilateral trade strategies to address its domestic 
developmental concerns and build capacity for competitive articulation at the global 
level. This research seeks to demonstrate that South Africa useS regionalism as a 
strategy to address its domestic growth challenges, extend political influence in the 
sub-region and project power at the global level. It argues that lack of cohesiveness in 
South Africa's regional and multilateral trade strategies are as a result of structural 
dissimilarity between South Africa and the majority of countries in the sub-region; as 
well as lack of a solid consensual normative framework that firmly integrates South 
Africa with its neighbours. 
27 Quoted in Theda Skocpol, op.cit., p.20. 
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Furthermore. there are also factors related to the past policies of the apartheid 
oovcrnment in the region. All these dimensions act to undermine South Africa's e ~ 
regional 'hegemonic' role and limit the extent to which it could build a common 
regional platform for effective articulation at the multilateral trade level. In essence, 
South Africa's failure to obliterate negative perceptions generated during the 
apartheid era, harmonise its 'domestic stability' objectives with the developmental 
interests of its regional counterparts and construct a consensual hegemonic platform 
limit the weight of its regional influence. 
To a considerable extent the sources of this divergence lie in the domestic scene, 
especia\ly the structure of South Africa's economy and social contradictions that the 
country contends with post-apartheid. South Africa's main concern at the domestic 
level is to generate dynamism in its economy and ensure international 
competitiveness, while at the same time pursuing social equity objectives. In this 
regard, in seeking to address these domestic challenges, South Africa increasingly 
locks itself in global structures and processes. Indeed, as Katzenstein has contended, 
'The domestic structure of the nation-state is a critical variable without which the 
interrelation between international interdependence and political strategies cannot be 
d d ,28 un erstoo .. 
But the state-society nexus reflects a degree of insularity, and the state acts to trigger 
competitive forces in the domestic scene that are confluent with its foreign economic 
interests. Ikenberry suggests for example that states are separated - or in other words 
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have relative autonomy - from but in constant bargaining with society.29 The state 
intervenes in the economy not because of the influence particularistic domestic actors 
exert upon it, but to compensate them for structural weaknesses in the economy. 
In turn, the state receives support from this externally-oriented fraction of capital, 
generally regarded as 'strategic'. In a sense, there is a symbiotic relationship between 
the state's need to enhance its competitive profile at the global level and the interests 
of powerful actors in the domestic economy. But this also raises concerns regarding 
how social costs of an external strategy are managed. These are discussed in Chapter 
4. 
1.3.1 Domestic-Global Linkages 
It should be noted that the state does not respond to global exigencies independently 
and purely on the basis of the character of its domestic structure, but rather within the 
strictures of neo-liberal global order which articulates itself within states. And this 
reflects itself in the regulatory, institutional and quasi-legal infrastructure of the state. 
This point is made powerfully by Sassen who contends that global processes are 
embedded in national territories - a development which has brought a rebalancing in 
the institutional architecture of government and affected its legislative or regulatory 
mechanisms.3o Or, what Gill characterises as institutionalisation of 'disciplinary neo-
28 Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Domestic and International Forces and Strategies of Foreign 
Economic Policy', International Organi=ation Volume 31 (4), 1977, p.587. 
29 John G. Ikenberry, 'The State and Strategies of International Adjustment', In Richard Little and 
Michael Smith (eds.), Perspectives on If'orld Politics, (London: Routledge, 1991), p.158. 
30 Saskia Sassen, 'Embedding the Global in the National'. In David A. Smith, Dorothy 1. Solinger and 
Stevens C. Topik (eds.), 'States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy', (London: Routledge, 
1999).,pI62. 
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liberalism at the macro-level power in the quasi-legal restructuring of state and 
international political forms: constitutionalism. ,31 
The clear expression of this, as captured by Haggard, Maxfield and Schneider, can be 
observed in the influence that capital exerts on government policy processes through 
organised pressure it can bring on the political process as well as through its 
investment decision.32 The structure of global capital, especially the increasing 
transnational activity of financial markets, has in the past two decades acted to limit 
the political strategies of state actors.33 For example, as Gill and Law have argued, 
one aspect of the structural power of capital is manifest in the assumption underlying 
government's growth strategy: if conditions propitious to business investment and 
enterprise innovation do not exist, an investment strike may follow?4 
Gill and Law further note that, ' ... as a result governments are increasingly constrained 
in their freedom of manoeuvre by the economic policies of other states, as well as the 
investment decisions of internationally mobile capital.,35 To say this is true for both 
developing and developed countries alike would be an understatement. Indeed the 
strain of these fetters has had a differential impact on the developing countries owing 
to the marginal position they occupy in the hierarchy of power in the global political 
economy. 
31 Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the Nell' World Order, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
p.131. 
32 Stephan Haggard, Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, 'Theories of Business and Business-
State Relations, In Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider (cds.), Business and the State in 
Developing Countries, (London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.38. 
33 Peter J. Katzenstein, op.cit .. p.597. 
34 See Stephen Gill and David Law, 'The Power of Capital: Direct and Structural', In Stephen Law, 
Power and Resistance in the New World Order, (London: Pal grave Macmillan, 2003), p.98. 
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Countries are differently endowed 111 the global system and respond to structural 
challcnges in ways that reflect their resource endowments and competitive 
capabilities. States cannot be understood independently from wider processes taking 
shape 111 the global economy. Indeed, as Cox has suggested, through 
internationalisation or crystallisation of global processes within the state, 'the nation 
state becomes part of a larger and more complex political structure that is the 
counterpart to international production.,36 
South Africa's regional and multilateral trade strategies are conditioned by both 
domestic consideration for 'social stability' as well as its structural position in global 
political economy. Strange suggests for example that the state is a political 
embodiment of the classes that have authority in the production structure, and that it is 
sandwiched between the world orders and the production structure in which it is 
10cated.37 Ikenberry makes a similar point when he argues, 'states occupy a unique 
position to mediate internal and external change.' 38 
35 See Stephen Gill and David Law, op.cit., p.102. 
36 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, 
(Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.253. 
17 Susan Strange, States and Markets, (London: Pinter, 1988), p.26; See for example the proposition in 
the German Ideology: Civil society 'embraces the whole commercial and industrial life ofa given stage 
and, insofar, transcends the State and the nation, though on the other hand again, it must assert itself in 
its foreign relations as nationality, and inwardly must organise itself as State', Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels F, The German Ideology, (edited and introduced by Arthur C.J), (London: Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1999), p.57. Marx and Engel conception of the state is that it reflects the civil society at a 
particular stage of production establishes the basis for the state. 
38 John G. Ikenberry, op.cit., p.147. 
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1.3.2 Domestic-Regional Developments 
Although this study looks at the Southern African sub-region in its evolution from old 
to new regionalism, the empirical reality is such that it would be premature to regard 
SADC as a fully fledged 'new' regionalist project. In its current form it can be said to 
be aspiring to one. However there are constraints that constantly undermine a 
movement towards such an 'ideal' state, and these are mainly located at the domestic 
level and some are generated by anxieties over distributive issues. Moreover, lack of 
an effective external guarantor willing to underwrite the cost of the integration project 
is a serious challenge for SADC's integration project. 
South Africa, though a core state within the sub-region, is unable to effectively play 
this role owing to the adjustment challenges at the domestic level or preoccupation 
with consideration of 'social stability' and competitiveness. These challenges, already 
alluded to, tilt the country strongly towards neo-mercantilist relationship with 
neighbouring countries in the sub-region. While at the dawn of the 1990s South 
Africa's transition, especially in its economic reforms, corresponded to neo-liberal 
discourse, this has largely been embedded within a social developmental framework 
(see Chapter 4). 
1.3.3 Embedded Liberalism? 
In its pursuit of export-drive in regional and global markets South Africa has had to 
be careful to protect sectors that are likely to suffer severe adjustment costs as a result 
of liberal is at ion (Chapter 4). To this extent South Africa's strategy can be regarded as 
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a limited form of 'embedded liberalism'. Embedded liberalism as propounded by 
Ruggie tempers multilateralism and external openness with domestic interventionism 
to ensure 'domestic social security and economic stability' .39 
In essence, as Ruggie argued, this stands in contrast to assumptions of laissez fare or 
unguarded openness. Countries that are projecting outwardly would, as Ruggie wrote, 
seek 'to minimise socially disruptive domestic adjustment costs as well as any 
national economic and political vulnerabilities that might accrue from international 
functional differentiation. ,40 For Ruggie, liberalising internationally while 
safeguarding domestic stability lies at the core of 'embedded liberalism' .41 
At the multilateral level, South Africa has sought to achieve, on the back of its 
regional strategy, a sufficient consensus in support of its positions amongst SA DC 
countries at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This consensus was viewed by 
South Africa as critical in binding the sub-region to its multilateral trade strategy, and 
ostensibly to ensure maximum developmental gains for the sub-region (see Chapters 
6). 
39 John G. Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Post-war Economic Order', international Organisation 36,2, Spring 1982, pp.379-415; compare with 
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 200111957), pp.136-140. Polanyi discusses the social history of the 19th Century and 
how the expansion of the self-regulating markets was met by a counter-movement to discipline its ills. 
Such a countermovement (forming a double movement in society) established its own institutional 
mechanism to protect vulnerable social classes as well as to rescue capitalist production from the 
devastating effects of self-regulating market. 
40 See John Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Post-war Economic Order', international Organisation 36, 2, Spring 1982, p.399. 
41 See John G. Ruggie, 'Unravelling Trade: Global Institutional Change and the Pacific Economy', In 
Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver and John Ravenhill (eds.), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: 
Cooperation or Co"!/lict? (St. Leornards: Allen Unwin, 1993). 
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Thus South Africa conceived of the sub-region as a bridge-head in prosecuting its 
foreign economic strategy which is defined chiefly in terms of its domestic growth 
and developmental challenges. The failure of this approach to fully materialise is an 
expression of structural gap and diversity of interests between much of the sub-region 
and South Africa. More crucially it reflects South Africa's inability to fully reconcile 
its domestic 'social stability' concerns with a 'hegemonic' role in regional relations 
(Chapter 6). 
South Africa's urge to set a regional agenda should not be seen in a disarticulated, 
loose form, but from the wider strategies at the global level. And these are also linked 
to concrete interests that emanate from the domestic sphere (e.g. benefiting the 
dominant domestic economic actors; encouraging flow of foreign capital; addressing 
employment and equity/developmental challenges) as well as idealistic ambitions for 
greater recognition and influence in structures of global economic governance. This 
view differs for example from approaches that conceive of international cooperation 
in narrow 'self-interested' realist paradigm as devoid of idealism.42 
1.3.4 Structural Power ojCapilal and Developmental Imperatives 
The primacy of South Africa's regional and multilateral strategies therefore is to 
maximise developmental gains, but this is pursued simultaneously with the objective 
of global assertion and, ostensibly, to ensure beneficial integration of the region in 
global economic relation. This ordering of priorities, as suggested in this work, does 
42 See Robert O. Keohane, .1fter Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.63. 
25 
not at all imply that things will remain static. The post-apartheid South Africa is 
relatively new in the area of foreign (economic) policy making, and its approach to 
regional and multilateral processes is likely to undergo incremental changes and 
assume different shapes at various temporal phases in its development. 
What also needs to be re-iterated is that the evolution of South Africa's regional and 
multilateral trade strategies is deeply woven into the global structural changes. They 
take shape against a complex background of a reconstituted relationship between 
states and markets, and where the latter could be said to enjoy a considerable measure 
of structural dominance over the former. Structural power, as defined by Susan 
Strange, 'is the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political 
economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic 
enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to 
operate. ,43 
Thus the states set to realise their national (developmental) objectives within a global 
system whose normative template is largely defined by markets agents. The ability of 
states to manoeuvre is by and large determined by their relative (economic) power in 
relation to other states. States power project themselves in the global system in pursuit 
of economic goals and to maximise their competitive capabilities.44 
To privilege the role of the state in this analysis is not to extol its cult; and neither 
does it deny the role played by non-state actors, especially grassroots civil society in 
43 Susan Strange, States and Markets. (London: Pinter, 1988), pp.24-25; See also Andrew Wyatt 
Walter, op.cit .. p.75. 
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regional and global level governance. Nor does this research overlook what Putnam 
characterises as the strategic dilemmas faced by state actors to reconcile domestic and 
international imperatives.45 Indeed state actors stand at the intersection of both 
realities and are constantly reconciling them. Hence, the thesis contends that South 
Africa's foreign economic approach both at the regional and multilateral level 
exhibits a limited form of 'embedded liberalism'. 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
This study is not fixed within disciplinary rigidities or narrowly paradigm-driven. Its 
theoretical framework is based on a flexible eclectic approach that draws mainly from 
critical or new International Political Economy associated with the work of Craig 
Murphy, Roger Tooze and Anthony Payne; theories on New Regionalism(s) 
Approach (NRA) propounded by Bjorn Hettne, Timothy Shaw and Frederik 
Soderbaum, amongst others. New Regionalism Approach is, according to Shulz et al 
linked with the New International Political Economy tradition and is an 'effort to 
transcend 'problem solving theory', state-centric ontologies and rationalist 
. I' .46 epIsterna ogles.· 
The strength of these related theoretical approaches lies broadly in their focus on the 
linkages between the domestic, regional and global level processes. Their starting 
44 See Ronen Palan and Jason Abbott with Phil Deans, State Strategies in the Global Political 
Economy, (London: Pinter, 1996), p.I27. 
45 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', In Peter B. 
Evans, Harold K. Jacobsen Robert D. Putnam (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics, (Berkely: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1993), p.459. 
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point is where the conventional or the positivist International Relations ends: the twin 
separation of politics from economics and the international from the domestic. The 
'new' International Political Economy transcends this divide.47 The equal weight they 
lend to both structure and agency as well as the recognition they give to both 
ideational and material definitions of power give them an edge over mainstream IR 
approaches.48 
New IPE, in particular, also differs from the traditional IR and its quintessential 
positivist research agenda in one crucial respect: it recast the solid, impassable 
barriers between the observer and the observed - where researchers are cast 
inoculated and merely record what they observe. It also jettisons the exclusion of 'the 
reality of intersubjective meaning in the structure of global political economy,49 
which leads to a 'value-free' theorising. 
Furthermore positivist preoccupation with methodological individualism closes the 
door to other forms of explanations which could be drawn from a wider spectrum of 
academic disciplines and, perhaps yield better research outcomes.50 What 'new' IPE 
proposes rather is an innovative research agenda that understands historical structures 
and processes as not a product of chance or fatality but continuously being shaped by 
46 Michael Shulz, Frederik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, 'Introduction: A Framework for 
Understanding Regionalization', Regionali=alion in a Globali=ing World: A Comparative Perspective 
on Forms, Actors and Processes, (London: Zed Books, 2001), pp.12-13. 
47 Murphy Craig. N and Tooze Roger (eds.), The New international Political Economy, (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1991), p.4. 
48 See Anthony Payne, 'Rethinking Development inside IPE', In Anthony Payne (ed.), The New 
Regional Politics C!f Development, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p.9. 
49 Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze, op.cit., p.18. 
50 ibid., p.19. 
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human agcncy and the observcr is viewed as part of its evolution rather than enquiring 
.1' . .11 'I ulsmtcrcstcu y.-
With rcspect to the domestic or the position of the nation-state it must be emphasised 
that this approach does not suggest the state has become irrelevant, but that there is a 
considerable degree of fluidity that cannot be ignored and that the domestic cannot be 
viewed as separated from regional and global level processes. Furthermore, as 
Devatak notes, 'Traditional conceptions of theory tend to work in favour of stabilising 
prevailing structures of world order and their accompanying inequalities of wealth 
and power' .52 
Not so with critical IPE. As Devetak has further suggested, the ' ... critical 
international theory takes the global configuration of power relations as its object and 
asks how that configuration came about, what costs it brings with it, and what 
alternative possibilities remain immanent in history' .53 Or, as Susan Strange argued, 
'International Political Economy must be concerned with future possibilities.'54 
Susan Strange defined the study of International Political Economy thus: 'it concerns 
the social, political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems of 
production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein.'55 In 
51 Cox defines 'historical structures' as 'persistent social practices, made by coJ\ective human activity 
and transformed through coJ\ective human activity.', Robert W. Cox, op.cil .• p.4; See also Antonio 
Gramsci, ,)'elections from Political Writings 1910- I 920, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), p.17-
18; Stephen Gill, op.cit .. 1991, pp.51-75. 
52 Richard Devatak, 'Critical Theory', In Burchill Scott, Devatak Richard, Linklater Andrew, Mathew 
Paterson, Reus-Smit Christian and True Jackie (eds.), Theories of International Relations, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996), p.160. 
53 ibid.. p.161. 
54 Susan Strange, Slales and Markets, (London: Pinter, 1988), p.19. 
55 ibid.. p.18. 
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this sense. sets of relationships at the domestic regional and global levels and the 
forces that regulate these. including their normative underpinnings arc part of what 
constitute the dimensions of study of the International Political Economy. 
The other strength of the discipline is in the fact of its recognition of multiplicity of 
transnational actors.56 This differs from the 'statist' approaches that are a hallmark of 
traditional IR. Statist approaches, as Palan e/ at has suggested, are insufficient in 
explaining new competitive global environments.57 One of the cornerstones of new 
regionalism approach in particular is that it seeks to 'unpack' the state and find better 
ways of understanding state-society complexes.58 
Another crucial signifier of the 'new' IPE is that it provides tools with which to assail 
the walls between Area Studies and International theorising. Indeed, since the 
epistemological starting point of IPE is that the distinction between the domestic and 
the international is no longer of any analytic relevance beyond description, it would 
be a theoretical anomaly to have, as the conventional IR theory is wont of doing, a 
distinction between 'International' and 'Area'. Even economic theory suffers from the 
same shortcoming. Hirschman has noted for example that: 
'the underdeveloped countries as a group are set apart, through a 
number of economic characteristics common to them from the advanced 
industrial countries and, ... traditional economic analysis, which has 
,6 ibid. p.21. 
,7 Roncn Palan and Jason Abbott with Phil Deans, op.cit., 47. 
\8 Michael ShulL, Frcderik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojcndal, op.cit.. p.13. 
30 
concentrated on the industrial countries, must therefore be recast in 
significant respects when dealing with underdeveloped countries.'59 
Even though there is increasing differentiation amongst 'underdeveloped' or 
'developing' countries so much so that in future the analytic distinction between these 
and developed could be less marked - for example there are growing pockets of 
poverty within the North and an emerging affluent class within the South - the 
material distinction, especially as measured in terms of economic and social indices, 
remains relevant. This also provides some clues to the skewed distribution of other 
non-material resources between these two poles - developed and developing - as well 
as the privileging of the 'North' or DEeD in IR or IPE theorising. 
John Darwin has pointed out that 'neglect of the relationship between the industrial, 
more or less developed countries of the 'North' (including the former Soviet Union 
and Japan) and the less developed countries of the 'South' is one of the most striking 
features of modem international relations theory. ,60 This is echoed by Grant and 
Soderbaum when they note that 'Africa is, to a large extent, neglected in the general 
debate on regionalism. ,61 Similarly Brown has observed that, 'characteristically, the 
dominant ideas about international relations have always tended to originate in the 
rich and powerful parts of the world rather than in poor or weaker areas.'62 
,9 Albert Hirschman, quoted in Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the 
Del'elopmental State, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1995), p.44. 
60 John Darwin, 'Africa and World Politics Since 1945: Theories of Decolonization', In Ng'aire 
Woods (eds.), Explaining international Relations Since 1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
p.1999. 
61 Andrew J. Grant and Frederik Soderbaum, 'Introduction: The New Regionalism in Africa', In 
J.Andrew Grant and Frederik Soderbaum (eds.), The New Regionalism in Africa, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003).p.1. 
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This neglect has seen much of the issues related to the 'South' 'peripheralised' from 
the broader IR discourse, and confined to the academic framework of Area Studies as 
a distinct area mainly dominated by historians, geographers, and sociologists. As John 
Darwin has observed that: 
'to a larger extent the study of North-South relations has become the 
preserve of area studies - specialised ghettos, where the unique 
character of the 'area' and the premium value of specialised regional 
knowledge are fiercely defined at the expense of cross-regional 
. I I 'd I" ,63 companson, et a one WI er genera IzatlOn. 
The IPE discourse, to a greater extent, still reflects disproportionate preoccupation 
with the North or the triad - including Europe, North America and Asia (especially 
Japan and gradually China). That IPE still reflects a 'pecking order' with the 
industrialised occupying the uppermost position in the hierarchy and the marginalized 
at the bottom of its theorising is without question. Murphy and Tooze contend that 'it 
reflects Western, male, privileged, and largely materialist view of the totality of 
questions that IPE is (and should be) concerned with.'64 
Similarly, Breslin has argued that, 'While critical IPE studies of the implication of 
globalisation and the state have become more 'pluralistic' in case studies, and more 
nuanced in approach, many modes of analysis still do not transfer efficaciously to the 
6: Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 200 I), p.l94. 
63 John Darwin, op.cit., p.J99. 
64 Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze, op.cit .. p.24. 
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study of developing states. ,os Breslin further suggested that 'the discipline needs to 
become more sensitive to case studies trom the developing world, with a recognition 
of the dilTerent characters of 'the state' outside the advanced industrialised world.,66 
In Paync's view, area studies should be brought out of their various 'ghettoes' and be 
re-thought inside international studies, and that these should be connected to the wider 
debate about global political economy.67 
Notwithstanding the limitations noted above, IPE still provides more scope to open up 
disciplinary enclaves and bring in developing countries under its analytic framework. 
The chosen case study in this thesis South Africa and Southern Africa is partly an 
attempt to close this gap. It will not be treated under the rubric of 'area studies', but 
examined within the broader IPE discipline, with generalisable observations. 
1.5 Distinctive Contribution to Theory and Originality of the Research 
This research seeks to make a modest contribution to IPE by bringing in a case study 
from developing regions, in this case Southern Africa, and look at particular ways in 
which state actors contend with the emergent global forces and challenges related to 
domestic economic development. This could in future make a significant contribution 
to comparative regionalisms. By drawing upon the IPE tools this research seeks to 
make a fruitful contribution in the debates on widening the focus of IPE, especially 
6, Shaun Breslin, Area Studies, IR and IPE: Rethinking the Study o/China's International Relations, 
2001, mimeo.; See also Anthony Payne, 'Rethinking Development Inside IPE', In Anthony Payne 
(ed.), The New Regional Politics 0/ Development, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p.22. 
66 Shaun Breslin, op. cit. , p.3. 
67 Anthony Payne, 'The New Political Economy of Area Studies', Millenium Journal 0/ International 
Studies, Volume 27 (2) 1998, p.253. 
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gIven its still largely OEeD-centric thcorisation.68 At a theoretical level this thesis 
proposes some innovation to NRA research agenda, by positing that certain forms of 
regionalism. mainly inter-state, can be studied within a sub-theoretical framework that 
can be characterised as strategic competitive regionalism. 
The specific area of concern in this research which is the interactions between 
domestic forces, regional core states, and multilateral processes is by and large under-
researched. It is also not clear from the existing literature (as will be reviewed in the 
next chapter) how global processes in tum condition the kind of political strategies 
preferred by state actors and expressed through regionalism; and what form of 
regional projects do these give rise to. The literature on New Regionalism Approach 
sometimes suffers from lack of precision on the role of the state. It ranges from 
positions that avoid the state altogether, to those that acknowledge the importance of 
the state but argue that it needs to be transcended, through to strongly 'post-statist' or 
'anti-statist' theorisation that elevates grassroots civil society movements to the same 
level as or above the state. 
The theoretical contribution to the debate that this thesis seeks to make is with regard 
to understanding particular state forms in semi-peripheral or peripheral regions that 
are engaging in regionalisation process within the context of globalisation. It argues 
that given the competitive pressures that these states face and the urge to integrate 
firmly into global markets, these inter-state projects at the regional level are informed 
by strategic competitive consideration. Thus, a particular form of regionalism 
68 See Shaun Breslin, op.cit. The study addresses some of the methodological limitations of IPE in 
understanding case studies from the developing world. 
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approach, building on New Regionalism Approach, could be theoriscd: 'Strategic 
Competitive Regionalism'. This is elaborated in Chapter 2. 
1.6 Research methods 
This dissertation employed a combination of research methods: semi-structured elite 
interviews. archival and documentary research, participation in policy conferences 
and round-tables with government officials and trade policy research community, and 
examination of primary and secondary source material. Information received from 
closed-sessions is difficult to quote directly as most of these were conducted under 
'Chatham House' ruies69, but where permission was obtained from participants 
citations are made. Primary source material includes internal discussion documents 
and reports, and these are cited as 'Confidential' in the bibliography. 
Secondary source material includes official and publicly available reports from 
government departments as well as inter-governmental agencies, for example 
Common Market for Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), Southern African Customs Union (SACU), United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCT AD), African Development Bank 
(AIDB) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Field research was conducted. Government officials, trade consultants, and 
individuals from the research community were interviewed. In total 42 interviews 
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wen: conducted. The /irst field research was undertaken in May 2004 in Switzerland, 
Geneva, and it coincided with the WTO Civil Society Symposium which I attended. 
During this field trip I interviewed trade diplomats from Botswana, Lesotho, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. This included both informal interactions as well as semi-
structured interviews. Most of these were recorded. 
A second field trip was undertaken between July and November 2004. This included 
trips to South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique and Zambia. In these 
countries I interviewed government officials, individuals working in regional 
organisations, in particular SADC, COMESA, and SACU. In Botswana and South 
Africa for example I was able to also interview people from research community who 
are active in trade policy and work closely with government, business and labour. 
Most of the interviews were done in South Africa - the core of my case study. 
Interactions with officials in other countries were mainly with people working in 
regional organisations than with national government officials. 
Some national government officials were interviewed where it was felt their input 
would be valuable in this research, and would complement the data sourced from 
officials working in regional structures. The main reasons for not paying much 
attention to national government officials, with the exception of South African 
government officials, relate first to cost of undertaking a SADC-wide field research, 
covering 14 countries. Second, the focus of this research is on South Africa and 
SADC as a regional framework of cooperation and integration, rather than bilateral 
69 These were explained as meaning that no recording of proceeding for the purpose of publication is 
allowed in order to allow participants to freely experience their views outside the official confines. This 
enables participants, especially government officials to speak outside ofthe official roles. 
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relationships between countries. Some of the interviews are recorded, and some are 
not. Some respondents asked not to be recorded; and in some instances technical 
difTiculties with the tape recorder were encountered. 
The blending of various research methods was designed to ensure depth in sourcing 
data. In addition, the structure of the thesis moves from theory to historical and to 
current chalIenges in regional and multilateral trade relations. An appreciation of the 
complexity of South Africa's regional and multilateral strategies required the 
utilisation of various research approaches. For example, the archival and documentary 
research helped me to trace various stages of SADC's development. This also enabled 
me to map out continuities and discontinuities between the 'old' and 'new' 
regionalism. Participating in some of the closed sessions and high-level seminars with 
government officials and policy experts afforded me a valuable insight into policy 
debates, and ensured familiarity with developments in the sub-region. 
Semi-structured elite interviews, notwithstanding their limitations regarding the 
controlIed environment in which they take place, afforded me an opportunity to 
clarifY some of the research questions and to understand the context in which 
policymakers take decisions and the constraints they face. To a greater extent 
government officials were frank about the issues that I raised during the interviews. 
What also helped was my background in working in a government environment. Thus 
it was with relative ease to find contacts and set up interviews. Preference for elite 
interviews was also motivated by the fact that state actors are principal agents in the 
ongoing regional and multilateral policy processes. The use of this technique was 
more fitting for the issues explored in this thesis. 
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1. 7 Organisation of the Study 
Chapter 2 is a survey of theoretical literature on regionalism, focusing in particular on 
nco-classical or conventional theorising of regionalism, drawing mainly from 
economics discipline; and also examines New Regionalism Approach. It offers a 
critical survey of these approaches and suggests an approach that can best account for 
developments in Southern Africa given existing global competitive imperative. This 
theoretical innovation is characterised as strategic competitive regionalism. 
Chapter 3 sketches the case study background - Southern Africa - and the forces that 
shaped the political consciousness of the region and its continued evolution. Here, 
South Africa's destabilising agenda, its urge to extend political influence over the 
region, and its strategic objective of effective articulation in the international system 
are examined. Continuities from regional relations structured within the apartheid 
social milieu as well as discontinuities in the advent of democratic South Africa are 
looked at. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that the tenuous nature of contemporary regional relations in 
Southern Africa is rooted in the seeds laid by the historical socio-political realities in 
the region. The region has as such not fully transcended realpolitik paradigm which 
was fashioned during this period, and thus retarding a leap from old to new 
regionalism. 
Chapter 4 provides an account of domestic forces that shape South Africa's foreign 
economic strategies, reflected in its global economic strategy which is led mainly by 
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the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The evolution of South Africa's trade 
and industrial policies since the early 1990s and how, with the articulation of global 
forces within the domestic scene. this shaped South Africa's regional and multilateral 
trade strategies will be explored. 
The structural challenges faced by the South African economy as a result of a period 
of declining growth and slow rupture of its accumulation strategy - import-
substitution industrialisation - has primacy in explaining the choice of strategy of the 
new political elite in the early 1990s. This juncture makes for an interesting reading as 
it captures the meeting point between global structural shifts, democratic change 
within South Africa, and emergence of new regional relations. 
Chapter 5 goes on to explore the integration of South Africa in regional relations and 
the emergence of a new framework of regional cooperation and integration. The 
tensions in South Africa's regional strategy become evident as the country seeks to 
reorder regional relations and redefine its own position in the new set of realities in 
the region. The difficulties South Africa contends with in its regional agenda partly 
reflect the structural gap between its economy and those of its neighbouring countries 
as weIl as an overhang from the apartheid era regional tensions. This brings to the 
surface a much larger tension introduced by the globalising forces between old forms 
of regionalism and 'new' regionalism. The examination of the SADC Protocol on 
Trade helps to bring clarity to these sets of relationships and highlight the tensions 
South Africa faces in the region. 
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Building on the themes explored in Chapters 4 and 5, Chapter 6 looks at South 
Afriea's relationship with the sub-region in structuring common positions to engage at 
the multilateral level. Of crucial importance here is that the tensions at the core of 
regional integration - mainly generated by South Africa's structural diversity and its 
differential interests relative to its regional partners - are strongly manifest. The case 
looked at is the relationship between South Africa and SADC/Africa group from 
Seattle Ministerial to the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The linkages 
between chapters 3, 4 and 5, expressed in the interplay between domestic forces, 
regional tensions and multilateral or global challenges are highlighted. 
The conclusion brings together various themes of the research and proposes questions 
for future research, focusing especially on the increasing importance of Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) to South Africa's external trade strategy and the 
gradual encroachment of forces of competitive liberalisation - including the US and 
the EU - in the sub-region, and the implications of this for South Africa's regional 
hegemony and competitive strategies at the global level. 
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CHAPTER 2: New Regionalism Approaches, Nco-classical Perspectives, and 
Strategic Competitive Regionalism. 
Having set out the core argument of the thesis in the previous chapter, stressing South 
Africa's strategic conception of regionalism, this chapter will move on to clarify 
operational concepts and survey relevant theories on regionalism. Given the 
complexity of the theoretical field, and the fact that regionalism cannot be viewed in 
isolation from globalisation and multilateral ism, this chapter concerns itself mainly 
with regionalism and, where necessary, make allusions to other related theoretical 
questions. 
This is important if this chapter is to maintain a sense of coherence and properly 
reflect on the key arguments advanced in this thesis. There are two main theories that 
will be reviewed here: orthodox economics perspectives and new regionalism 
approach. A third ideal-type analytic framework - strategic competitive regionalism -
will be proposed to improve on the limitations of existing theories. It is argued here 
that this theoretical schema is more efficacious in understanding inter-state regionalist 
projects that are under-girded by particular forms of state-society relationships. 
It should also be pointed out that there are views that do not necessarily fall into either 
of the two main approaches identified. One that will also be briefly looked at is 
associated with Manuel Castells and betrays a great deal of scepticism towards 
regionalisation. It puts emphasis on 'multi-layered and networked production 
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structure' in place of regionalisation, and strongly argues that in the face of the global 
economy rcgionalisation has dissolved.' 
This chapter is structured into five sections. The second looks at the evolution of the 
concept of regionalism and traces its genealogy. The third section sketches out the 
conceptual definition of regionalism and regionalisation, and summarises various 
theoretical approaches to understanding these concepts. Building on this, the 
subsequent sections examine in turn these theoretical approaches and their 
explanation of the substantive expression of regionalism and its relationship with 
wider global processes. The fourth section surveys the orthodox approaches to 
regionalism. 
The fifth section critically examines New Regionalism Approach (NRA), which is an 
IPE sub-field. Although it is a fledging analytic tool, it has introduced important 
innovations to the study of regions. This, it will be argued, differs from the orthodox 
approaches in that it is more eclectic and open minded in its approach to 
regionalisation and globalisation. It views regionalisation as intricately linked to 
world orders and provide a useful understanding of how regions are constituted. 
Furthermore, the NRA transcends the state and identifies other actors that are 
increasingly playing an important role in defining regions. For example, rather than 
looking only at formal processes, it also examines issues related to cross-border 
informal activities, migration flows, region-wide civil society networks, security and 
development; as well as interrelationships between these. 
I Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, (Oxford: Blackwells, 2000). 
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This thesis does not however claim that each of these paradigms is monolithic or 
perfect in themselves. On the contrary, as will be shown in this chapter, they are 
characterised by various contradictory strands and weaknesses. While drawing 
heavily on the NRA approach, much of the thesis is informed by case study and 
empirical policy experiences. Theory is therefore used not as a total explanatory 
instrument. Rather, it is employed to cast light on the case study. 
Building on the NRA, the sixth section will thus propose that state-led regionalist 
processes are fruitfully examined by comprehending strategic and competitive 
dynamics that articulate themselves within states, setting off competitive impulses 
that are then funnelled through state agencies and regionalisation processes. In this 
regard, contemporary state-led regionalism could best be characterised as strategic 
competitive regionalism. This approach, though constructed on the theoretical 
foundation of NRA, also draws from Cerny's concept of 'Competition State', 
developmental state approaches, as well as from Strategic Trade Theories.2 
The choice of this analytic framework conceptualisation is in part influenced by the 
equal weight this thesis gives to theory and empirical research. Furthermore, as 
argued in this thesis, there is a relationship between the strategic behaviour of state 
actors, the appropriation of the regional space by the elite to respond to the processes 
of globalisation for reasons that mainly have to do with the domestic economic 
interests, the linkage between state elite strategies to deal with domestic social 
2 For a comprehensive survey of strategic trade theories, see Paul Krugman (ed.), Strategic Trade 
Policy and the New International Economics, (London: MIT Press, 1986); and Jeffrety A. Hart and 
Aseem Prakash, ·Strategic Trade and Investment Policies: Implications for the Study of International 
Political Economy', The World Economy, Volume 20(4), July 1997. 
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challenges and competitive pressures generated by the globalisation process, and the 
increasing elevation of trade and industrial strategies as instruments of development. 
There is therefore a great deal of complementarity between vanous theoretical 
paradigms that are concerned with the sets of issues highlighted above: These do not 
often communicate efficaciously to yield a better organising framework to 
understanding state-driven regionalisation processes in the context of increasing 
globalisation and persistent development challenges in developing regions or 
countries. Strategic Competitive Regionalism - as set out in this thesis - is an attempt 
at evolving an organising analytic tool that could be employed to improve our 
understanding of the relationship between the domestic, regional and global level 
processes (see discussion below). Hence the choice of strategic trade perspectives, 
competition state theory, developmental state theories, and new regionalism approach 
as constituting a controlled 'eclectic' analytic framework. 
2.1 Regionalism: The Genealogy of a Concept 
The concept of new regionalism refers to the phenomenon which has been on the 
increase in the post-Cold War era, where a number of regionally organised economies 
began to shape the contours of the world economy and deepened cooperation at the 
regional or sub-regional level. It is a paradigm through which state actors have come 
to view their countries' position in the world economy, and a strategic positioning to 
deal with a range of challenges pertinent in particular regions, including those to do 
with economic development. Explanations that have been offered to make sense of 
regionalism are varied. 
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It is worth reiterating that regionalism is not a novel development. To be sure, it has 
been around for over five decades. Although its lineage can be traced back to the 
Zollverein, \vhich was a German Customs Union in the 19th Century, formed among 
18 small states and was intended at creating Germany's nation-state, 3 regionalism was 
not fully formed until the initial seeds of the European Union were laid in the 1950s.4 
In Africa too, the first signs of regionalism could be traced back to the establishment 
of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) anchored in South Africa's political 
dominance in 1910; but this was never fully legitimated until 1969 when it was a 
fully-fledged contractual arrangement among sovereign states. 
These developments were, by and large, part of the first wave of regionalism that was 
highly politically driven and inward looking. There is no doubt that there have been 
continuities between this phase and the current phase of regionalism. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, the mid-1980s witnessed the emergence of a second wave of regionalism 
and this coincided with - if not reinforced by - the ruptures that took place in the 
world system with the eclipse of the Cold War and the emergence ofa unipolar world 
defined strongly by neo-liberal paradigm. The impact this temporal shift had in 
defining the contours of contemporary regionalism has indeed been remarkable. The 
end of the Cold War also unshackled Europe from Cold War bipolar tensions, 
3 See Friedrich List, The Natural System of Political Economy, (Translated and Edited by W.O. 
Henderson) (London: Frank Cass, 1837/1983), p.45; See also Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading 
Blocs in the ""orld Economic System, (Washington D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 
p'l's Frankel has noted. the formation of the European Economic Community in 1958 was stimulated 
by a desire to ensure pe~anen~ peac~ in Europe; it ~as an essentially politically-driven project with 
political and security consideratIOn at Its heart, and thiS was further succoured by the US. See, Jeffrey 
A Frankel, op.cit .. p.5. 
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bringing into sharp relief centrifugal forces, and propelled the EU into becoming a 
global actor in its own right. 'i 
These developments also ensured that the EU would export a particular brand of 
regionalism and. as it were, seek to create the world after its own image. According to 
Frankel, the EC project as it advanced in the early 1990s after the Maastricht Treaty 
had a demonstrative effect on other parts of the world.6 Established on nco-liberal 
foundations, the European regionalist project moved ahead to become an experiment 
that would be followed by most regions around the world. Although this was initially 
lauded as a template that could be used by countries seeking to advance towards 
regionalisation, it has presented difficulties for other regions, and foreclosed the space 
to creatively advance different forms of regionalism. 
Furthermore, it has also created rigidities for theoretical analysis into other regions. 
Observers were stuck with the EU template and every other region was seen as its 
reflection in the making. Breslin and Higgott have bemoaned the institutionalisation 
of Europe as 'one of the major obstacles to the development of analytic and 
theoretical comparative studies of regional integration.' 7 
However, it is important to stress that Europe, notwithstanding its limitations, has 
been an important temporal landmark in the genesis of regionalism, and has 
5 Bjorn Hettne. 'Europe: Paradigm and Paradox'. In Michael Shulz, Frederik Soderbaum and Joakim 
Ojendal, Regionafi=ation in a Globali=ing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and 
Processes, (London: Zed Books, 2001), p.29. 
6 Jeffrey A. Frankel, op.cit., pA. 
7 Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott. 'Learning from the Old, Constructing the New', New Polith-al 
Economy. Volume 5 (2) 2000, p.243. 
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intlucnccd thinking on rcgionalisms in other parts of the world. Competitive 
implications of this development have been extensively analysed by Lester Thurow.8 
In pointing to the evolution of the current regionalist processes, Fawcett and Hurrel 
have noted for example that: 
'The political salience of regionalism rose significantly as a result of 
developments within Europe (the EC decision to press ahead with the 
completion of the Single Market, the negotiation of the Maastricht 
Treaty, and enlargement of the EU towards Scandinavia and Central 
Europe); the successful negotiation and ratification of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A); and the increased 
momentum of cooperative efforts with ASEAN and continuing 
discussions with the Asia-Pacific region over new economic and 
security arrangements (APEC, PECC, ARF).9 
New Regionalism as articulated in Shulz refers to 'a phenomenon, still in the making, 
that began to emerge in the 1980s, starting in Europe with the White Paper and the 
8 Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America, 
(New York: Warner Books, 1992), pp.67-111. Thurow argues that this will sharpen competitiveness 
between North America, Europe and Japan, introducing more barriers to entry in to the European 
market. A counter-perspective is offered by Kenichi Ohmae. He dismisses the notion of national 
frontiers as constituting barriers to international economic transactions. See, Kenichi Ohmae, The 
Imvisible Continent: Four Strategic Imperatives of the New Economy, (London: Nicholas Brealey, 
2000), pp.4-5. 
Q Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organi=ation and 
International Order, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.I-2; See also Kym Anderson and 
Richard Blackhurst, 'Introduction and Summary', In Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds.), 
Regional Integration and the Global Trading System, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp.1-
2. 
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Single European Act. and gradually turning into a truly world wide phenomenon.' JO 
They further note the following as factors that influenced the emergence of new 
. I' 11 reglOna Ism: 
• Shift from bipolarity to muItipolarity, or perhaps tripolar structure centred 
around the EU, NAFTA and the Asia Pacific, with a new division of 
power and division of labour. 
• The relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a more 
permissive attitude on the part of the US towards regionalism. 
• The restructuring of the nation-state and the growth of interdependence, 
transnationalisation and globalisation. 
• Recurrent fears over the stability of the multilateral trading order and 
growing new protectionism. 
• The changed attitudes toward (neoliberal) economic development and 
political systems in the developing countries as well as in the post-
communist countries. 
Hettne's original conceptualisation of the evolution of regionalism also emphasised 
similar markers. According to Hettne, regionalism and 'multipolarity' are 'two sides 
of the same coin'; and whilst the old regionalism was created from above by the 
superpowers', the new evolve spontaneously from within states and other actors. 12 He 
10 Michael Shulz. Frederik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, 'Introduction: A Framework for 
Understanding Regionalization', In Michael Shulz, Frederik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, 
Regionali=ation in a Globali:ing If'orld: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes, 
(London: Zed Books, 2001), p.3. 
II ibid. 
12 Bjorn Hettne, 'Globalization and the new Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation', In Bjorn 
Hettne, Andras Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 1999), pp.7-8. 
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further notes that the old regionalism was inward-looking and protectionist m 
orientation and the new regionalism is 'open', and compatible with the interdependent 
world economy.13 It needs to be stated that, even though at a broader level, this is 
undoubtedly the case, there are still many variations across countries regarding how 
transition is made from old regionalism to the new forms. In a word, there cannot be a 
uniform path towards regionalism. While advanced countries would seem to have 
undergone a decisive transformation towards mature region structures, the same 
cannot be said of developing regions. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has struggled and is still struggling to make this transformation. 
As suggested in Chapter 1, regionalism here can thus be characterised as still in a state 
of flux. As Grugel and Hout explain, ' ... the structural contexts in which regions are 
being built are different, the capacities of states vary and different social coalitions 
push for the adoption of regionalist policies. Hence the outcomes are very different 
indeed.' 14 
This is not to suggest a linear evolution through various stages to conform to a 
particular image of completeness. Rather, it highlights the difficulties the majority of 
African countries experience in responding to the new global challenges and the fact 
that their regionalist processes still carry the imprints of the Cold War era, and are 
13 See also Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, 'Conclusion: The New Regionalism', In Andrew 
Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order, (London: Macmillan, 1996), p.251; 
Jean Grugel and Wil Hout, 'Regions, Regionalism and the South', In Jean Grugel and Wil Hout (eds.), 
Regionalism Across the North-South Divide: State Strategies and Globali=ation, (London: Routledge, 
1999), pp.1 0-11, they argue that regionalism has become 'a way of adapting to the new liberalism and 
is often described as 'open regionalism', in order to mark the contrast with the closed nature of the old 
regionalism in the 1960s ... ' 
14 Jean Grugel and Wil Hout, 'Regions, Regionalism and the South', In Jean Grugel and Wil Hout 
(eds.), Regionalism Across the North-South Divide: State Strategies and Globalbation, (London: 
Routledge, 1999), p.11. 
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highly statist in expression. This is evident for example when looking at the case of 
Southern Africa (Chapters 3 and 5). Although Bjorn ~1ettne's characterisation of these 
differences is hroad enough it, however, fails to account for unique set of experiences, 
especially the proportion between continuities and discontinuities in some regions. 
Another interesting take on regionalism is that offered by Helge Hveem. In looking at 
the evolution of regionalism, Hveem places emphasis on ideational and institutional 
factors, and argues that neo-utilitarian perspectives which give undue weight on the 
force of globalisation on regionalism are inadequate. 15 He contends that beyond 
maximisation of utility by governments there are also collective action problems 
conditioned by issues related to identity or conscious (political) construction of 
regions. 16 In this sense, there is really no pre-determined format to which regions 
would conform as they evolve; but the unique set of challenges countries collectively 
perceive may serve to spark the emergence of a region. 
Another approach that goes beyond merely describing outward differences between 
the old and new regionalisms, but examines substantive policy shifts, is articulated by 
Mistry. He identifies six signifiers of new regionalism - and these constitute a 
qualitative difference between the new and old regionalism l7 : involves greater 
diversity among members; have an outward orientation; go beyond liberalisation in 
goods to include liberalisation in services, investment, technical and regulatory 
standards; strive to attain global competitiveness of the region concerned as well as 
15 Helge Hveem, 'Explaining the Regional Phenomenon In an Era of Globalization', In Richard Stubbs 
and Geoffrey R D Underhill, (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 2000), p.71. 
16 Helge Hveem, 'Explaining the Regional Phenomenon In an Era of Globalization', In Richard Stubbs 
and Geoffrey R D Underhill, (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p.71. 
17 Percy S. Mistry, 'New Regionalism and Economic Development', In Fredrik Soderbaum and 
Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), pp.120-121. 
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that of individual members; have already undertaken significant unilateral 
liberalisation; and increasingly involve North-South memberships. 
What all these perspectives emphasise is the multidimensionality and complexity of 
regionalisms, and that it is difficult to muster a precise analysis of shifts associated 
with this trend as it assumes multiple forms and, at times, proceed from different 
sources. Southern Africa, in embryonic form, exhibits some of the characteristics set 
out by Mistry. The state actors at the regional level seek to facilitate the 
competitiveness of domestic firms in larger regional markets 'thus improving 
prospects for capturing a larger market share in the global economy.' 18 South Africa, 
the core state within the region, exhibits these tendencies more strongly than other 
countries. 
One factor that is increasingly becoming clear is that the resurgence of regionalism 
cannot be viewed independently from the changing global system. The two are inter-
linked. A focus on intra-regional dynamics, as Fawcett and Hurrel have noted, would 
be insufficient. J9 Hence this research is concerned with not just intra-regional 
dynamics but also with global level cooperation exemplified by engagements at the 
multilateral trading system (see Chapter 6). 
18 Percy S. Mistry, op.cit .. p.122. 
19 Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, op.cit .. p.3. 
51 
2.2 Conceptual Definition 
In dclining regionalism. Hettne lays stress on its subjective essence as opposed to 
proceeding from a priori definition. In other words there are no existing physical 
configurations that should construct an understanding of what a 'region' is or should 
be. Using Anderson's notion of imagined communities, he argues that like nations, 
regions 'also possess a subjective quality and can consequently be seen as 'imagined 
communities.'20 Similarly, Grugel and Hout contend that 'regions are made and re-
made. and their membership and frontiers are decided through political and 
ideological struggle and the conscious strategies of states and social actors. ,21 
Although the NRA carries a strong appeal for theory construction, especially in terms 
of broadening our understanding of how regions come into existence, it needs to be 
pointed out that regions do not emerge from empty spaces. Existing regions or 
geographic configurations can - and indeed should - be taken as starting points, 
although not the only starting points, in thinking about emergence of new regions. 
It is also important that a too strong a distinction is not made between regions as 
socially or politically constructed and the physical spaces within which they are 
constructed. For example, geographic contiguity may act to engender a regional social 
consciousness, and could also lay a basis for identifying common challenges or 
prospects for cooperation. As will be shown later, Hettne's approach does give some 
recognition to the physical spaces especially in the first phases of 'regioness', 
however too much emphasis still tends to be placed on social spaces. 
20 Bjorn Henne, op.cil .. 1999, p.9. 
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What is distinct though about much of the NRA literature, and therein lies one of its 
theoretical strengths. is the weight it places on human agency rather than on some pre-
figured structure. By so doing, this perspective draws out the ideational and inter-
subjective meaning of what constitutes a region - a view which is lacking in orthodox 
economics approaches or International Relations (IR) approaches. It is important 
though. in the context of this study, to reiterate that existing structures do not lose 
their importance, but that the explanatory power lies more in the subjective or the 
meaning for which regionalism is intended. 
2.2.1 Levels of Regional Identity 
In further setting out the NRA theoretical framework on understanding the evolution 
of regions and their mutations over time, Hettne points to five levels of regioness.22 
The first is a regional space which is a geographic area, delimited by more or less 
natural barriers. Here, territory is a key signifier. The second level is what he calls a 
regional complex, which captures widening trans-local interactions between human 
groups and exhibits a sense of instability and the need for band-wagoning to avert 
external threats. The balance of power in an anarchical order is the assumed reality. 
The third level is a regional security, and this can evolve spontaneously and can 
encapsulate various dimensions, including cultural, security or political. This can be 
both formal and informal, and could, for example, be sparked by porous borders or 
21 Jean Grugel and Wil Hout, op.cit .. p.9. 
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emerge as a response to potential or existing resource conflicts in neighbouring 
countries. The fourth is a regional colI/llllmily, and this would have a formal structure 
and an organised framework and could reflect convergence in areas such as security 
arrangements. economic policies and political regimes. The last is a re~i()nal 
institutionalised poli(v. This level has 'a more fixed structure of decision-making and 
stronger actor capability.' This could be characterised as a relatively mature level of 
region development, and is exemplified by the EU. 
There is no singular way of understanding regions as these are immanently complex 
and multidimensional and vary in their expressions. In defining a region Boas et al 
emphasise the social space and suggest that the region contains multiple processes, 
ideas, actors and identities.23 Shaw e/ al caution against viewing regionalism only 
'through the lenses of Euro-centric integration theory. ,24 Similarly, Shulz e/ al suggest 
that ·there are no 'natural' or 'given' regions, but these are constructed, deconstructed 
and reconstructed - intentionally or non-intentionally - in the process of global 
transformation, by collective human action and identity formation. ,25 
22 Bjorn Hettne, 'The New Regionalism Revisited', In Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), 
Theories a/Sew Regionalism, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p.29 
23 Morten Boas, Marianne H. Marchand and Timothy M. Shaw, 'The Weave-World: The Regional 
Interweaving of Economics, Ideas and Identities', In Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), 
Theories of.Vel\' Regionalism, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p.201. 
24 Timothy M. Shaw, Frederik Soderbaum, Julius E. Nyang'oro and J. Andrew Grant, 'The Future of 
New Regionalism in Africa: Regional Governance, Human SecuritylDeveIopment and Beyond', In 
J.Andrew Grant and Frederik Soderbaum (eds.), The New Regionalism in Africa, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2003), p.193. 
25 Michael Shulz, Frederik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, op.cit., p.14. 
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2.2.2 IJc/inil iOlls 
The distinction between regionalism and rcgionalisation is now broadly accepted in 
the literature. Regionalism is largely considered to refer to formalised regions with 
formally agreed membership and boundaries that emerge as a result of 
intergovernmental dialogues and treaties. While such formal regions will necessarily 
encompass some form of institutionalisation, there is no conception that a specific 
form of institutionalisation is required to qualifY as a 'proper' region. Rather, the 
interest is in what factors explain the wide variations in the institutional level of 
. ~o 
regIons. 
The notion that regionalism captures 'the body of ideas, values and concrete 
objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying the provision of 
security and wealth, peace and development within a region: the urge by any set of 
actors to organise along a particular regional space', lies at the core of New 
Regionalism Approach.27 Hurrell suggests that, regions 'are socially constructed and 
hence politically contested.'28 This fits in well with the NRA perspective of 
understanding regions as shifting, not yet complete, and in the process of 
construction. A thick yet concise definition of regionalism is offered by Hveem. He 
defines regionalism as: 
26 See Andrew Hurrell, 'Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism', Review of International Studies 
21(4),1995, p.332. 
27 Michael Schulz, Frederik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, op.cit., p.5. 
28 Andrew Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', In Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, 
Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organi=ation and International Order, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p.38-39. 
55 
' ... the body of ideas promoting an identified geographical or social 
space as the regional project. Or it is the presence or the conscious 
construction of an identity that represents one specific region. It is 
usually associated with a policy programme (goals to be achieved) and 
strategy (means and mechanisms by which goals should be reached), 
and it normally leads to institution building. ,29 
This definition accords importance to both geographical and social spaces. The 
existing geographies could spark an urge towards regioness more so if contiguity 
reflects convergence on variables such as language, culture, shared political and 
economic objectives and so forth. A more state-centric view of regionalism is offered 
by Milner and Mansfield. They highlight the importance of factors such as geographic 
proximity, cultural affinity, shared political objectives, economic ties, and shared 
historical bonds.3D 
In terms of how this works out in concrete or empirical terms, Milner and Mansfield 
would suggest that regionalism is a result of the preferences of national policy 
makers, strength of domestic institutions, power relations and multilateral 
institutions.3 ] In this sense, institutions, preferences and interests as well as power 
dynamics are important variables. Preferential trading arrangements would in this 
29 Helge Hveem, op.cit., p.72; See also Morten Boas, Marianne H. Marchand and Timothy M. Shaw, 
'The Weave-World: The Regional Interweaving of Economies, Ideas and Identities', In 29 Fredrik 
Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 
p.201. 
JO Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner V, 'The New Wave of Regionalism', International 
Organi=ation, Volume 53 (3), Summer 1999, p.592; Jeffrey Frankel also identifies some of these 
factors, especially cultural ties or language as having some importance in encouraging trading relations 
between different countries. See Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic 
System, (Washington D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1997). 
31 ibid. 
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VII':\\ he the concrete expression of regionalism. These are, according to Milner and 
Mansfield. cnten.:d into by state actors in order to lock in liberal economIc and 
political reforms.':' So. the emphasis here is on the domestic sources of regionalism 
and rational choices state actors make in international economic relations. 
This thesis agrees with Gamble and Payne's view of regionalism as a state-led project 
'designed to reorganise a particular regional space along defined economic and 
political lines.'33 Similarly, Grugel and Hout, focusing on regions in peripheral areas, 
concur with this approach as they conceptualise regionalism as a 'states-led' project 
and that it forms part of 'conscious state strategies for development.'34 At a more 
narrowly defined level - and in the sense used in this thesis - regionalism could be 
viewed as a strategic instrument used by state actors to gain competitive advantage in 
global markets and project influence at the global level. State actors are defined here 
simply as government elites, state's political representatives or agencies sanctioned by 
government through legal or quasi-legal processes and negotiate internationally or 
regionally de jure as state representatives. 
While regionalism refers to the form, regionalisation refers to the process by which 
societies and economies become integrated - particularly but not only in the economic 
sphere. Perhaps the best definition comes from Vayrynen, who argues that: 'the 
process of regionalisation fills the region with substance such as economic 
interdependence, institutional ties, political trust, and cultural belonging. ,35 Such 
32 ibid.. p. 605. 
33 Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, 'Conclusion: The New Regionalism', In Andrew Gamble and 
Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order, (London: Macmillan, 1996), p.2. 
34 Jean Grugel and Wil Hout, op.cit., pp.l0-11. 
35 Raimo Vayrynen, 'Regionalism: Old and New', International Studies Review. Volume 5, 2003, p.39. 
57 
regionalisatilln and economic integration in particular can occur without the creation 
of formal political regionalism. They arc 'regions without prescribed or proscribed 
borders' ill hased on 'transnational flows and networks,37 rather than cartography and 
political borders.'x 
Here the example of economic integration in East Asia is instructive, as 
regionalisation has not only taken place without regionalism, with 'Virtually no 
commercial agreements ... among East Asian countries prior to the mid-l 990s,39, and 
has been relatively unhindered by the political rivalries across the Taiwanese Straits, 
In this case regionalism followed growing economic ties initiated by market agents 
through increased exports and cross-border investment, forming what Yergin and 
Stanislaw characterise as 'a new regional integrated economy.'40 
2.3 Conventional Approaches to Regionalism 
Concerns about the status of multilateralism during the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations are often cited as having led to the elevation of the importance of 
regionalism. Economists and Liberal Institutionalists, in particular, have been the 
most worried in this regard. When these debates emerged, close to the end of the 
1980s, regionalism in policy circles was initially cast in terms as either as a stumbling 
36 Ash Amin, 'Regions unbound: towards new politics and place'm Geografiska Annaler B, Volume 86 
(1). 2004, p.34. 
37 ibid. p.31. 
38 Manuel Castells. op. cit. 
39 Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner V, 'The New Wave of Regionalism', International 
Organi;ation, Volume 53 (3), Summer 1999, p.598. 
40 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw. The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government 
and the Market Place that is Remaking the Modern World. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 
pp.188-192. 
58 
bloc or as a spur for progress at the multilateral level or Insurance In case the 
multilateral s~ stem fails . .J1 
2.3.1. Stepping Slone/Building Bloc Debale 
The stepping stone/stumbling bloc metaphor was introduced in the debates when it 
was feared that the US was marching away from multilateralism and recoiling 
inwardly. The regionalist option was initially associated with the declining hegemonic 
clout of the US and its frustration at the inability to achieve its parochial objectives 
via the multilateral route. In addition, the multilateral route increasingly represented 
intrusion into its economic space than the US was willing to countenance. It then 
began negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with Canada in the mid-1980s, and this 
later included Mexico and was inaugurated as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992, with the ratification process taking almost two years to 
.p 
complete .• 
To examine these perspectives further, it is important to highlight the key concerns of 
the orthodox approaches. These approaches take preferential trading arrangements, 
including Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Customs Unions as main signifiers of 
regionalism. By October 2004, the recorded number of existing preferential trade 
41 See Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, op.cil., p.1; Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst, 
'Introduction and Summary', In Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds.), Regional Integration 
and the Global Trading System, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pA; Jaime de Melo and 
Arvind Panagariya, 'Introduction', In Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in 
Regional Integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pA. 
42 John G. Ruggie. Winning the Peace: America and the World Order in the New Era, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996), p.129. 
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agreements (PTAs) notified to the WTO were said to have reached a 300 mark.43 
Some view the existence of these PTAs and customs unions in zero-sum terms in 
relation to the multilateral trading system (see below). 
In the multilateral trading system there has always been a difficult accommodation 
between free trade proponents that place emphasis on unilateral liberalisation or 
liberalising multilaterally and proponents of managed trade. The latter group is wary 
of merely liberalising for the sake of it and to pay homage to the ideology of free 
trade. but considers domestic environment as an organising rationale for any choice of 
strategy. Such approaches. in some shapes exhibiting a barely veiled mercantilism, 
have mutated into strategic theory perspectives44 (see discussion below). 
One example of the difficult accommodation between ideological free traders and 
'strategic' traders in the multilateral trading system is expressed in the derogations 
afforded Free Trade Areas (FTAs), including customs union. This exception to the 
most-favoured nation's (MFN) rule is formalised in GATT article XXIV.45 According 
to Article XXIV, FTAs and customs unions are to liberalise 'substantially all trade'; 
. b . I' 46 and that these should not raIse arners to extema partIes. 
43 World Trade Organisation, Report by the Consultative Board 10 the Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpalwdi: Thefuture (I(the W70, (Geneva: World Trade Organisation, 2004), p.21. 
44 David J. Richardson, 'The political economy of strategic trade policy', International Organization, 
44 (I) Winter 1990. 
45 The MFN rule is based on the principle of non-discrimination. In its simple application it means that 
when a country extends concessions to one partner it must extend them to all. This is one of the 
cardinal principles of the multilateral trading system. Preferential trading arrangements are by 
definition contradictory to this principle. 
46 Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst, op.cit., p.ll; see also Jeffrey A. Frankel, op.cil .. p.3 for a 
summary of the debates surrounding Article XXIV. 
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These arrangements were given special exceptions with the view that on the whole 
thc\' \\ mIld he less discriminatory and would act to facilitate trade.47 The barriers to 
- -
the outside world \\ ould either remain the same as before these arrangements were 
established or be reduced. 4x It has long been recognised that this article is overlaid 
with ambiguities and amenable to abuse as it potentially provides a loophole for 
protectionism behind FT A barriers. In the 1990s it has also raised the spectre of 'new 
protectionism' on 'behind the border' non-tariff measures. 
Bhagwati has been one of the prominent critics of regionalism amongst orthodox 
economists. He sees the current wave of regionalism as likely to endure, and that its 
main driving force is 'the conversion of the United States, hitherto an abstaining 
party, to Article XX1V:49 He looks at preferential trade arrangements mainly from 
two angles. The first regards those between developed economies and developing 
countries (North-South); and the second are those among developing countries 
(South-South). He sees the latter as largely innocuous as it does not have much effect 
on the world's economic welfare. It is the latter (North-South) that he is more critical 
f 50 o. 
Taking this argument forward, Bhagwati and Panagariya contend that 'weak states 
may agree to specific demands of strong states, in ways that are not exactly optimal 
47 World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.26. 
48 Jagdish Bhagwati, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview', In Jaime de Melo and Arvind 
Panagariya (eds.), Sell' Dimensions in Regional Integration, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp.25-27; John G. Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and the World Order in the New Era, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p.130. 
49 Jagdish Bhagwati. op.cit .. 1993, p.29; See also Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, 'Introduction', 
In Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.6. 
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from the roint of \'iew of the economic efficiency of the world trading systcm.'51 
Bhag\\ati and Panagariya's main concern is with thc distortionary effects of these 
agreements on thc outcomcs of the multilateral trade negotiations.52 
Furthennore. Bhagwati and Panagariya use the notion of 'dynamic time-path 
question to analyse the relationship between regionalism and multilateral ism. This 
examines whether the dynamic effect of the PTA is to accelerate or decelerate the 
continued reduction of trade barriers towards world wide liberalisation.53 Elsewhere, 
Bhagwati points out that the expansion of regionalism creates a 'spaghetti bowl' 
phenomenon characterised by multiplicity of PT As with high trade barriers against 
third parties and that these could dilute the multilateral trading regime.54 
In their conclusion of its overall effect, Bhagwati and Panagariya argue that 
regionalism through PTAs tend to favour the interests of the 'hegemons' and reduces 
c: 55 
rather than enhance wellare. 
In a recent report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General of the WTO, 
Supachai Panitchpakadi, some of Bhagwati's arguments are forcefully restated. The 
report is extremely cautionary about PT As, suggesting that some of their agendas 
50 Jagdish Bhagwati. op.cit .. 1993, p.29; See also Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya, 'Introduction', 
In Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds.), Nell' Dimensions in Regional Integration, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, \993), p.6. 
51 Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, 'Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism -
Strangers, Friends, or Foes?', In Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, eds., The Economics of 
Preferential Trade Agreements, (Washington D.C: The AEI Press, 1996), p.43. 
52 ibid .• p.44. 
53 ibid. 
54 Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, In Jagdish Bhagwati 
and Anne O. Krueger (eds.), The Dangerous Drift to Preferntial Trade Agreements, (America 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Washington D.C., 1995), pp.2-3. 
55 Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, op.cit, 
62 
'might lead the WTO to a wrong direction:~6 The Consultative Board, chaired by 
Peter Sutherland (Chairman of Goldman Sachs International and former WTO 
Oircctor-Ciencral). has Bhagwati as one of its members. 
The report argues that. 'the administration of these schemes [PT As] is complicated, 
Preferential origin rules are complex and inconsistent.' Quoting former South Africa's 
Minister of Trade and Industry. Alec Erwin, the report goes further to argue that the 
costs arising out of preferential arrangements 'are particularly onerous for small 
corporations and traders, and hence for the developing countries. ,57 
The strong objections of the Bhagwati camp is to some degree understandable, 
especially where the economic welfare of smaller countries is at stake and they are 
subjected to interplays of power. PT As are generally exclusive. They distribute 
benefits to those inside and discriminate against outsiders. Central to PTAs is tariff 
reduction for the benefit of members, and this may advantage domestic firms that 
compete with firms outside the integrating area for imports. External barriers remain 
high while intra-regional barriers are reduced. The effect is diversion of trade which 
benefits politically powerful industries and disadvantages consumers. Hence these 
initiatives are generally regarded as 'second best' compared to multilateral 
~6 World Trade Organisation, op.cit., 2004, p.19. 
q Alec Erwin, quoted in World Trade Organisation, Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-
General Supachai Panitchpakadi: Thefuture of the WTO, (Geneva: World Trade Organisation, 2004), 
p.22. 
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lihcralisation.'H They liheralise commerce amongst members, but discriminate against 
third parties.''! 
On the benetit side of FT As. Mansfield and Milner point out that they can positivc\y 
influence terms of trade in relation to the rest of the world and also help to realise 
scale econom ies that may attract regional production. Furthermore, these can also 
induce members to undertake and consolidate economic reforms.60 The argument that 
regional integration can serve to lock in domestic policy reforms and guarantee 
credibility has been received sceptically by Bhagwati. He contends, for example, that 
regional integration does not guarantee credibility to domestic policy reforms any 
. . I' d 61 more than a country s economic po ICY oes. 
A different approach to preferential trading arrangements is offered by Baldwin. He 
disputes the standard view that the main trigger for regionalism was frustration with 
multilateralism. He points to empirical evidence of US flirtation with bilateral deals 
dating back to the 1970s with a series of attempts at courting Canada.62 He further 
notes that in 1979 a study on North American FT As was mandated by the US 
Congress. and the report that was produced in 1981 'recommended that further 
bilateral liberalisation with Canada and Mexico be explored.'63 Later on, Canada 
58 Robert Z. Lawrence, 'Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration: Changing Paradigms for 
Developing Countries'. In Goddard Roe C, Cronin Patrick and Kishore Dash C (eds.), International 
Political Economy: State-.\farket Relations in a Changing Global Order, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2002), p.407. 
W Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, op.cit., p.592; Jagdish Bhagwati, op.cit., p.1-2. 
60 Mansfield ED and Milner HV, op.cit., pp.593-595. 
61 Bhagwati. op.cit., p.7. 
62 Richard E. Baldwin, 'The Causes of Regionalism', The World Economy, Volume 20(7), November 
1997, p.876. 
63 ibid. 
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initiated the LS-CanaJa I·TA. and Mexico initiated the Mexico-US FTA which finally 
Ilis theoretical innovation within orthodoxy approach in looking at regionalism is 
captured in what he characterises as a 'domino theory'. Baldwin proposes that 
regionalism has taken a domino form, in which the 'idiosyncratic incidents of 
regionalism triggered a multiplier effect that knocked down bilateral import barriers 
like a row of dominoes:65 What this simply means is that the formation of regional 
trade blocs triggers excluded countries to seek inclusion, especially as benefits of 
trade and investment diversion accrue to existing members. 
According to Baldwin this generates two effects: it could either open up the regional 
bloc to excluded members; or, if it remains closed to outsiders, may spark preferential 
trading arrangements amongst excluded countries.66 In his view, regionalism could 
exist side by side with the multilateral trade regime and without in any way 
threatening it. Baldwin also suggests that 'regionalism may be a powerful force for 
multilateral trade Iiberalisation', and that it constitutes 'half of the trade liberalisation 
'wheel' that has been rolling towards global free trade since 1958.'67 
The other seemingly less alarmist perspectives on the relationship between 
regionalism and multilateralism, have been advanced by Srinivasan et al. Although 
they regard concerns over the negative impact of regionalism on the global economy 
b4 ibid.. p.884; See also Jeffrey A. Frankel, Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System, 
(Washington D.C: Institute for International Economics, 1997), pp.6-7. 
65 ibid. .. p.877. 
bO See ihid.. pp.877-878. 
67 ibid.. pp.885 - 886. 
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as mt:rbIO\\ n. tht:ir conclusion is also somewhat apocalyptic about the future. 
Srinivasan ('/ u/ argut: that nt:w regionalism 'indicates a movement towards weakened 
multilateral discipline. \\ ith threats of global trade wars and impaired economic 
. . I d d II . ,68 performancc 01 exc u e sma er countrIes. 
Srinivasan £'1 al however concede that, ' ... although RIA [Regional Integration 
Arrangemcnts] is not first best for the world, as trade impediments between the region 
and the rest of the world remain, it may still be optimal for countries in the region.'69 
This proposition could be regarded as a middle-ground view in the debate on whether 
regionalism is a stumbling bloc or a stepping stone to multilateralism. In its extreme 
expression. the question. as Ruggie has observed, is framed in ways that suggests that 
regionalism would cast the shadow of the 1930s protectionism over the future of 
multilateral ism in trade.70 
Rather than vicwing regional integration arrangements in a one-dimensional view as 
either leading to positive or negative outcomes, Srinivasan et al place emphasis on the 
intent of these arrangements. 71 Ruggie adds that these are all embarked on to liberalise 
dimensions that are not yet part of the global trading arrangements, for example 
intellectual property and investment accords.72 Ruggie's view fits neatly with the 
notion of WTO-plus credited to the former Treasury Under-Secretary in Clinton's 
68 T.N. Srinivasan. John 'Whalley and Ian Wooton, 'Measuring the Effects of Regionalism on Trade and 
Welfare', In Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds.), Regional Integration and the Global 
Trading S~vstem, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p.53. 
69 T.N. Srinivasan, John Whalley and Ian Wooton, op.cit., p.54. 
70 John G. Ruggie, op.cit .. 1996, p.130; Some authors have argued that earlier trade discriminatory 
practices especially in the 1930s had contributed to the collapse of world trade during this period. See 
Jeffrey A. Frankel. Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System, (Washington D.C: Institute 
for International Economics, 1997), p.3. 
71 ibid. p.74. 
72 ibid. p.13). 
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Administration. La\\fenee Summers. He argued that whatever form trade 
lihcralisation takes. he it unilateral. bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral does not 
matter since aillcad to the same objective.73 Bhagwati et al counter that if we are not 
careful \\e may end up \\alking on all toUr. 74 
Another perspective. which is on the fringes of the orthodox economics-NRA debate 
is that articulated by Castells. Castells is sceptical of theoretical accounts that suggest 
that the world economy and international trade should be understood in terms of 
different trade blocs that are organised regionally. He suggests that 'the 
regionalisation of the global economy has largely dissolved, in favour of a multi-
layered. multi-networked structure of trade patterns, which cannot be apprehended by 
using the categories of countries as units of trade and competition.'75 He further 
argues that ·the complexity of interaction between government strategies and trade 
competition cannot be understood under the simplistic notions of regionalisation and 
trading blocs.,76 This bears resemblance with Kenichi Ohamae's notion of 'invisible 
. db I . . 77 continent' characterIse y seam ess economIc transactIons. 
Essentially, these views privilege economics over politics and they effectively suggest 
that there are no regions within which politics are played out. This explanation does 
not adequately account for the strategic behaviour of state actors, although not wholly 
influenced by firms, but seeking to advantage them, in both the domestic and regional 
7.1 See Jagdish Bhagwati, op.cil., 1995, p.8; see also, Jeffrey A. Frankel, op.cit., pp.5-6, Frankel points 
out that the CS views all the "lateralisms" as having an equal and benign weight; and this is a strategy 
that defines US approach to global trade engagements. Frankel attributes this strategy to US concern 
with declining political and economic hegemony. 
74 See World Trade Organisation, 2004, Op.cil. 
7~ Manuel Caste lis, op.cil., p.IIS. 
76 ibid., p.116. 
77 Kenichi Ohmae, op.cil. 
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spheres. While Castells makes a powerful and persuasive point about the extent to 
which transnational production networks are salient and have multiple allegiances, the 
implications of his argument that there is therefore no regionalisation process linked 
to globalisation grossly understates the 'facilitative' role of the state in these 
transnational economic transaction. 
2.3.2. Debates Within the WTO 
There is recognition within the WTO that RT As are a permanent feature of the global 
trading system, and the question is not so much about how to eliminate them but 
rather how they can be brought under tight multilateral trade disciplines to ensure that 
they promote multilateral liberalisation and not undermine it.78 The proliferation of 
RTAs, with every member of the WTO belonging at least to one of the 312 that are 
currently in existence, has raised concerns about their impact on the multilateral 
trading system: with fears that, if these are not monitored properly, they might 
undermine the WTO.79 In their current form, the RTAs are seen as representing a 
' ... frightful matrix of preference agreements, discriminatory preferences, and 
complicated rules of origin, in which the MFN principle was becoming the exception 
h h ,80 rather t an t e norm. 
With tighter disciplines, it is however hoped that RT As could hold a potential to 
positively reinforce the multilateral trading system, particularly where they are geared 
78 See for example World Trade Organisation, 'A Note by the Secretariat', TNIRLlM3, 01 August 2002. 
79 See Jeffrey J. Schott, 'Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System?' In 
Jeffrey J. Schott (ed.), Free Trade Agreements: US Strategies and Priorities, (Washington D.C: 
Institute for International Economics, 2004), p.7. 
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towards the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and with a stress on regulatory 
convergence or 'WTO-plus' measures among integrating parties.xl The discussions on 
reviewing RTAs in the WTO are mainly focused on Article XXIV, a provision which 
has generally been seen as creating ambiguity and in need of precise clarification.x2 
Of particular importance is the clarification of the meaning of "substantially all trade" 
(Article XXIV:8), which refers to customs union and free trade agreements (FTAs). 
In the negotiations, various proposals have been put forward by different countries. 
Some have argued strongly - and in fact there seems to be emerging some consensus 
positions - that the definition of 'substantially all the trade' requirement should be 
based on two requirements or combination of the two: statistical benchmark of the 
percentage of trade (tariff lines), and sectoral coverage. Regarding the former, much 
of the emphasis is placed on the six-digit tariff lines listed in the Harmonised System 
as a statistical benchmark.83 
With respect to sectoral coverage, which is more of a qualitative benchmark, stress is 
laid on ensuring that in future no sector would be excluded in the tariff liberalisation 
schedule (except those that are deemed security sensitive), especially agriculture and 
textiles - which are often deemed sensitive sectors. The other important element of 
efforts aimed at creating strong positive linkage between regionalism and 
multilateral ism, in the context of RT A proliferation and progress in the WTO, regards 
80, A Note by the Secretariat', World Trade Organisation, TN/RLIM3, 01 August 2002. 
81 ibid; See also, Gary P. Sampson and Stephen Woolcock (eds.), Regionalism. Multilateralism and 
Economic Integration: The Recent Experience, (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003). 
82 See World Trade Organisation. Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai 
Panitchpakndi: Thefuture of the UTO, (Geneva: World Trade Organisation, 2004), p.26. 
83 See Australia's Paper. World Trade Organisation, TN/RLlW/15, 09 July 2002. However, this raised 
problems as some members had 8- or 10-digit tariff lines. See TN/RL/M/3, Note by the Secretariat, 01 
August 2002 .. 
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the impact of these processes on the regulatory mechanisms as well as on widening 
and deepening of the scope of trade. 
Harmonisation or convergence of regulatory-type policies amongst integrating parties 
is a substantive development as it may potentially intrude into the domestic policy 
space. As noted by Crawford and Fiorentino, recent trends in cross-regional 
arrangements. especially those between North and South, have tended to 'go beyond 
the WTO regulatory framework to include provisions on investment, competition, 
intellectual property, environment and labour among others.'84 
This 'regulatory' trend of regionalism is often referred to as WTO-plus even though it 
runs the risk of undermining the multilateral trading system and create an alternative 
platform where negotiations and agreements are governed by the force of might and 
narrow self-interest than rule and fairness. It is also important to note that some of the 
agreements reached at this level could impose severe strictures for developing 
countries, for example in the area of Trade Related Aspects on Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), which offers flexible provisions for developing countries at the 
multilateral level, that could be lost in regional trade arrangements between developed 
I . . 85 and deve opmg countrIes. 
There seems to be a realisation amongst some developing countries that there is much 
at stake in these processes that could have implications for their developmental 
interests. As such, their key concern is with the extent to which the proposed 
84 Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino, 'Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements', 
World Trade Organisation Working Paper, 2005. www.wto.org 
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disciplines on RTAs are sensitive to their developmental challenges. When the Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations were launched in November 2001, this factor was taken 
into consideration. Specific negotiations in the area of reviewing RTAs were given 
force by Paragraph 29 of the Doha Declaration, which stated that: 'We also agree to 
negotiations aimed at claritying and improving disciplines and procedures under the 
existing WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements. These negotiations 
shall take into account the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements.' 
As to how precisely the interests of developing countries are going to be reflected 
would be determined by a process of negotiations whose outcomes would form part of 
the package of agreement at the end of the Doha Round. Developing countries have a 
strong interest in this area as most of the RTAs that they participate in were formed 
under the 1979 Enabling Clause, and these are not subject to the 'substantially-alI-the 
trade' requirement, and provide some flexibilities which are absent from Article 
XXIV. Even so, they are still not expected to raise trade barriers against other WTO 
members.86 In its paper, India argued that the Enabling Clause is linked to the 
developmental needs of developing countries and affords them policy space to adjust 
to competition, and under Article XXIV this would be narrowed.87 
The Enabling Clause-type arrangements also include the preference mechanisms 
designed to provide market access to developing countries on non-reciprocal basis. 
One of the central negotiating issues for developing countries, especially the African, 
85 ibid p.6. 
86 See Gary P. Sampson, 'Introduction', In Gary P. Sampson and Stephen Woolcock (eds.), 
Regionalism. Multilateralism and Economic Integration: The Recent Experience, (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 2003). p.6. 
87 World Trade Organisation, 'India's Submission', TN/RLfWI114, 06 June 2003. 
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Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group8S is that special and differential treatment should 
be a component of North-South RTAs (established under Article XXIV), and that 
developing countries have tlexibilities in such arrangements. Furthermore, with 
regards to South-South arrangements (established under Enabling Clause), existing 
tlexibilities should be retained.89 According to the ACP Group, 'The existing GAIT 
1994 Article XXIV provisions do not take into account developmental aspects of 
RTAs entered into between developed and developing, i.e., between countries with 
significant differences in levels of development, productive and export capacities and 
. . ,90 
competItIveness. 
There is little doubt that the debate regarding whether regionalism is a stepping stone 
or a stumbling bloc to multilateralism is likely to define orthodoxy perspectives for 
some time. There has however been a positive shift, at least in the multilateral trading 
system, in defining clearly what this means in tenns of both the procedural and 
substantive dimensions of R T As and their relationship with the multi lateral trading 
system. However, the debate is narrowly framed in tenns of trade creation versus 
trade diversion, and is overly obsessed with welfare-enhancing outcomes - defined in 
tenns of utility maximisation for consumers of goods91 - to the exclusion of other 
critical variables such as security and development. 
88 This Group is very active in the WTO negotiations. It consists of developing countries from three 
regions: Africa. Carribean and Pacific regions, .and a majority of which where colonised by European 
countries. Since the early \970s these countnes have had special economic relations with Europe 
institutionalised through the Lome Convention (and since 2000, Cotonou Agreement), and receive 
preferential treatment from the EU. 
~9 Paper by the ACP Group of States, World Trade Organisation, TNIRL/W/\55, 28 April 2004. 
90 Paper by the ACP Group of States, World Trade Organisation, TN/RL/W/\55, 28 April 2004, 
Paragraph 6. The paper notes that the reason for this limitation is the limited participation by 
developing countries during this period of GA IT's existence. 
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This debate remams stuck in narrow variables despite the fact that even amongst 
Economists questions regarding the bencfits of trade creation versus trade diversion 
remain inconclusive. For example, Fiorcntino and Crawford note that ' ... it is 
notoriously difficult to assess the trade creation and diversion effects for a single 
RTA; the empirical evidence on the subject remains ambiguous.'92 Similarly, Jeffrey 
Frankel, one of the leading thinkers on Regional Trading Blocs has asserted that the 
concepts trade creation and trade diversion ' ... do not have standard definitions that 
are entirely agreed upon.,93 He further contends that, The presumption that trade 
creation and trade diversion can be identified with the good and bad effects of PT As 
[Preferential Trade Agreements], respectively, is oversimplified for a number of 
,94 
reasons. 
This then leads us to the next explanation, which brings some improvements in the 
understanding of regionalism and its relationship to global structural changes. The 
New Regionalism Approach (NRA) emanates mainly from critical International 
Political Economy, and seeks to transcend the state in theorising regionalist processes. 
Furthermore, it is not limited by the stepping stone/stumbling bloc metaphor. This 
perspective initially evolved out of United Nations University/WIDER discourses, 
and Bjorn Hettne was one of the leading pioneers of the new regionalism debate 
within the IPE intellectual genre. 
9J For a survey of perspectives, See Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free 
Trade, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.181-184. 
92 Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino, op.cit., p.18. 
93 Jeffrey A Frankel, opcit., p.IS. 
94 ibid. He goes on to discuss the reasons, suggesting that under certain circumstances trade diversion 
can be good, where its existence reduces distortions in consumers' patterns of consumption; when 
economies of scale allow producers to operate at a lower cost; or, when the new competition curtails 
the market power ofinetTicient domestic monopolies. See, pp.IS-16. 
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2.4 Critical IPE/New Regionalism Approach Perspectives 
The NRA perspective shares a common ground with some of the orthodox approaches 
in its recognition of the outward orientation of new or 'open' regionalism, but in 
everything else the two perspectives diverge sharply. Shulz e/ al suggest that 
' ... today·s regionalism is extroverted rather than introverted, which reflects the deeper 
interdependence of today's global political economy. The new regionalism is in 
different ways linked to global structural change, and especially to what is perhaps its 
dominating feature - globalisation.'95 
Breslin et al make a similar point when they observe that regionalism and 
globalisation are 'mutually reinforcing and co-constitutive rather than contending 
processes. ,96 The question of stumbling bloc/stepping stone is therefore rendered 
irrelevant in the NRA research agenda. Rather, an emphasis is placed on the 
symbiotic relationship between globalism and regionalism and the fact that these are 
'intimately connected, together shaping the emerging world order. ,97 
NRA literature on regionalism would, for example, look at questions generated by 
perceptions of collective challenges, such as, related environment, security and 
economic development. Regionalism could also be simply a response to an urge to 
construct a regional identity on the basis of contiguity or shared cultural, ideational 
and social meanings; or, it could be for reasons of consolidating the state, as is 
95 Michael Shulz, Frederik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, op.cit .. p.14. 
96 Shaun Breslin, Richard Higgott and Ben Rosamond, 'Regions in Comparative Perspective', In Shaun 
Breslin, Christopher W. Hughes, Nicola Phillips and Ben Rosamond, New Regionalisms in the Global 
Political Economy, (London: Routledge, 2002), p.8. 
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perhaps the case in most of the Sub-Saharan Africa.98 Wyatt-Walter are apt in arguing 
that there are political economy reasons for regionalism, and these include geography, 
history of cooperation on non-economic issues, and security factors.99 
It must be pointed out though that the NRA is a relatively new analytic framework 
and as such it is in the process of further development. One of its proponents, Frederik 
Soderbaum explains that much of its focus is on theory building, and he decries the 
fact that there is little theoretical debate on 'new' regionalism and that what 
predominates in much of the literature are specific case studies or empirical accounts 
which are based on limited theoretical perspectives. IOO 
Indeed the essence of 'new regionalism', as understood by the NRA, does not simply 
lie in the temporal distinction, but more substantively in the epistemological 
framework employed in studying regions. A slightly different account is put forward 
by Boas et al who emphasise the importance of plurality of meanings in thinking 
about regionalisms. In Boas et ai, for example, the focus is on ' ... a multitude of 
overlapping, disjunctive and often contradictory regionalization processes .. .' 101 
97 J. Andrew Grant and Frederik Soderbaum, 'Introduction: The New Regionalism in Africa', In 
J.Andrew Grant and Frederik Soderbaum. The New Regionalism in Africa, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 
p.8. 
98 Andrew Hurrelll, op.cil .. pp.58-73. 
99 Andrew Wyatt-Walter, Regionalism and World Economic Order', In Louise Fawcett and Andrew 
Hurrell, Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organi=ation and International Order, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995). p.82. 
100 Fredrik Soderbaum, 'Introduction: Theories of New Regionalism', In Fredrik Soderbaum and 
Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism, (Basingstoke: Pal grave, 2004), p.2. 
101 Morten Boas, Marianne H. Marchand and Timothy M. Shaw, op.cil, p.204; this is a very thin area of 
disagreement. If one also looks at the volume by Shulz et al it is quite evident that there are strong 
convergences than divergences; See Michael Shulz, Frederik Soderbaum and Joakim Ojendal, 
'Introduction: A Framework for Understanding Regionalization', Regionalization in a Globalizing 
World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes, (London: Zed Books, 2001), p.l4. 
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Furthermore. the approach propounded by Boas et of highlights the fluidity of 
interactions between different levels of regionalisms and actors involved, and elevates 
informal processes and non-state actors to the same level as that of the state. 102 
Echoing some of the positions articulated by NRA, Shaw el 01 note that 'we find it 
useful to employ the prefix 'new' as a means to distinguish new theoretical 
approaches compared to previous frameworks.' 103 It should be noted that nothing here 
is said about spatial configuration or some teleological significance. The weight is 
placed on the analytic framework rather than on empirical processes or ultimate 
objectives. In short, it is about how regions are to be understood and not so much 
about what is to be studied. 
While emphasis on theory building lends a heuristic value, especially given the 
relative novelty of this methodological approach, it may however fall into a fallacy of 
seeking to fit practice to confirm a theoretical paradigm or simply become everything 
to everyone who studies regions, thereby losing precise shape and meaning. There is 
no doubt that NRA is indeed an innovative research agenda. However, it should avoid 
de-emphasising or discrediting empirical processes. Theory building need not always 
be viewed as disembodied from empirical observations. Indeed, there are synergies 
that could be drawn between the two. Furthermore the ambivalence that the NRA 
sometimes expresses towards the state can be deeply disconcerting as in most 
developing countries the state is seen as a contested terrain and an instrument 
potentially endowed with transformative possibilities. 
102 ibid. p.204. 
103 Timothy M. Shaw, Frederik Soderbaum, Julius E. Nyang'oro and J. Andrew Grant, op.cit., p.192. 
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It may well be that there is a case to continue building a strong theoretical foundation 
to understand various experiences that are taking shape in various parts of the world, 
including those that are inspired and led by state or non-state actors - taking place at 
formal or informal levels - but to construct a homogenised analytic approach could be 
counterproductive. Soderbaum, for example, does highlight this point when he 
suggests that ' ... the emphasis on theory by no means implies a neglect of the 
empirical worlds of regionalism.'l04 The reality is that - and not to over-stress the 
differences - regions are diverse and at times contend with unique sets of 
circumstances which may require a flexible analytic approach to understanding them. 
2.4.1 Comparative Regionalisms: A bridge between theory and practice 
As Soderbaum and Shaw have pointed out, the bridge between theory and practice in 
regionalism can best be served by a comparative approach; and such an approach 
could help ameliorate the ethnocentric bias inherent in much of regionalism 
literature. lo5 In a volume that brings together scholars who are articulating more 
'critically' grounded perspectives to regionalism, Soderbaum and Shaw challenge the 
universalism that came to characterise the study of regionalism. They dismiss the one-
dimensional inquiry on whether regionalism is a stepping stone or a building bloc 
towards multilateral ism as inadequate in helping us understand the characteristic 
. f . I' 106 dynamics 0 current reglOna 1St processes. 
104 Fredrik Soderbaum. op.cit, p.2. 
105 Frederik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, 'Conclusion: What Futures for New Regionalism?', In 
Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2004), p.214. 
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What is clear is that scholars that are building the NRA research agenda are more 
concerned with understanding regionalism in its broader sense rather than viewing it 
through lenses that are narrowly prefigured by orthodox economic approaches. The 
dominant feature in Soderbaum and Shaw's approach is a view that regionalist 
processes should be understood outside the epistemological and formal boundaries of 
Europe, and this should not necessarily invalidate the European experience and its 
contribution, but also not to use it as a central reference point. To borrow from 
Wathiong'o's polycentric view of the world, indeed 'there could never be only one 
centre from which to view the world but that different people in the world had their 
culture and environment as the centre. The relevant question was therefore one of how 
one centre related to other centres.' 107 
Such an understanding, freed from the methodological strictures of Eurocentric 
epistemology, can help to creatively chart a comparative approach to regionalism. 
Hettne's model of levels of , region ness', discussed earlier, lays a good ground to help 
develop useful comparative studies that could further enrich the understanding of new 
regionalism within the changing global context; and this could draw both useful 
parallels and identifY critical divergences in the evolution of regionalism in different 
parts of the world. There is no doubt that such an approach could be fertile with 
important insights into the nature of impact global processes have on different regions 
and the unique sets of circumstances these contend with. 
106 ibid. pp.215-216. 
107 Ngugi Wathiong'o, Moving the Centre: The Struggle for Cultural Freedoms, (Oxford: James 
Currey, 1993),p.9. 
78 
lIettne suggests that a new theory of regionalism should be constructed on 
. d' d I' h lOR 13 • d comparatIve stu ICS an post-structura 1st approac es. ~owever, cautIon nee s to 
be exercised in imputing a theoretical paradigm in a prescriptive fashion as that may 
yield incomplete insights into the diverse forms which regionalism takes in various 
parts of the world and their relationship with global/multilateral processes. At the 
broader level, the study of new regionalism is best left flexible and be allowed a space 
to evolve as a historical process that is contested and shaped by various theoretical 
fields as well as empirical experiences. 
A caveat about designing comparative studies that do not take into account varying 
points of development was offered by Breslin and Higgott. They suggested that 'in 
too many comparative studies there is a tendency for juxtaposition to be used instead 
of comparison' and that 'if a valid comparison is to be made, then the disjuncture of 
temporal states of development needs to be taken into account.' 109 
Theory building on regionalism also needs to strive towards evolving sub-fields in 
order to study varying dimensions of regionalism from formal process to informal, 
from state-driven to those driven by non-state actors, as well as intersections in 
various regionalist forms in a more determinate and coherent fashion. Indeed, as 
Hettne suggests, 'regions are always evolving and changing. A region must be 
understood as a process and as a social construction.' I 10 Thus it would be limiting to 
understand regionalism within narrowly framed paradigm (s). 
!O8 Bjorn Hettne, op.cit.. 2004, p.27. 
109 Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott, 'Learning from the Old, Constructing the New', New Political 
Economy, Volume 5 (2) 2000, p.342. 
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Notwithstanding the shortcomings identified earlier, for example regarding theory 
building at the expense of empirical observations and ambivalence towards the state, 
the NRA has opened up new avenues to understanding multiple regionalist processes. 
It is eclectic and more flexible, and provides an intellectual space for more theory 
innovation. The next section proposes an ideal-type analytic framework that is best 
suited to explain the case study employed in this thesis. 
2.5 Towards a Strategic Competitive Regionalism 
This section turns to an area which has not been extensively examined in IPE or NRA 
literature - that of strategic competitive regionalism. This thesis proposes that moving 
from theory to empirical observation, or infusing the two, would require more 
precision in studying regionalist processes. Moreover, given the diversity of the 
processes that constitute regionalism and the plurality of actors that are part of or 
driving these processes, it would be beneficial to innovate New Regionalism 
Approach along distinct branches that would correspond to the empirical processes 
under observation. 
For example, it should be possible to have informal processes examined using a 
distinct framework - informal regionalism approach - to differentiate it from more 
formal processes. Also, certain regionalist processes that reflect state actors' 
orientation towards international competitiveness could well be examined using a 
different approach - strategic competitive regionalism. There could be a number of 
110 ibid., p.2S. 
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other ideal-type theoretical approaches depending on what is being studied. For 
examp\c, there are also approaches that are concerned with regulatory convergence in 
regional integration schemes and their procedural compatibility with the multilateral 
trade processes. I I I This does not necessarily suggest these be vicwed in isolation from 
othcr forms in which regionalism manifest itself. 
This thesis proposes a sub-theoretical branch or analytic tool that could be 
characterised as 'strategic competitive regionalism' to be employed in examining 
inter-state regional processes in the context of global competitive challenges and 
developmental concerns. This approach, in the form in which it is proposed in this 
thesis, draws together scattered ideas that nonetheless capture the strategic behaviour 
of states and refocus them to better reflect particular forms of state-led regionalist 
processes. It is not claimed here that this is an altogether novel approach, but is an 
organising force that could further contribute to innovation of regionalism studies. 
This approach highlights the strategic uses of regionalism by state actors to facilitate 
competitiveness of their domestic industries in global markets. Furthermore it also 
denotes the strategic nature of relationships that state actors enter into at the regional 
and global levels to maximise their political bargaining capacity as well as improve 
competitiveness of domestic industries in regional and global market place. Phillips 
argues that 'sub-regionalism can be seen to be as much about domestic political 
economy (the national capitalist project) as about a 'new international political 
III See Gary P. Sampson and Stephen Woolcock, (eds.) op.cit. 
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economy" at the regional and global levels. 112 This docs not necessarily suggest the 
fusion of the state and capital into a single mechanism in the manner suggested, for 
example, by Jessop in his review of state monopoly capitalism. I 13 
A more forceful explanation on the linkage between regionalism and strategic trade 
perspectives is offered by Gamble and Payne. They argue that 'the current regionalist 
projects have been driven to some extent by a 'strategic trade view' and this creates 
competitive conditions for regional firms who are externally oriented. I 14 Essentially, 
new regionalism, as noted earlier, is externally oriented and seeks to benefit the 
domestic economy in the global market arrangements which are defined through the 
discourse of competitiveness. As suggested by Ravenhill, domestic economic actors 
that are not yet strong to compete globally may be protected via regionally agreed 
arrangements while being gradually exposed to global markets. I 15 However, 
protection here is not for its own sake in the form in which it was taking place when 
import-substitution industrialisation was in vogue, but it is for the purpose of building 
116 
a strong export platform. 
112 Nicola Phillips, 'The Future of the Political Economy of Latin America', In Richard Stubbs and 
Geoffrey RD Underhill (2000) (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p.330. 
IIJ Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theory and Meditations, (Oxford: Blackwells, 1982), 
p.l4. 
114 Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, 'The World Order Approach', In Fredrik Soderbaum and 
Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Theories of New Regionalism, (Basingstoke: Pal grave, 2004), p.52. 
115 John Ravenhill, 'Regionalism', In John Ravenhill (ed.), Global Political Economy, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p.124. 
116 For a detailed discussion on the notion of import protection as export promotion, see Paul Krugman, 
'Import Protection: International Competition in the Presence of Oligopoly and Economics of Scale', 
In Henryk Kierzkowski, Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp.180-193. 
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Payne also suggests that the rationale for contemporary regionalism has not been 
established on the doctrine of protection but rather on strategic trade. 1I7 Whereas 
import-substitution industrialisation and the use of tariff to nurture a competitive 
advantage for the home industry was the leitmotif of old regionalism, this is 
increasingly being superseded by nuanced forms of protection and support directed 
mainly at 'strategic' export-oriented sectors. 
Amongst industrial economies this development intensified in the late 1980s and was 
largely provoked by perceptions of Japan's rise as an economic power - especially its 
'competing out and protecting in' approach - but also sparked by the realisation that, 
with the eclipse of the Cold War, much attention in countries' external strategies 
would be on economic competitiveness rather than military warfare between states.1l8 
Much of strategic trade concepts in the developed economies have been propounded 
in view of trade conflict in high-technology industries, and these are regarded as 
crucial in sustaining productivity, technology development and high-wage job 
creation. 119 This thesis contends that this perspective could also be used to analyse 
strategic behaviour of core states in developing regions in the context of global 
competitive exigencies. 
For developing countries, and Southern African countries in particular, there is also a 
realisation that regionalism can be a potent force to respond to the challenges of 
117 Anthony Payne, op.cit., 2004, p.16. 
118 See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-
1975, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Robert Reich B., 'Making Industrial Policy', 
Foreign Affairs, Volume 60, 1982; Stephen S. Cohen and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The 
Myth qf the Post-Industrial Economy, (Washington D.C: Basic Books, 1987); Lester Thurow, !lead to 
Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan. Europe. and America, (New York: Warner Books, 
1992). 
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globalisation and underdevelopment. Ilowever, gIven the general weakness of 
political instruments, including institutional innovation to effectively integrate into 
global markets, strategic competitive regionalism can only be said to benefit regional 
core states such as South Africa (Chapter 5). Apart from South Africa, much of the 
Southern African region is caught between the old and the new forms of regionalism 
(Chapters 3 and 5). 
Nonetheless, state actors in Southern Africa still view regionalism, in the long-term, 
as fulfilling strategic competitive objectives, and more specifically ensuring inward-
flows of investments, structural and geographic diversification of exports and 
integration into global markets and institutions of global governance, as well as 
building capacity for effective political articulation at the multilateral level. Schott 
notes that developing countries ' ... face tough competition for investment and therefore 
have to engage in a process for competitive liberalisation .. .', and he suggests that this 
'competitive liberalisation', driven through regionalism, is not based on 'fortresses' but 
on external orientation. 120 
The particular form of regionalism examined in this thesis - strategic competitive 
regionalism - would correspond to a particular state form of state (see discussion 
below). Global competitive dynamics act to alter the traditional role of the state in 
relation to domestic social forces. In this sense, the state plays the role of a facilitator 
to enable domestic firms to compete effectively in global markets. The emphasis is 
less on the invisible hand of the markets but more on the invisible hand of 
119 Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High Technology Industries, 
(Whashington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993), p.2. 
120 Jeffiey Schott, op.cit .• p.ll. 
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government support. 121 Beck has suggested for example that, in this sense, the state 
could perhaps be understood as embodying two faces: ' ... on the one hand it is 
withering away, but on the other it is more urgent than ever, and both for good 
,122 
reasons. 
He further points out that the image of the contemporary state is similar to that of a 
snake that is in the process of shedding its old skin to acquire a new skin, and that the 
state, like a snake, is shedding the skin of its classical tasks and developing a new 
global 'skin of tasks.' 123 To the extent that globalisation re-defines the role of the state 
and restructures its institutions and policies in relation to the domestic economy and 
the global sphere, the emerging state forms in various parts of the world could best be 
. d' . I d ,124 characterIse as re-artlcu ate state. 
2.5.1 Competition State 
Indeed, the character of the state has undergone transformation in the context of 
globalisation, although the extent of this transformation is hard to measure. 125 As 
suggested by Cerny, in the light of this alteration of state's classical 'welfarist' tasks, 
the concern of the state is increasingly with the promotion ' ... of competitive 
121 See Laura D' Andrea Tyson, op.cit. 
122 Ulrich Beck, What is G1oba/isation, (London: Polity, 1999), p.38. 
123 ibid. 
124 Jeffrey A. Hart and Aseem Prakash, 'Globalization and Governance: An Introduction', In Aseem 
Prakash and Jeffrey Hart (eds.), Globali=ation and Governance, (London: Routledge, 1999), pp.14-15. 
125 See Jan Aart Scholte. Globali=ation: A Critical Introduction, (Basingstoke: Pal grave, 2000), pp.135-
146; David Held and Anthony McGrew, 'The Great Globalization Debate: An Introduction', In David 
Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the 
Globali=ation Debate, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp.l-11. 
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advantages of particular production and service sectors in a more open and integrated 
ld ,126 wor economy. 
The state is thereforc being transformed into a 'complex mix of civil and entcrprise 
associations' - a 'Competition State.' 127 Cerny defines the competition state thus: 
'The main task or function of the contemporary state is the promotion of economic 
activities, whether at home or abroad, which makes firms and sectors locatcd within 
the territory of the state competitive in international markets - the competition 
state.' 128 
The competition state, as Cerny points out, exhibits four types of policy changes: a 
shift from macro-economic to micro-economic interventionism; pursuit of 
competitive advantage as distinct from comparative advantage; emphasis on inflation 
targeting and general neo-liberal monetarism; and a shift from public welfare 
maximisation to the promotion of enterprise, innovation and profitability in both 
. d bl' t 129 prIvate an pu IC sec ors. 
Although these dimensions as identified by Cerny characterise states that are putting 
weight on international competitiveness, it should be stressed that states, depending 
on their capabilities, often adopt flexible responses that mayor may not necessarily 
conform to a particular form of state-type, for example that which is strongly 
penetrated by the forces of neo-liberalism. Scholte argue for example that some states 
126 Philip G. Cerny, 'Structuring the political arena: Public Goods, States and Governance in a 
Globalising World', In Ronen Palan (ed.), Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories, 
(London: Routledge, 2000), p.22. 
127 Philip G. Cerny, 'Globalization, Governance and Complexity', In Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. 
Hart (eds.), Globali=ation and Governance, (London: Routledge, 1999), p.206. 
128 ibid. p.199. 
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have been able to exert influence than others in global spaces. I3O Similarly, Jessop has 
suggested that, ' ... it is necessary to examine each state in its own terms rather than 
treat all capitalist states as identical because of their common foundation.' 131 
To further elaborate this point, some states would - within the limits of their 
capabilities - maintain both commitment to public welfare and promotion of domestic 
enterprise, for example through R&D support and a host of other incentives including 
financial, to promote competitiveness in the global market place. At least Cerny does 
acknowledge that, 'Although each of these processes can be observed across a wide 
range of states, there are significant variations in how different Competition States 
. h h f d . d fi ., I 32 cope Wit t e pressures 0 a aptahon an trans ormatIOn.· 
This notion of the competition state propounded by Cerny closely approximates Cox's 
theorisation of internationalisation of the state. Cox characterises the 
internationalising state in terms of 'the global process whereby national policies and 
practices have been adjusted to the exigencies of the world economy of international 
d t · ,133 pro uc IOn. 
Much as the 'Competition State' has been nurtured by the global neo-liberal context, 
Cerny's overly rigid association of the 'Competition State' with a nco-liberal state is 
deeply unsatisfactory as this ascribes homogeneity to all states. It also creates an 
unnecessary dichotomy between 'welfare tasks' and those sparked by competitive 
129 ibid 
130 Jan Aart Scholte, op.cil., p.135. 
131 Bob Jessop, op.cit, p.24. 
132 Philip G. Cerny, op.cit., 2000, p.32. 
133 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.253. 
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impulses. States' economic bchaviour is not always idcologically pre-figured, but can 
be a product of political compromises amongst social forces. 
Yet, as suggested earlier, states assume dirtcrent forms and may at times exhibit a 
strong developmental edge depending on their capabilities. Cerny's ascription of 
ideological identity to states hides marked varieties between states and unique ways in 
which they respond to global forces. It also misses a crucial point: that states do not 
always pursue their objectives on the basis of blind ideological commitment, but 
rather to achieve politically calculated objectives linked to domestic economic 
134 
enhancement. 
For example, Cox acknowledges that the process of internationalisation of the state 
' ... results in different forms of states corresponding to the different positions of 
countries in the world economy.' 135 Similarly, Gamble cautions that the state should 
no longer be viewed in a reductionist and deterministic sense as wholly beholden to 
the interests of capital nor should they be viewed as enjoying 'absolute autonomy.' 136 
The 'strategic' states, especially those in developing countries, in varying forms, 
manifest a strong developmental orientation. 
134 See T.1. Pempel, 'The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy', In Meredith Woo-
Cummings (ed.), The Developmental State, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p.140. 
135 Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America, 
(New York: Warner Books, 1992), p.252. 
136 Andrew Gamble, 'The New Political Economy', Journal of Political Studies Volume XLIII, 1995, 
p.524. 
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2.5.2 Strategic States, Developmental States 
According to Pempel, developmental states' ... define their missions primarily in terms 
of long-term national economic enhancement', and that · ... they actively and regularly 
intervene in economic activities with the goal of improving the international 
competitiveness of their domestic eeonomies.,137 This is distinguishable from the 
'regulatory' state which is a hallmark of most developed economies and whose 
mission is defined primarily in terms of setting regulatory mechanisms for the benefit 
of market agents, and often regulates or manages tensions arising in the market place, 
or the plan-ideological state that was ubiquitous during the Stalinist era. 138 
In its internal organisation, a developmental state approximates Johnson's view of a 
plan-rational state which expresses a Weberian form of the state as opposed to say 
plan-ideological or market regulatory state.139 A developmental state, according to 
Chang, focuses on long-term and structural change, and 'politically' manages the 
economy in such a way as to ease tensions that arise during restructuring, and develop 
. . I h' h" I 140 instltutlOna mec amsm to ac leve Its goa s. 
Pempel offers a number of short-comings in how the notion of a developmental state 
has hitherto been applied. First, he contends that, 'It privileges the political and 
economic role played by state bureaucrats', and that the national bureaucracy is 
treated as ' ... totally depoliticised, socially disembodied, and in rational pursuit of a 
J37T.J. Pempel, op.cit .. p.139. 
138 Chalmers Johnson. op.cit .. 1982; Bruce Cumings, 'Webs with no spiders, Spiders with no webs', In 
Meredith Woo-Cummings (ed.), The Developmental Slale. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 
p.64; T.J. Pempel, 'op.cil., p.139. 
139 Chalmers Johnson, op.cil., 1982; Bruce Cumings, op.cit .. p.64. 
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self-evident national interest.' 141 The second observation he makes is that it is silent 
on questions related to . intranational political and economic conflicts', and more 
specifically the socio-economic character of the developmental state. 142 
Finally, he highlights the fact that theorisation on the developmental state tends to 
ignore the international context and focus on the domestic context, especially on such 
concerns as ' ... business organisation; allocation of scarce capital, energy resources, 
and technology; infrastructure development; tax credits; budgetary incentives; mass 
education; labour regulations; foreign direct investment and the like.' 143 While these 
dimensions are indeed characteristic of developmental states they are not in 
themselves exhaustive in defining what ultimately constitute a developmental state. 
It is likely that states, moving from a certain implicit understanding of their role as 
developmental states, for example adopting some of the features of East Asian 
economies, may develop an approach which they consider most suited to their 
domestic context and is sensitive to global and regional forces. As noted in Chapter 1 
for example, South Africa, although it would on the basis of the above-mentioned 
dimensions qualify as a developmental state, is broadly outwardly oriented and its 
regional and global strategies express a limited form of 'embedded liberalism'. In 
essence, an international role of the state - and indeed its active participation in the 
processes of multilateral governance, including international trade - does not 
necessarily preclude a developmental role in its domestic context. 
140 Ha-Joon Chang, 'The Economic Theory of Developmental State', In Meredith Woo-Cummings 
(ed.), The Developmental State, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p.I92. 
141 T.1. Pempel, op.cit., p.144. 
142 ibid, p.145. 
143 ibid, p.146. 
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In short, a state can both be a devc\opmental state on the basis of such traits as an 
insulated bureaucracy, pursuit of' national interests', macro-economic improvements, 
increasing aggregate national wealth, enterprise development etc., and still project 
outwardly. As will be shown in Chapter 4, South Africa exhibits both dimensions. Or, 
to use Pempel's formulation in describing the 'modern state', 'It is like the 
mythological Janus, and has two faces. One looks inward toward domestic society; 
d h · . I ,144 the other turns towar s t e mternatJOna arena. 
2.5.3 Strategic Trade Theories and Regionalism 
In general, strategic trade theories have emerged out of the dissatisfaction with 
classical accounts of comparative advantage based on natural endowments, and have 
mainly been in relation to government supply-side interventions, especially in support 
of high-tech industries in industrialised economies to enhance their international 
competitiveness. As suggested by James Brander, traditional trade theory, especially 
based on the Hescher-Ohlin model, does not adequately account for high volume of 
trade between similar countries and thus fails to consider the existence of imperfect 
competition.145 The emerging approaches, which counter traditional perspectives, are 
motivated by the view that, 'National prosperity is created, not inherited.' 146 
144 ibid., p.147. 
145 James A. Brander, 'Strategic Trade Policy', National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Working Paper No. 5020, February 1985, p.l. 
146 Michael Porter, 'The Competitive Advantage of Nations', In Cynthia A. Montgomery and Michael 
Porter (eds.), Strategy, (Harvard: Harvard Business Review, 1991), p.135. 
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Laura Tyson, drawing on Michael Porter, contends that a nation's competitiveness in 
industries with strategic characteristics - that is high-technology sectors - ' ... is less a 
function of its national factor endowments and more a function of strategic 
interactions between its firms and government, and between them and the firms and 
the governments of other nations.' 147 However, as will be shown in this section, this 
perspective could be adapted to explain variable forms of state intervention in 
developing countries in ways that differ from 1950s and 1960s dirigisme. 
The 'strategic' element of the state is most visibly expressed in how the state sets out 
domestic policy agenda in relation to global challenges, and how this is executed at 
the regional level. Regionalisation thus represents, for developing countries, a useful 
platform in engaging in strategic trade games. This is best illustrated in the case of 
South Africa, and is discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Looking at the actual policy 
activities of states, a degree of overlap between strategic trade, investment and 
. d . I I" b d' d 148 m ustna po ICles can e lscerne . 
The latter comes in the form of a set of policies designed to benefit domestic 
industries that are regarded as of crucial importance to increase the aggregate wealth 
of the country and assert its prestige in the global market place. Strategic trade 
policies are distinguished from governmental interventions in certain specific sectors 
_ and this is a function of industrial policy. Strategic trade policy can be in the form of 
subsidies in a high-tech industry in the context of imperfect competition 149 or in 
147 Laura D' Andrea Tyson, op.cit., p.3. 
148 See Peter Dicken (2nd ed.), Global Shift: Internationali:ation of Economic Activity, (London: Paul 
Chapman, 1992), p.150. 
149 Robert O. Keohane, 'Bargaining, Institutions, and International Economic Relations', In Paolo 
Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan (eds.), The Political Economy of International Cooperation, (London: 
Croom Helm, 1988), p.32. 
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sectors which the state considers strategic to increase the national aggregate wealth. 
Both of these approaches are geared towards enhancing national welfare and global 
. . fd . fi 150 competitIveness 0 omcstlc Irms. 
As Peter Dicken notes: 
'States compete to enhance their international trading position and to 
capture as large a share as possible of the gains from trade. They 
compete to attract productive investment to build up their national 
production base which, in tum, enhances their international competitive 
.. ,]51 posItIOn. 
The case for a strategic trade policy as discussed in literature arises as a result of the 
existence of 'imperfect' or oligopolistic competition in world markets, and that a few 
actors in a particular industry are able to hive off 'supernormal' profits. 152 
'Supernormal profits', as Grossman and Richardson suggest, are a common feature of 
imperfectly competitive environments. ls3 This then becomes the basis for 
governments to intervene to influence strategic relationships between firms through 
injection of support in domestic industries that seek to enter the oligopolistic markets 
150 See for example, Stephen Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade', In Jeffry 
A Frieden, International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, (London: 
Routledge, 200 I), pp.20-2 I. 
lSI ibid.. p. I 49. 
152 See Gene M. Grossman, 'Strategic Export Promotion: A Critique', In Paul Krugman (ed.), Strategic 
Trade Policy and the New International Economics, (London: MIT Press, 1986), p.48. 
153 Gene M. Grossman and J. David Richardson, 'Strategic Trade Policy: A Survey of Issues and Early 
Analysis', Special Papers on International Economics No. IS, April 1985, International Finance 
Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University. 
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to gain a share of profit. 154 At one level, this is about strategies to enable domestic 
industries to capture market share and enhance profits. As originally developed, 
strategic trade theories were narrowly focused on trade policy in thc context of 
oligopolistic industries in imperfect markets. l \) 
But this does not have to be motivated only by what exists out there in terms of 
'supernormal profits'. More fundamentally, in the context of developing countries 
who are late starters, it can also be influenced by the long-term strategic 
considerations of the state regarding questions related to structural shifts in the 
domestic economy from natural (static) comparative advantages to dynamic (created) 
competitive advantage in high performing or potentially strategic export sectors in 
global markets - whether there are supernormal profits or not should not be of 
paramount concern. 
The key concern is mainly with long-term 'economic prosperity' or development in 
the face of globalisation challenges and asymmetric competitive capabilities in global 
markets. It needs stressing that strategic trade and industrial policy measures are a 
state-interventionist mechanism which, contrary to the dirigisme practices, are built 
into an economic space broadly designed to favour market agents, and are oriented 
towards export promotion. James Brander, one of the pioneers of the strategic trade 
view, does acknowledge that the concept has also been broadened to refer to trade 
policy targeted ' ... towards industries that are thought to be important for some reason.' 
154 William Cline R., 'US Trade and Industrial Policy: The Experience of Textile, Steel and 
Automobiles', In Paul Krugman (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and the New international Economics, 
(London: MIT Press, 1986), p.230; Jeffrey A. Hart and Aseem Prakash, op. cit. , 1999, p.250. 
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For developing countries the sectors that would enjoy strategic consideration by the 
state do not necessarily have to be high-tech sectors in the first place, although along 
the continuum when sufficient resources have been accumulated, the economy has 
undergone substantial transformation, and a greater competitive ground gained In 
global markets, high-tech sectors could also be targeted. In this sense, OWIng to 
technological deficiencies, developing countries are not usually first-movers In 
technological innovations l56, and thus would not be counted in strategic competitive 
moves in high-tech industries. This therefore creates a lacuna in strategic trade 
theories, which needs to be filled by understanding peculiar ways in which certain 
states in developing countries pursue strategic trade objectives in regional and global 
contexts. 
In developing regions, where much of the consideration is with economic 
development, strategic trade and industrial policy approaches would thus aim at 
shifting comparative advantage along the continuum: from primary products to value-
added manufactured products (with a mixture of labour and capital intensity), to 
capital-intensive and to knowledge intensity or a hybrid of the latter two. This 
structural shift is part of a departure away from natural to created dynamic advantage, 
and for its sustainability it requires change in the investment strategy in respect of 
human capital and R&D. 
155 See James A Brander, op.cit; Douglas A. Irwin, op.cit .. pp.209-211. 
156 For a discussion on the technological differences between North and South, as well as inadequacy of 
Heckscher-Ohlin model in accounting for certain trade patterns, see Frances Steward, 'Recent Theories 
of International Trade: Some Implications for the South', In Henryk Kierzkowski, Monopolistic 
Competition and international Trade, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.88. 
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In this connection, Chang defines economic development as involving' ... shifting of 
resources from such low-productivity activities as agriculture into high productivity 
activities like manufacturing.' 157 Although Chang's conceptualisation of industrial 
policy is narrow,158 structural shifts in the economy are often carried out through the 
instrument of industrial policy which, Amin and Tomaney argue, ' ... should be 
conceptualised as a bridge between global economic orientation and the local 
development needs', and that it should be 'system-centred' rather than 'firm-
centred' .159 Firm centred approaches could easily be susceptible to rent-seeking 
behaviour by certain interests, with enormous costs to the state. 160 
For Chang, industrial policy is a ' ... policy aimed at particular industries (and firms as 
their components) to achieve the outcomes that are perceived by the state to be 
effiCient for the economy as a whole.' 161 This definition, with its emphasis on 
efficiency objectives of industrial policy, ignores the wider social context within 
which some countries pursue industrial policies. As will be shown in Chapter 4, 
Industrial policies in developing countries, and in South Africa in particular, is not a 
stand-alone policy objective, but embedded within national development objectives 
and is balanced with equity considerations. 
157 Ha-Joon Chang, 'The Economic Theory of Developmental State', In Meredith Woo-Cummings 
(ed.), The DevelopmentaI5;tate, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p.196. 
158 Ha-Joon Chang, The Political Economy of Industrial Policy, (London: Macmillan, 1994). 
159 Ash Amin and John Tomaney, 'The regional development potential of inward investment', In 
Michael Storper, Savros B. Thomakis and Lenar J. Isipouri (eds.), Latecomers in the Global Economy, 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p.81. 
160 See Gene M. Grossman and J David Richardson, op.cit., p.2. 
161 Ha-Joon Chang, op.cit., 1994, p.60. 
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A more flexible definition is employed by Chalmers Johnson.ln2 Johnson defines 
industrial policy as 'the infusion of goal-oriented, strategic thinking into public 
economic policy' and that it is ' ... a logical outgrowth of the changing concept of 
comparative advantage.' In3 Rather than ensuring a decisive break from, say, 
agriculture or other resource-based sectors and privileging manufacturing, these 
processes are seen in related terms. 
The relationship between these two sectors, agriculture/resource-based and 
manufacturing, for example, are conceptualised in terms of backwards-and-forwards 
linkages where inputs from upstream processes or agricultural activities can facilitate 
value-added food-stuff processing activities or downstream manufacturing activities 
(see Chapter 4). 
The strategies of state actors in developing countries could involve a complex set of 
policy measures which are directed not only at high-productivity sectors, but also 
small and medium enterprises as well as the use of government procurement as a form 
of industrial policy to discriminate in favour of domestic economic agents. 
Essentially, this strategy is designed to give domestic firms a competitive advantage 
in international markets and incentivise multinational corporations to invest in the 
country, with potential technology spill-over effects. I 64 South AtTica for example uses 
a panoply of support measures geared towards supporting domestic economic agents, 
creating incentive for enterprise development, and development of partnerships 
162 Chalmers Johnson, 'Introducing the Idea ofIndustrial Policy', In David B. Audretsch (ed.) (Volume 
1), industrial Policy and Competitive Advantage, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998). 
163 ibid., p.8. 
164 See Jeffrey A. Hart and Aseem Prakash, 'Strategic Trade and Investment Policies: Implications for 
the Study ofInternational Political Economy', The World Economy, Volume 20(4), July 1997, pp.457 
-471. 
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between domestic and foreign capital. These measures are pursued alongside equity 
goals (see Chapter 4). 
International competitiveness is often associated with long-term domestic prosperity, 
social justice and international leadcrship.165 For developing countries going through 
a phase of domestic restructuring, and here again South Africa is a relevant case, 
international competitiveness presents itself as a way out of marginality and into 
effective integration into the global markets and exercising influence in regional and 
multilateral structures of governance. South Africa's switch from import-substitution 
industrialisation to export-orientation in the early 1990s was an expression of 
determination to lock the economy into global markets. This is discussed in great 
detail in Chapter 4. 
However, strategic trade approaches and industrial policies have drawn criticism for 
their reliance on the state, and they remain suspect amongst nco-classical 
economists.166 Critics of industrial policies point out that the strategy of picking out 
'winners' from 'losers' could distort price signals and create inefficiencies; and that 
strategic trade approaches could lead to all-out trade wars and encourage rent-seeking 
. b d . fi 167 behaViour y omestlc Irms. 
165 See a forceful case for building a manufacturing economy in the US discussed by Stephen Cohen S 
and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy, (Washington 
D.C: Basic Books, 1987), p.3. At the core of their argument is that a service economy should be viewed 
as complementary rather than as a successor to a manufacturing economy. It is sometimes on the basis 
of these arguments that protectionism is justified in developed countries. This is often adduced in view 
of the rising tide of outward migration of jobs in the manufacturing sectors. 
166 See Jeffrey A. Hart and Aseem Prakash, op.cit., 1997, pp.457 - 476. 
167 See J. David Richardson, 'The New Political Economy of Trade Policy', In Paul Krugman (ed.), 
Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics, (London: MIT Press, 1986), p.258. 
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These objections are less surprising. Neoclassical economists tend to cast the state as 
a villain and are cynical of its independent role in the market place. They view the 
state as 'inherently corrupt', lacks transparency, and 'impede efficient allocation of 
,168 Th .. h h . . I b resources. ey are ImpervIOus to arguments t at testate carnes a potentia to e 
an instrument for advancing social transformation or to play an 'activist' role for 
enhancing national competitiveness. 
2.5.4 Regionalism and Strategic Competitiveness 
As Gamble and Payne note, international competitiveness is seen as lying at the core 
of economic policy by strategic traders. 169 The current regionalist projects are, 
according to Gamble and Payne, all driven by strategic trade considerations: to protect 
strategic sectors in the economy and achieve international competitiveness. 17o A 
similar perspective is offered by Nesadurai. She suggests that regionalism is used as 
an instrument to help develop competitive domestic industries to give them advantage 
over their foreign rivals, and this would facilitate the creation of large markets for 
. . d . 171 domestIc In ustnes. 
Also, Grugel and Hout assert that 'region-building is overwhelmingly the result of a 
set of strategic calculations by actors located inside states and societies who push for 
168 Jeffrey A. Hart and Aseem Prakash, op.cit .. 1999, pp.252-253; See also Wyn Grant, Industrial 
Policy, (Edward Elgar Publishers: Aldershot, 1995). Grant surveys views on both sides of the debate on 
industrial policy. 
169 Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, 'Conclusion: The New Regionalism', In Andrew Gamble and 
Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order, (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp.251-252. 
170 Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, op.cit .. p.252. 
171 Helen Nesadurai, 'Globalisation and Economic Regionalism: A Survey and Critique of the 
Literature', CSGR Working Paper No. 108/02, November 2002, p.22, www.csgr.org 
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integration as a way of positioning themselves in response to global change.'172 It is 
clear that thcre arc strategic considerations, pursued mainly by core states within 
regions, linked to the competitiveness of domestic industries and for projecting 
influence at the global level. Thus there is a mutually reinforcing and co-constitutive 
relationship between the domestic, the region, and the global or multilateral level 
processes. 
2.6 Conclusion 
There is no doubt that, building on the eclectic theoretical platform offered by NRA, 
innovative ways of studying new regionalism(s) can be explored. This is especially 
relevant to semi-peripheral or core countries within regional arrangements. The 
orthodox approaches do not provide adequate answers to some of the questions that 
state actors are confronted with, and fail to grasp the political economy use of 
regionalism In the face of globalisation. Orthodox approaches overlook the 
significance of regionalism, or its potential thereof, in acting as a powerful instrument 
in the hands of state or non-state actors to respond to globalisation and developmental 
challenges. 
Innovative approaches that go beyond a one-dimensional inquiry regarding whether 
regionalism is a stumbling bloc or a building bloc to muItilateralism are long over-
due. The NRA has made a fruitful contribution to taking the research agenda on 
regionalism forward. It is more open-minded, pluralistic, and though recognising the 
role ofthe state it does not take it as a given but seeks to 'unpack' it. 
172 Jean GrugeJ and WiJ Hout, op.cit., p.lO. 
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However, NRA is becoming a dense theoretical field, without any boundaries. It can 
easily fall into the danger of becoming amorphous and overly flexible. Although it 
might be useful at a broader theoretical level to retain a flexible and eclectic approach, 
there needs to be more control and sub-branches that are able to understand different 
forms of regionalisms that are taking place at different levels, managed by diverse 
range of actors. and taking shape in different social and geographic configurations 
should be elaborated. 
This chapter has argued that to reconcile certain empirical processes and theory it 
would be necessary to improve NRA. Thus this thesis suggests that for inter-state 
processes that are outward-oriented or striving to be such, and where core states are 
active in driving the regionalist processes for reasons linked to domestic competitive 
considerations, it might be appropriate to apply a precise and tight analytic framework 
- 'strategic competitive regionalism.' 
This is not necessarily contradictory with the core foundations of NRA approach. 
Rather, it complements it. Instead of having regionalist processes captured within the 
broad category of 'new regionalism(s)' these could perhaps be designated within 
specific branches, for example informal regionalism approach, micro-regionalism 
approach, or as used in this chapter, strategic competitive regionalism. The flexibility 
of the theoretical approach would not necessarily be compromised. Indeed, it could be 
retained through the use of comparative approaches, and be further enriched. 
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The next chapter looks at the evolution of regionalism in Southern Africa, trace its 
evolution from old regional ism in 1980 to the emergence of post-apartheid South 
Africa as a regional core state in 1994. This is a useful background in understanding 
the social relationships that have come to shape the contemporary regional relations in 
Southern Africa. and how South Africa has gradually embraced strategic competitive 
regionalism. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Political Economy of Southern Africa: A Historical Overview 
I laving located Southern Africa within the broader developmental challenges 
confronting Africa in the introductory chapter, and having already set out a theoretical 
landscape in Chapter 2, this chapter looks at the evolution of regionalism in Southern 
Africa between the 1980s and the 1990s. This period is formative in the emergence of 
what is today known as the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 
significance of this period also lies in its association with episodic developments in 
the world system, namely the oil crisis and recession in major developed economies 
as well as the debt crisis affecting mostly developing countries. A number of other 
systemic developments, including the decline of the communist bloc and the 
ideational dominance of neo-liberal developmental paradigm, also occured (see 
Chapter I). 
It was against the background of these shifts that new forms of externally-oriented 
regionalism flourished. Although sparked by different set of challenges, the evolution 
of SADC during this period was not immune to developments outside of the region. 
Since the organisation developed from an initial cooperation arrangement - Southern 
African Development and Coordinating Communitiy - it has encountered difficulties 
as it tried to define itself in the brave new world of open regionalism, while at the 
same time contend with problems associated with old politics, especially those that 
were related to issues of internal security. SADC has thus suffered enormously from 
this hiatus - on the one hand caught up in the image of old regionalism and on the 
other struggling to integrate into global economic relations. There were also other 
unique sets of challenges confronting the region as the socio-political context within 
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South Africa was taking a new, positive tum, and the organisation would have to 
embrace the country as a new partner in regional relations. 
This chapter is an overview of these challenges. It traces SA DC from its initial seeds 
as a coordinating community in the early 1980s to its maturation as a fledgling 
regional integration initiative in the 1990s and beyond. Of particular interest is the 
nature that it assumed as a result of unique set of circumstances, especially the 
hideous reality of the apartheid rule in South Africa as well as the Cold War dynamics 
that were at play at the time. How the organisation transformed itself from a semi-
autarkic regionalist structure inspired exclusively by political considerations, and 
reacting to South Africa's security-oriented foreign policy, to the one gradually 
embracing openness and engaged in economic integration. 
3.1 The Formation ofa Developmental Community: From SADCC to SADC 
3.1.1 SADCC in Historical Perspective 
The conception of the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) in the early 1970s was aimed at responding to unique set of circumstances 
related to socio-political realities in South Africa and the latter's increasing 
hegemonic encroachment in regional affairs. SADCC was finally inaugurated in April 
1980. In its original intent, the organisation was not meant to be an economic 
integration vehicle nor was it designed to be a supranational body. From the outset, 
the organisation was less demanding of its members. Weight was accorded on 
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sovereign authority of national governments than on the principle of supranationality. J 
Indeed. having recently appropriated state power from colonial rulers, the new 
incumbents were reluctant to cede any part of it. As Anglin noted, 'national 
sovereignty was fundamental to SADCC's modus operandi.'2 It is therefore less 
surprising that this logic, especially preoccupation with national interest and 
economic autonomy, is still pervasive in the current SADC. 
The frontline states group that played a key role in the evolution of SADCC 
(precursor to SADC) include Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, 
and Zimbabwe (the latter after attaining independence in 1979). Seretse Khama of 
Botswana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and Samora 
Machel of Mozambique are postcolonial leaders who had gained great political stature 
in their countries and the sub-region and are often credited for pioneering regionalism 
and helped facilitate the establishment of SADCC. However, opinions differ as to 
exactly how the organisation came into being, with some observers arguing that the 
idea behind the formation of SADCC was born in Britain, London rather than in 
Tanzania.. Arusha, and was later exported to the region (see below).3 
When the organisaiton was finally established in April 1980, in Lusaka, there were 
three other countries - Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho - who expressed interest, and 
this expanded the membership from the initial six frontline states to nine founder 
member countries of SADCC. The document establishing SADC, titled: 'Southern 
I Douglas G. Anglin, 'Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and 
PTA " International Organisation, Volume 37(4), Autumn 1983, p.709. 
1 ibid .• p.692. 
) See for example Margaret C. Lee, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa, (Lynne 
Rienner: Boulder, 2003), p.48. 
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Africa: Towards Economic Liberation:' committed member States towards the 
following objectives.): 
• reducing political dependence, particularly, but not only on the Republic of 
South Africa; 
• forging links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration; 
• mobilising resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and 
regional policies; 
• ensuring concerted action to secure international cooperation within the 
framework of our strategy of economic liberation. 
The formation of the Front-line States (FSL), which was SADCC's antecedent, had a 
nominal approval of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),5 and was seen as an 
important element in consolidating nation-building and strengthening the state after 
political independence. Building on this cooperation framework, countries in the sub-
region began to deepen their level of cooperation to include the pursuit of social and 
economic development to be realised through SADCC. Active consultations amongst 
FSL countries in the mid -70s culminated in a meeting of Foreign Ministries of the 
FSL countries in Gaborone, in May 1979 where the initial outlines of a regional 
organisation were developed. 
In July of the same year, another meeting of Ministers responsible for economic 
development was convened in Arusha, Tanzania, where a declaration for the 
4 Douglas G. Anglin, 'SADCC After Nkomati', African Affairs, Volume 84 (335), April 1985, p.167. 
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establishment of SADCC was made.6 However, it is claimed in a document published 
by the Danish Foreign Ministry that the seeds for the establishment of SADCC were 
sown in London towards the end of the 1970s where a structure called Southern 
Africa Aid Coordination Conference (SAAC) was created.7 Indeed SADCC was 
viewed with suspicions by some African policy experts, especially those that were 
part of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); and regarded it 
as externally inspired and at counter purpose with the Lagos Plan of Action's 
objective of creating a continent-wide integration scheme.8 Similarly, Margaret Lee 
suggests that SADC was a brainchild of a Briton, David Anderson around 1978; and 
upon his return from Brussels he shared the idea with the influential Tanzanian 
President, Julius Nyerere - who is said to have diffused it in the region.9 
The establishment of the organisation was finalised in April 1980, and this coincided 
with the grim events that were shaping the world economy, including recession, debt 
crisis and fall of commodity prices. Although in much of the Sub-Saharan Africa the 
formation of regional economic blocs was spurred by a political agenda set in 
accordance with the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980 - which called for the creation of 
African Common Market by the year 2000 - there were other realities that inspired 
5 Thomas Ohlson, Strategic Confrontation versus Economic Survival in Southern Africa, In Francis M. 
Deng and William I. Zartman (eds.), Conflict Resolution in Africa, (Washington D.C: Brookings 
Institution, 1991), p.239. 
6 SADC Secretariat, The Southern African Development Community-SADC: History. Evolution and 
Current Status, SADC Secretariat, Gaborone, 2003, p.2. 
7 Tom Ostergaard, SADC: A Political and Economic Survey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark, 
1990, p.57; c.f. Douglas G.Anglin, 1983, op.cil .. p.685. Anglin suggested that David Anderson, EEC 
delegate in Maseru, Lesotho, was first to propose the idea of SADCC and he then consulted key 
decision makers in the region on the idea. 
S Reginald H Green, 'Economic Integration/Coordination in Africa', In James Pickett and Hans Singer 
(eds.), Towards Economic Recovery in Sub-Saharan Africa, «London: Routledge, (990), p.108. 
9 Margaret C. Lee, op.cit .. pA8; Lee quotes Daniel Ndlela, whom she interviewed, who was the first 
black consultant to be hired by SADC. 
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the establishment of SADCC. And these related to the advcrsarial nature of political 
relations betwcen South Africa and most of the Southern African region. 
Thus SADCC's strategy \vas one of regional cooperation - primarily to act as a buffer 
against, and reduce dependence on apartheid South Africa - rather than as a regional 
economic integration mechanism. Harlov defines regional cooperation as 'a process 
whereby nation-states in common solve tasks and create improved conditions in order 
to maximise internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits for 
each participating country'; on the other hand regional integration is defined as 'a 
process through which a group of nation-states voluntarily in various degrees share 
each other's markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimise conflicts 
and maximise internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of 
their interaction: 10 
Regional cooperation also derived its political and moral force from the realisation 
that the majority of countries in the sub-region occupied a peripheral position that was 
juxtaposed to a relatively strong South African economy. Even though structurally 
South Africa's dominance seemed unassailable, SADCC countries were intent on 
denying it a legitimate political status in the sub-region, to treat it as a pariah, and 
thereby constraining its international diplomatic ambitions. The existence of the 
apartheid system within South Africa ensured that the country would be in a morally 
weak position in its regional foreign policy as well as in its diplomatic relations extra-
regionally. 
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South J\ frica socio-political character and the policies that sustained it cast a 
frightening spcctre across the rcgion, and constituted a challenge that needed 
collective action to dislodge. Thus, South Africa provided an objective for the 
mobilisation of political elite in Southern Africa into a collective force, using the 
instrument of regionalism. Indeed, regionalism in Southern Africa during this period 
followed Hveem's notion of collective action problems, namely identity or conscious 
(political) construction of regions (see Chapter 2).11 South Africa was regarded as an 
outsider in the sub-region - indeed it was viewed in the similar light as, if not worse 
than, former colonial powers. In this regard, it was seen as a key link in the more 
elaborate chain of imperialist establishment. Thus, some political commentators in 
the region suggested that de-linking was a political necessity in order to ensure 
. d I 12 autonomous economic eve opment. 
However, SADCC countries were deeply integrated into the South African economy, 
and they could not afford a clean break from it. As noted by Hanlon, South Africa 
dominated the economies of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland - its partners in the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) - and had strong trade ties with Zimbabwe, 
Malawi and Zambia.13 The country absorbed most of the cheap migrant labour from 
neighbouring countries in particular from Mozambique and Lesotho to sustain its 
mining economy. According to Hanlon, in the 1980s South Africa absorbed about 275 
\0 Jens Harlov, Regional Cooperation and Integration within Industry and Trade in Southern Africa, 
(A Idershot: Ashgate, 1997), p.15. 
II Helge Hveem, 'Explaining the Regional Phenomenon In an Era of Globalization', In Richard Stubbs 
and Geoffrey R 0 Underhill, (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Glohal Order, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p.71. 
12 Archie Mafeje, 'Food for Security and Peace in the SADCC Region', In Emmanuel Hansen (ed.), 
Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development, (London: Zed Books, 1987), p.206. Ibbo Mandaza, 
'Perspectives on Economic Cooperation and Autonomous Development in Southern Africa', In Samir 
Amin, Derrick ChitaIa and Ibbo Mandaza (eds.), SADCC: Prospects for Disengagement and 
Development in Southern Africa, (London: Zed Books, 1987), p.21 O. 
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000 legal migrant workers from the regIOn: half of these were from Lesotho and 
nearly 60 000 originated in Mozambique. 14 
Furthermore. South Africa was a source of intermediary inputs and manufactured 
goods for most countries in the sub-region. Even though this reflected a core-
periphery dynamic it represented something of inevitability for SADCC countries. 
Much as they projected a strong political opposition to South Africa, changing the 
nature of economic relations remained an intractable, if not an impossible challenge. 
In Davies and O'Meara's explanation these two factors - migrant labour and trade 
patterns - were indicative of the fact that 'South Africa's regional policy has thus 
been to ensure that neighbouring territories continue to serve South African capital in 
h ,15 t ese ways. 
3.1.2 Project Coordination as a basis of development 
As noted earlier, Southern Africa was not immune to the systemic crisis in the mid-
1970s through to the 1980s. The production structures of SADCC countries were not 
dissimilar to the rest of the continent, and the sub-region suffered as much from 
external shocks due to high commodity dependence. SADCC economies were very 
small and highly dependent on commodity exports, largely agriculture - which for the 
majority of countries accounted for over 90 percent of merchandise export receipts -
13 Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, (London: Catholic 
Institute for International Relations, 1986), p.2. 
14 ibid. 
15 Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, 'Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African 
Regional Policy since 1978', Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 11 (2), Aprial 1985, p.186. 
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and these were also subjected to unfavourable terms of trade in the world markcts. 16 
As Mafcje notes, the economics of SADCC countries also experienced negative 
balance of payments owing to decline in the price of commodities in world markets. 17 
Angola's balance of payment position was adversely affected in 1981 owing to war 
and low prices for its three major export commodities - coffee, petroleum and 
diamonds; Botswana. in 1982, experienced balance of payments difficulties owing to 
the low prices and sales of diamonds; Malawi was seriously affected due to low prices 
for tobacco, sugar and tea; in Swaziland it was sugar cane and cotton that came under 
the strain of world price depression; Zambia's position was made unenviable by the 
depression of copper and cobalt price; Zimbabwe, witnessed price effects linked to 
tobacco, cotton and sugar cane commodities; and in Tanzania it was sugar and cotton 
that suffered badly.18 As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, nothing much has changed both 
in the tenns of trade and in the structural features of these countries' economies. 
In short. SADCC countries were also affected as part of Sub-Saharan Africa by the 
economic ills that visited themselves upon the world economy and, as noted 
previously, this was compounded by the narrow structure of production as well as 
domestic policy failures in most African countries (see Chapter I). In line with the 
general paradigm that defined regionalism in much of Africa, the sub-region elevated 
the theme of development as one of the signifiers of its regionalist approach. 
The urgency and the significance of regionalism became all the more pronounced 
16 Archie Mafeje, op.cil.. p.190. 
17 ibid.. p.185. 
18 ibid. 
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with the systemic crisis and the concomitant economic decline. Continent wide, even 
before the onset of the crisis. regionalism was seen as a route towards overcoming 
social and economic challenges in the post-colonial period. As already set out in 
Chapter 1. this developmental strategy was largely politically driven and its general 
outlines was shaped by dirigiste interventionist measures, including import-
substitution industrialisation and Pan-African ideology. 
There was however no clear coordination or strong political oversight of the various 
integration projects across the continent. Each proceeded fairly autonomously 
depending on the perceived challenges in each sub-region. Rather than taking a 
functional integrationist route that would proceed along the neo-classical path starting 
with a free trade agreement and concluding with a political union, SADCC's 
programme of action traversed a different line: project coordination was its flagship 
strategy. 
Indeed, SADCC constructed its developmental framework around specific projects 
that were regarded as of priority to the sub-region and correlated with various 
countries' economic challenges. This minimalist ambition was partly due to extreme 
preoccupation with political questions, particularly the need to reduce dependence on 
South Africa. There is no doubt that the political elite rather than the Secretariat -
which was the bureaucratic structure of the organisation - played a more dominant 
role. 19 
It needs mentioning that a year after the establishment of SADCC, a new arrangement 
19 Douglas G. Angling. op.cit .. 1983, pp.692-693. 
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whose ohjective was purely trade integration, was also established. This arrangement 
- the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) of East and Southern African countries 
(which would later on become COMESA and rival SADC) - was established in 1981 
in Lusaka. Zambia as part of the continent wide vision pursued by the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the OAU as part of expediting a 
continent-wide common market by 2025; and was given political legitimacy by the 
Lagos Plan of Action in 198 I and the 199 I Abuja Plan?O It was clear from the outset 
that rivalries between these two organisations, occupying more or less similar 
geographic spaces, would be unavoidable. As Anglin notes, 'Whereas PTA was an 
example of painstaking development from below, SADCC was much more a 
deliberate act of political wiII, carrying the personal imprimatur of its presidents and 
• • . ·21 prIme mmlsters.' 
However, this co-existence was successfully managed to a point. There was an 
implicit understanding that SADCC would not engage in trade integration which was 
PTA's territory. Given the fact that initially five (and later six) SADCC members were 
also members of the PTA, it was therefore important that duplication of functions and 
rivalries be avoided. SADCC would focus on project cooperation and the political 
agenda regarding isolating South Africa; and the PTA would proceed with market 
integration that would culminate into a common market. However, as it would be the 
case much later when SADCC was transformed into SADC and decided to pursue 
market-led regional integration, this accommodation began to unravel and intra-
regional tensions, mainly between COMESA and SADC, accentuated (see Chapter 5). 
Given the complex history of these two organisations, COMESA will not be dealt 
20 Jens Harlov, op.cit., p.117. 
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"ith in detail in this thcsis. allusions will be made on areas that are of relevance to the 
case study under cxamination. 
As part of leveraging their collective strategy and generate economic benefits out of 
cooperation, SADCC countries set out to work on sectoral programme. This was a 
minimal approach to development and taking a step away from relying too heavily on 
South Africa. According to the programme of aetion that would encapsulate specific 
projects each country would be responsible for coordinating a sector into which donor 
funding would be channelled. There were twelve sectors that were identified as 
constituting this programme of action (See Table 3.1 below): 
21 Douglas G. Anglin, op.cit., 1983, p.685. 
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Table 3.1: SADCC's Programme of Action 
SADCC Programme Sector 
Energy Angola 
Food security Zimbabwe 
Agricultural research Botswana 
Livestock production and animal disease Malawi ' 
control 
Fisheries, forestry and wildlife Lesotho 
Soil and water conservation and land Zamhia 
utilisation 
Mining Zambia 
Industry and trade 
Transport and communications Mozambique 
Tourism Lesotho 
Manpower development Swaziland 
Adapted from Tom Outegaard, 1990, p.58. 
Transport and communications infrastructure were the main pillars of regional 
cooperation. Under transport, projects included the rehabilitation of railway line from 
Neala to the Mozambican border and of the Botswana railway; roads upgrading in 
Lesotho; roads building in Tanzania; increasing the capacity of Beira and Maputo 
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port; and building a new terminal facility at Harare airport.22 Given South Africa's 
dominance of the transport routes between the region and other international 
destinations. the main foeus of SADCC strategy, according to Gelb, ' ... was 
developing transport and communications infrastructure networks which did not have 
South Africa as a hub. ·23 
The railway line established during the colonial era had structured a highly dependent 
relationship between South Africa and other countries that were previously under 
colonial rule in the region. For example, a South African company controlled most 
forwarding of imports and exports, and South Africa would at times use its dominance 
to punish neighbouring countries who were deemed hostile by subjecting them to 
embargoes. border closure and rail and port delays.24 
South Africa's railways and seaports were crucial for the flow of trade of 
neighbouring countries. thus ' ... the economic livelihood of many African states 
depended on links which the Apartheid regime could cut whenever it liked. ,25 It is 
these infrastructural linkages, anchored on South Africa, that SADCC member states 
sought to sever and create capacities that would ensure collective self reliance outside 
South Africa's purview. Some of the landlocked countries - Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi - are to be found in Southern Africa, and it was 
believed that the sectoral cooperation approach would be of greater value to them in 
22 Christopher R. Hill, 'Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa', African Affairs, Volume 82 (327), 
April 1983, p.215; Robert M. Price, 'Pretoria's Southern African Strategy',A/ricanAffairs, Volume 83 
(330), January 1984, p.224. 
23 Stephen Gelb. 'Africa and NEPAD', A Report prepared/or the UK Department/or International 
Development (DFID), Johannesburg: Edge Institute, 2002, p.9. 
24 Joseph Hanlon, op.cit.. pp.2-3. 
2~ Africa Today, (3rd eds.), The Southern A/rica Development Community (SADC), (London: Africa 
Book LTD, 1997), p.82. 
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terms of providing the critical linkages needed to access external markets. 
Countries such as Mozambique that had the potential to facilitate transport linkages 
for trade in the region came under a severe destabilisation programme by South 
Africa. The scope for developing viable transport networks independent of South 
Africa was thus significantly narrowed. This rendered one of SADCC's main 
objectives - that of de-linking from South Africa - virtually impossible to achieve 
under the circumstances. The sectoral strategy in the sub-region was not optimal and 
far less capable of achieving its core objective of de-linking from South Africa and 
encouraging self-sufficiency across SADCC. 
The weakness of SADCC's sectoral approach was also manifest in one important 
respect: it created a perverse situation where the political elite in the regional 
integration project became preoccupied with the domestic agenda at the expense of 
regional cooperation. This was further compounded by a lack of strong institutional 
capacity and gradual loss of commitment by political elite in regional cooperation 
project. Regional solidarity began to slowly ebb away as domestic considerations and 
'national interests' took hold. Its importance was only in so far as countries were going 
to leverage it for their individual material benefits. 
3.1.3 SADCC's External Dependence 
While this sector-based approach provided state actors across the sub-region with a 
sense of common purpose and an objective around which their expectations of the 
future could converge, it however betrayed serious shortcomings. In addition to those 
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already set out previollsly, one other short commg was with regards to its over-
reliance on donor SUpp0l1. Every year SADCC would convene a consultative 
conference "here governments and donor agencies would make financial pledges to 
support various projects; and the European Economic Commission (EEC) was the 
major source of funding. 26 These pledges were not made directly to the SADC 
Secretariat in Botswana, but to individual governments after the donors had decided 
which projects they wanted to fund.27 
In the late 1980s, within a decade of its establishment, SADCC had already received 
about US$6.3 billion and with 490 projects under its command.28 As Mkandawire 
noted, SADCC was the only regional scheme in Africa to receive so much attention 
from external donors.29 Mkandawire suggests that external involvement fulfilled two 
purposes: first it ensured that the radical impulses within SADC were kept in check; 
and second, it had strategic importance for the European countries in particular in 
terms of ensuring stability and predictability in the region; and ensuring accessibility 
ofthe region to capital for markets and raw materials.30 
More than two decades after SADCC was established there is still strong donor 
interests in SADC's activities and the UK's Department of Foreign and International 
Development (DflD) plays a key role in sustaining SADC's existence. Donors, 
26 Douglas G. Anglin, op.cit., p.l77. 
27 Margaret C. Lee, op.cit, p.50. 
28 Tom Ostergaard, op.cit., p.59. 
29 Thandika Mkandawire, 'Dependence and Economic Cooperation: The Case of SADCC', In Emanuel 
Hansen (ed.), .4frica: Perspectives on Peace and Development, (London: Zed Books, 1987), p.165. 
3D ibid., pp.167-168. 
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according to 1)11I)"s Regional Trade and Integration advisor, devote substantial sums 
ofmoncy and technical assistance to Secretariats of regional integration schemes.3l 
This has always created perpetual dependency and inevitably tended to direct regional 
projects along donor preferenees.32 This dependence tore into the heart of SADCC's 
'radical' programme to de-link from the external world, and it exposed this vision as 
seriously lacking in substance. Furthermore it helped to render SADCC strategically 
weak and lacking a deep sense of purpose and vision for the future. 
3.2 SADCC and South Africa: Sources of Regional Tensions 
Tense relations between South Africa and the sub-region go as far back as the 1960s, 
and by the 1990s these had reached a nadir. In discussing the nature of these relations, 
Davies has pointed out that the period between 1960 and 1990 exhibited weakening of 
links between South Africa and the surrounding region.33 Some of the features of this 
relationship, as Davies has noted, include increased political incompatibility between 
apartheid South Africa and independent states in the region; import restrictions caused 
by South Africa's import substitution policies; and the effects of South Africa's 
destabilisation agenda in the sub-region.34 Among these, the destabilisation agenda 
seem to have had the most deleterious impact on the overall nature of political 
31 Helena McCleod, 'Regional Integration and the Role of Donors', In Dirk Hansohm, Willie 
Breytenbach and Trudi Hartzenberg, Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa, (Windhoek: 
Gamsberg Macmillan, 2003), p.22S. 
32 Christopher R. Hill, op.cil., p.2IS; Robert M. Price, op.cit., p.228. 
33 Rob Davies, 'Building A new Relationship in Southern Africa: The Challenge Facing South Africa's 
Government of National Unity', In Bjorn Hettne, Andras Inotai, and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds.), Globalism 
and The Nell' Regionalism (London: London, 1999), p.266. 
34 ibid. 
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relations between South A frica and sub-regional states and had wrought destruction in 
Southern Africa's social and production structures. 
The effects of South Africa's past policies in the region are still evident. Indeed these 
effects run deep and, to a considerable extent, complicate regional relations as 
negative perceptions of South Africa still abound, even after apartheid has ended. This 
also seems to have had a remarkable effect on post-apartheid South Africa's 
confidence in projecting leadership in the region. 
As will be shown in Chapter 5, negative perceptions generated during this period 
continue to play themselves out in the contemporary relations between South Africa 
and most SADC countries. This is made all the more complex by the state of near 
permanency in the structural differences between South Africa and the rest of the sub-
region. The next section will look at the exact nature of South Africa's regional 
strategy, its twin pillars of constellation approach and destabilisation programme, as 
well as the role of external players in the sub-region. 
3.3 South Africa's Regional Strategy 
It is important to emphasise that South Africa's regional strategy was shaped mainly 
by domestic socio-political considerations and, to some degree, the frustration created 
by international isolation. A clear regional approach linked to these two 
considerations first surfaced mid-1970s through what became known as 'Total 
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National Strategy' .35 The objective of this strategy was mainly to safeguard the 
survival of white minority rule and ensure greater security at its borders. 
This was initially sparked by interlinked developments emanating from within the 
domestic socio-political context as well as from the wider region. First, there were 
South Africa's liberation movements - the African National Congress (ANC) and the 
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) - nestling in neighbouring states and launching cross-
border attacks against Pretoria's interests, including military and other identified 
symbols of apartheid. 
Second. as Price has suggested, there were suspicions on the part of Pretoria regarding 
the motives of neighbouring states, especially the possibility that they could mobilise 
conventional military attacks. Such phantoms were reinforced by Deon Geldenhuys, 
an academic who had strong links with the apartheid administration, and had 
counselled on means in which South Afriea could effectively carry out its regional 
destabilisation in order to stave off potential attacks from its neighbours.36 
South Africa's anxieties were heightened by the mutual defence pact between front-
line states in the early 1970s.37 Cuba's military presence and the Soviet's military 
succour to liberation movements in the sub-region further aggravated these 
apprehensions. Cuba and Soviet's military assistance was mainly channelled towards 
the Marxist-oriented MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique - both 
liberation movements until the dawn of independence in 1974. 
3~ According to Joseph Hanson the concept of total strategy was coined by a French General, Andre 
Beaufre. whose writings inspired PW Botha. See Joseph Hanlon, op.cit .. p.59. 
36 See Joseph Hanlon, op.cit .. pp.29-31. 
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In response both to domestic threats and those perceived to be emanating from the 
region, P. W. Botha. the then Minister of Defence - and later South Africa's President 
- mooted a 'Total National Strategy' in 1977. The external threat perceived by South 
Africa. including the Soviet influence in the region, the existence of liberation 
movements across a number of regional bases and the rise to power in Angola and 
Mozambique of Marxist-oriented political parties was viewed as constituting a 'total 
onslaught' to undermine white rule in South Africa.38 This was also framed, as 
suggested by Hanlon, as ' ... a specifically communist plot to overthrow white rule in 
South Africa. ,39 According to Barber and Barrat, 'The concept of the Total National 
Strategy (TNS) reflected Botha's view of security as a critical consideration in foreign 
and domestic policies:4o 
EssentiaJly, as Price has observed, South Africa's foreign policy preoccupation was 
with 'the protection of the country's unique socio-political order from external 
threat.'41 This socio-political order was under-girded by certain patterns of state-
capital relations, which included complex sets of relationships between parastatal 
corporations and domestic and foreign corporations,42 completing what Jessop 
characterises as 'state monopoly capitalism' .43 For example, Calinicos points out that 
state corporation dominated sectors such as: iron and steel (ISCOR), electricity 
(ESCOM), coal and oil (SASOL), oil refining (NATREF), aluminium (AI usaf), and 
37 Robert M. Price, op.cit .. p.13. 
)8 Tom Ostergaard, op.cit., p.5l 
3Q Joseph Hanlon, op.cil .. pp.7-8. 
40 James Barber and Jane Barrat, South ,4frica's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security 
1945 - 1988, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.253. 
41 Robert M. Price, op.cil .. p.ll. 
42 Vella Pillay, 'Rising Cost of Apartheid: The Economic Crisis', Phyllis Johnson and David Martin 
(eds.), Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War, (ZPH/SARDC, 1986), p.222. 
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Industrial Development Corporation which was active in many sectors.44 This thesis 
will not get into detail in discussing the constellation of social forces within South 
Africa. especially the relationship between the state elite and business during this 
period so as not to lose the broader context within which Botha's regional policies 
4' evolved .. 
Botha's 'total national strategy' was, it must be emphasised, strongly linked to the 
economic logic of the apartheid system and the internal security strategy to limit 
domestic political activities and uprisings, especially in the wake of the Durban 
strikes in 1973, the political uprisings in Soweto in 1976, and intimations of a 
possible armed 'insurrection' generated by the ANC military wing in exile working 
with underground networks within the country. 
As Ostergaard has argued, this total strategy was designed to maintain white rule in 
South Africa by eroding external support for the liberation movements; secure 
recognition of South Africa's hegemony in the region; thwart attempts by SADCC 
countries to lessen their economic dependence on South Africa, and destroy the image 
of non-racial states in the SADCC region as a model for South Africa.46 There were 
two main pillars that characterised it: The first entailed a soft dimension aimed at 
41 Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theory and Meditations, (Oxford: Blackwells, 1982), p.14. 
44 Alex Calinicos, Southern Africa After Zimbabwe, (London: Pluto Press, 1981), p.86. 
45 For a good discussion on this see Alex Calinicos, op.cit .. p.114. Calinicos highlights the linkages 
between the military and big business in sustaining South Africa's regional strategy, p.114; Tim M. 
Shaw discusses South Africa's industrial-military complex in the context of sustaining the white 
minority rule in South Africa and the importance of this complex in the regional and international 
strategy, Timothy M. Shaw, 'South Africa's Role in Southern Africa in the Year 2000', In Olajide 
Aluko and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Southern Africa in the 1980s. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1985). For a detailed critique on the nation-state centric literature on Southern Africa, see Ibrahim S.R. 
Mbasaha and Timothy M. Shaw, 'Southern Africa Before and After Nkomati', In Ibrahim S.R. 
Msabaha and Timothy M. Shaw (eds.), Confrontation and Liberation in Southern Africa, (London: 
Westview Press, 1987). 
46 Tom Ostergaard, op.cit .. p.52. 
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structuring a region-based alliance - 'Constellation' - and the second was in the form 
of dcstabilisation. 
3.3.1 Constellation of Southern African States 
The growmg international isolation of South Africa in the 1970s and pressure to 
reform its domestic politics placed the Nationalist regime on the defensive. This 
isolation was gnawing at its diplomatic image and, compounded by growing domestic 
insecurity, pushed South Africa to seek greater realignment in regional politics. This, 
it was hoped, would help redeem South Africa's image in the eyes of the international 
community, especially western countries. 
South A frica waS keenly aware of the difficulties of endearing itself with western 
countries when the domestic political situation remained sullied by its apartheid 
policies. Furthermore, as Hanlon observed, South Africa wanted to use the sub-region 
as a useful export market for its industries in order to attain self-sufficiency in the face 
of international isolation.47 
Against this background, South Africa sought to construct a regional cooperation 
framework that was defined primarily in terms of its interests. Thus a constellation of 
Southern African states (CONSAS) first mooted by Prime Minister B. J. Vorster in 
1974 was seized upon and pursued with great enthusiasm by P. W. Botha when he 
became President in 1979.48 This was designed to be a carrot that would draw 
47 Joseph Hanlon, op.cit .. p.2. 
48 Christopher R. Hill, op.cit., p.14. 
124 
neighbouring states into South Africa's political orbit, and provide the basis for intra-
regional economic relations centred on South Africa's ideology. Thus it would also 
allow South Africa a greater political and economic leverage on the region, while at 
the same time shoring up its diplomatic image abroad. 
According to Davies and O'Meara, the constellation approach ran from the end of 
1979 until mid 1980.49 South Africa calculated that a constellation would achieve 
both political ends and economic objectives, The economic dimension was important, 
particularly so in view of the pangs experienced by the domestic industry due to the 
contraction of the internal market. This strategy was also linked to the consolidation 
of domestic capital-state relations, and received the support of white business 
community in South Africa.50 
Zimbabwe. as Davies and O'Meara suggested, would have been the key country in 
constructing this constellation, and countries such as Malawi and Swaziland - both 
cooperating with South Africa - would have been the next targets.51 Botha's plan to 
create a constellation was scuppered by Zanu-PF's victory in the polls in 1980, which 
also witnessed Mugabe's ascendance to power. As noted by Calinicos, 'Zimbabwe 
delivered an apparently fatal blow to his [Botha's] plan to create ' ... a constellation of 
states dominated by Pretoria in Southern Africa.'52 Mugabe would later playa central 
role in SADCC politics, leading anti-apartheid efforts in the sub-region. The 
49 Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, op.ci(., p.196. 
~o Christopher R. Hill. op.eir., p.2l6. 
~I Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, op.ei(., p.l96. 
~2 Alex Calinicos, op.ci(., p.lll. 
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establishment of SADCC In April 1980 finally put paid to South Africa's 
constellation initiatives.53 
Had South Alriea succeeded in normalising its relations with neighbouring countries 
it would have made significant strides towards enhancing its international image, both 
politically and for its domestic capital.54 Even though Southern Africa was of 
immediate strategic importance to South Africa there was a strong desire by Botha to 
court black African states further north of the sub-region. 
The apartheid regime was aware that failure to court its neighbours and charm the 
wider continent would deprive it of an opportunity to assert itself in the international 
system, and that this would have guaranteed its isolation for many years to come. In 
view of the fact that by the mid-80s South Africa's economy had reached a crisis 
point, worsened by outflows of capital and sanctions, South Africa had to rethink its 
internal project and regional strategy.55 Considerations of political sustainability of 
the apartheid regime and the competitiveness of its economy weighed heavily on 
South Africa's state actors. There is no doubt that South Africa had a strong urge to 
achieve international recognition via a regional strategy and play an important role in 
. . I t 56 the mternatlOna sys em. 
In this respect there are important parallels or continuities between the apartheid and 
the post-apartheid state's regional strategy. In the post-apartheid era, South Africa's 
global strategy is linked to a strong regional role and building of common approach 
53 ibid.. p.197. 
54 ibid., p.217. 
55 See an insightful discussion by VeIJa PiJlay, op.cit .. pp.223-224. 
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with its regional partners, and expresses strategic competitive regionalism (see 
Chapters 5 and 6). The discontinuity lies in the fact of a changed (apartheid) social 
milieu, absence of the Cold War and emergent realities associated with globalisation. 
Under Botha, South Africa saw the region as a centre-piece towards attainment of 
larger diplomatic stakes in international relations; under the ANC government the 
same logic is apparent (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
As Mwase and Maasdorp have noted: 
'The RSA's thrust under de Klerk was the development and 
consolidation of trade links with key African countries' growth poles 
and through them the zones: Kenya (East Africa), Egypt (North Africa), 
Nigeria (Anglophone West Africa) and Cote d'Ivoire (Francophone 
West Africa). This growth centres' strategy was a pointer to Pretoria's 
determination to go beyond the SACU/SADC/COMESA sub-region in 
pursuit of wider African markets, replacing in some cases European and 
h A · I' ,57 Nort men can supp lers. 
This observation by Maasdorp and Mwase has curious parallels with the current South 
Africa's foreign economic strategy. The Department of Trade and Industry 'Global 
Economic Strategy' state for example that: 'We have identified Nigeria, Algeria, and 
Egypt as key countries with whom we will need to collaborate closely in pursuing our 
56 See Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, opcit., pp.l84-211. 
57 Gavin Maasdorp and Ngi1a Mwase, 'The Southern African Customs Union', In Ademola Oyejide, 
Ibrahim Elbadawi and Sephen Yeo, Regional Integration and Trade Liberali=ation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, (Volume 3), (London: Macmillan, 1999), p.242. 
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African agenda. ,<g The main thrust of this strategy is to be Africa-wide in pursuing 
political and economic relations and is part of South Africa's strategic competitive 
regionalism (see Chapters 5 and 6). This would be predicated on building strong 
diplomatic relations in the wider Africa region and projecting a strong regional power 
image in global affairs. 
When South Africa's efforts to court regional states during apartheid failed, it recoiled 
behind its immediate sphere of influence: the 'independent homeland states', and 
formed a much diminished constellation pact with them. These homeland states were 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). These hardly had international 
recognition as states.59 It was a chimera created to serve the insatiable political needs 
of the South African state as well as to soothe its insecurities. It was also against this 
complex background that SADCC emerged. In its first appearance, the organisation 
was dubbed ' ... counter-constellation - a designation that in itself reflects the black 
state's opposition to South Africa's proposed constellation.'60 Furthermore, South 
Africa shifted from a softer to an aggressive line in its regional strategy. 
3.3.2 The Destabilisation Programme 
In order to stave off potential revolt - either domestically or from outside or both -
against the apartheid state, Pretoria embarked on a systematic destabilising campaign 
targeting specific countries it deemed hostile. It frantically searched for the military 
bases of liberation movements in neighbouring countries with a view to demoralising 
58 Faizel Ismail, Xavier Carim and Peter Draper, South Africa's Global Economic Strategy: A Policy 
Framework and Key Elements, DTI, Pretoria, 2000. 
59 See Joseph Hanlon, op.cit., p.37-43. 
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and completely eliminating them. According to Davies and O'Meara, targeted 
countries were grouped into three categories: conservative states who were seen as 
potential collaborators; those considered to be the most vulnerable to pressure; and 
those seen as constituting a challenge to South Africa.61 
Countries on the first tier included Swaziland and Malawi, and these were offered 
incentives of various sorts, including direct financial payments and economic 
concessions. Swaziland is said to have been offered a payment of R50 million as part 
of the customs union agreement in the early 1980s, and it secretely signed a 'Non-
Aggression Pact' with South Africa, locking it into South Africa's objectives of 
eliminating 'terrorism and subversion,.62 This therefore meant that South Africa's 
liberation movements or any political activity linked to them would not be tolerated in 
these territories. 
Countries that fell on the second and third tiers included Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Angola. These came under severe military harassment by South Africa, especially 
intensifying between 1979 and 1983.63 The application of the destabilisation 
programme also entailed cross-border attacks by South Africa targeted at ANC 
members living in these countries; economic coercion in the form of restrictions 
imposed on the movement of goods; and direct support offered by South Africa to 
insurgent activities in Angola and Mozambique.64 
60 Deon Geldenhuys, op.cil., p.4l; Christopher R. Hill, op.cil., p.223. 
61 See Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara., op.cil., p.l99. 
62 ibid, p.200. 
63 See Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, op.cil., pp.199-200. 
b4 ibid 
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The sub-region was, in South Africa's view, an extension of its intcrnal sccurity 
programme. In this understanding, the domestic and the sub-regional were two faces 
of the same reality. Internally, the South African state was highly militariscd and this 
spilled over into the region in the fonn of destabilisation programme. An important 
aspect of South Africa's defence policy, as observed by Ohlson, was to increase 
capacity for military intervention in the region, and this was ostensibly done to limit 
S . . f1 65 oVlet III uence. 
It is estimated that between 1980 and 1988 the total regional cost of South Africa's 
destabilisation amounted to U$60 billion, measured in GOP losses, with about a 
million deaths and millions displaced. 66 This is said to have been about three times 
the gross external resource inflows in the fonn of grants, soft loans, export credits and 
commercial loans over a nine year period.67 For Angola alone the loss of South 
Africa's aggression stood at US$l 0 billion.68 
These costs have been unevenly distributed in SADC with a large proportion 
shouldered by Angola and Mozambique. Both countries had about 1.5 million people 
displaced as refugees in other countries.69 In his presentation before the United 
Nations conference in 1988, Robert Gersony, the U.S. State Department official, 
described South Africa as having produced ' ... a systematic and brutal war of terror 
against innocent civilians through forced labour, starvation, physical abuse and 
65 Thomas Ohlson. op.cit .• p.224. 
66 Tom Ostergaard, op.cit .. p.51; Margaret C. Lee, op.cit .. p.46. 
67 Tom Ostergaard, op.cit; Joseph Hanlon. op.cit .. p.l. 
68 People's Republic of Angola, White Paper on Acts o/Aggression by the Racist South African Regime 
Against the People's Republic 0/ Angola, (Luanda, 1983), quoted in Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, 
op.cit.. p.202. 
69 ibid. 
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wanton killing ... one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings 
since World War 11.,70 
The systematic destruction of transport routes to Beira and Ncala in Mozambique 
forced countries to rely on South Africa for transit of goods, with the resulting net loss 
to Mozambique of about US$I.5 billion in transit traffic revenue.7 ! For Malawi, 75 
percent of its overseas traffic was routed through South Attica; it was 50 percent for 
Swaziland; and almost 40 percent of Zimbabwe; Botswana and Lesotho depended 
entirely on South Africa.72 Other costs included loss and deferred economic 
development, and this is estimated at US$2 billion.73 
Arguably, it is on the basis of these costs that a number of SADCC countries would 
later expect a democratic South Africa led by the ANC to be more generous and less 
self-serving in its economic relations with the rest of the sub-region (see Chapter 5). 
Indeed, as Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan have noted, 'There is a moral obligation 
for the new South Africa to engage Southern Africa in a positive manner.'74 As 
discussed in Chapter 5, these expectations turned into bitter disappointment as South 
Africa, post-apartheid, became pre-occupied with its own domestic challenges, global 
interests and neo-mercantilist pursuit vis-a-vis the sub-region. 
70 quoted in ibid.. p.52. 
71 ibid.. p.54. 
72 ibid.. p.53. 
73 Joseph Hanlon, op.cit .. p.2. 
74 Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick J McGowan, 'Partner or Hegemon? South Africa in Africa', (Part 
I) Journal o/Contemporary African Studies, Volume 16 (I), 1998, p.12. 
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3.3.3 ihe role (~r externa/forces in Southern /~rrica 
Some commentators have suggested that during this period, especially in the 1970s 
and 1980s, South Africa played a 'sub-imperial' role on behalfofwestern interests in 
the sub-region.75 While the formation of SADCC cannot be understood apart from the 
Cold War superpower rivalry - indeed South Africa was well positioned in these 
rivalries in Southern Africa - there is no sufficient basis to make a strong claim that it 
was acting purely as a proxy in this ideological battle. Indeed South Africa had its 
own interests and this counted weightily in defining its regional strategy. 
This is not to suggest that South Africa had no strategic relations with the US, but the 
primacy for South Africa's strategy would seem to have been on its socio-political 
agenda at the domestic level. And yet the character of the South African state and its 
(regional) foreign policy blended well with US's interest in the region, especially its 
objective of repelling 'communist' influence and limiting the sprouting of anti-
western revolutionary movements. In this regard, South Africa and the US could be 
characterised as travellers on the same path and reinforced each other at the 
intersections oftheir purposes. South Africa was always ready to invoke the spectre of 
communist expansion in the sub-region in order to gain western sympathies for its 
regional strategy. 
Quite evidently, during this period the political developments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
were to a considerable degree shaped by super-power rivalries - and in the sub-region 
South Africa was an important US ally (and not so much a 'sub-imperial state') in this 
75 Ibbo Mandaza, op.cit .. p.226. 
132 
rivalry. Africa's position as a strategic chessboard, as well as contending views on the 
extent or Southern Africa's importance in this tension, is well documented in African 
literature.76 Mandaza quotes a telling address by Chester Crocker who was 
responsible for US Africa Policy:77 
'The Reagan administration recogntzes that Africa is a region of 
groWing importance to U.S. global objectives economic, political 
strategic, human and so forth. We cannot afford to neglect a region 
where our interests are so clearly growing and I would simply refer here 
in passing to the obvious factors of our long history of involvement with 
Africa: to the many links of culture and blood that ties an important 
portion of our own citizenry to Africa; to our growing import-
dependence on fuel and non-fuel minerals produced in Africa, to 
Africa's growing role as an actor in World politics.' 
us strategic approach towards Africa was clearly to deter the perceived growing 
influence of 'communism' and to tighten regional security to safeguard US interests 
as it regarded Africa as its sphere of influence.78 This is where a common cause was 
to be nurtured between South Africa's political objectives and those of the US. The 
76 Michael Chege, 'Sub-Saharan Africa: underdevelopment's last stand', In Barbara Stallings, Global 
Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995); Bernard Magubane and Ibbo Mandaza (eds.), Wither South Africa, (New 
Jersey: Africa World Press, 1988); Sam C Nolutshungu, ' South African State and Africa', In Bernard 
Magubane and Ibbo Mandaza I, Wither South Africa, (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1988); Kevin C 
Dunn, 'Africa and International Relations Theory', In Kevin C Dunn and Timothy M Shaw (eds.), 
Africa's Challenge to international Relations Theory. (London: Palgrave, 2001); Adebayo Adedeji, 
'Marginalisation and Marginality: Context, Issues and Viewpoints', In Adedeji (ed.), Africa within the 
World: Beyond Dispossession and Dependence, (London: Zed Books, 1993); Christopher Clapham, 
Africa and the international System: The Politics of State Sun'ival, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996). 
77 Ibbo Mandaza, 'US Policy and the Struggle for National Independence' , In Bernard Magubane and 
Ibbo Mandaza (eds.), Wither South Africa, (New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1988), p.120. 
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existence of Marxist-Leninist inclined revolutionary movements in Mozambique in 
the form of fRELlMO, and Angola in the form of MPLA, was sufficient to qualifY 
the sub-region as of strategic importance to the US. 
A contrary view regarding the emphasis of South Africa's strategy is offered by 
Nolutshungu. He contends that that: 
'The thrust of South Africa's African foreign policy under Botha was to 
be Southern African rather than continent-wide, corresponding to the 
extent of effective applicability of South Africa's military power; and as 
luck would have it, coinciding with an American decision after 
Reagan's accession to give the highest priority to 'fighting communism' 
in Southern Africa while treating the rest of sub-Saharan Africa as less 
. ,79 Important. 
This thesis is of the view that although Southern Africa was the immediate centre-
piece, the thrust of South Africa's strategy sought to transcend it and to reach out to 
other African leaders as a gateway to international recognition (see discussion below). 
In an apt observation, and in contrast to Nolutshungu's perspective cited earlier, Deon 
Geldenhuys argues that South Africa was attracted to bigger 'diplomatic stakes' than 
surrounding black states: it sought rapprochement with black states up north, beyond 
South Africa's immediate political remit.8o This explanation seems more cogent given 
78 Ibbo Mandaza, op.cit .. 1988, pp.120-121. 
79 Sam C Nolutshungu, op.cit .. p.I72. 
80 Deon Geldenhuys, op.cit .. p.38. 
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the importance South Africa attached to enhancing its diplomatic image - even though 
at the back ofa repressive state machinery. 
As the visage of South Africa's relationship with the US presented itself, it expressed 
something deeply perverse given US moral standing as a guardian of universal 
principles such as self-determination, and South Africa's pariah status, owing to the 
repressive apartheid regime that was at the helm. However, at the core of this 
relationship, the objectives and the means adopted were perfectly reconcilable. The 
US viewed developments in Southern Africa through the prism of its strategic 
tensions with the Soviet bloc, and was prepared to stretch its capacity in shoring up 
counter-vailing forces, and in this strategy South Africa was a key pillar. It was 
particularly attracted to Southern African politics by Soviet aid of MPLA in Angola, 
and FRELIMO in Mozambique.8l 
These two movements, supported by the USSR, went on to assume power and 
declared their party rule Marxist-Leninist. Therefore, in the context of the Cold War, 
the US drew upon the doctrine of raison d'etat and its quintessential 'dual moral 
standard' which, as Dunne and Schmidt defines it, delineates two principles of right 
and wrong: one for individual citizens living inside the state; and a different standard 
for the state in its external relations with other states.82 
Thus US's support of South Africa, in spite of its morally reprehensible human rights 
record, did not constitute much of an unsettling moral dilemma. This was made all the 
81 See Olajide Aluko, 'Nigeria, the United States and Southern Africa', African Affairs, Volume 78 
(310), January 1979, p.97. 
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more compelling in view of the fact that the ANC received 'considerable material and 
diplomatic support by the Soviet Union', and had military and political bases in 
. f h b . 83 varIOUS parts 0 t e su -regIOn. 
The OAU, and specifically countries in Southern Africa, did not hide their disdain for 
South Africa's hegemonic strategy, and set out to resist any attempt to draw them into 
a formal relationship with the apartheid state.84 Attempts to court neighbouring 
countries in Southern Africa and draw them into some form of political constellation 
under South Africa's leadership proved fruitless as the degree of animosity 
heightened. 
A number of countries in the sub-region, including Zimbabwe, Angola, Tanzania and 
Mozambique maintained a very close relationship with the national liberation 
movements in South Africa and provided a protective cover for these, including 
provision of military and other material support. For example, the ANC and the PAC 
were given observer status in SADCC and were also full members of the PTA of East 
and Southern African countries (which later became COMESA).85 
It needs stressing that beyond constructing a political bulwark against South Africa, 
SADCC did not have much success in achieving the objective of self-sufficiency and 
economic development. There was hardly any strong basis to evolve common values 
and converging expectations on much deeper questions of economic integration. As 
82 Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, 'Realism', In John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globali=ation of 
World Politics (2nd Eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.143 
83 Yash Tandon, 'Africa within the Context of Global Superpower Struggle', In Emanuel Hansen (ed.), 
Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development, (London: Zed Books, 1987), p.40. 
84 Deon Geldenhuys, op.cit .. p.39. 
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the political landscape within South Africa gradually assumed a positive turn in the 
early 1990s, with the apartheid government slowly unravelling, it became clear that 
SADCC would have to reorient its approach. 
3.4 From SADCC to SADC: A Transition to 'New Regionalism' in Southern 
Africa 
The change from a coordinating conference to a development community took place 
in August 1992 when the Heads of State and Government of the SADCC met in 
Windhoek, Namibia. This was concluded with the signing of a binding Treaty by all 
member states. This gathering signalled a shift from a merely coordinating body to a 
development community that would foster cooperation and integration on a wide 
range of areas. The change of name from Southern African Development 
Coordinating Conference (SADCC) to Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) was a powerful symbolism which expressed a deeper sense of commitment 
to regional identity. South Africa joined the body in August 1994. Its integration 
brought greater promise of economic prosperity, and over a year later trade 
integration was placed on the agenda. 
SADC's objectives are distinctly articulated in Article 5 of the founding Treaty, 
which sets out to achieve development and economic growth; poverty alleviation and 
enhancing the quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa; evolve common 
political values, systems and institutions; promote interdependence among member 
85 Interview with Sindiso Ngwenya, Assistant General-Secretary: COMESA, 7 September 2004, 
Lusaka. 
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states and ensure collective self.-reliance; ensure linkages and complementarity 
between national and regional programmes; strengthen historical, social and cultural 
ties among member states, harmonise political and socio-economic policies of 
member countries; develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles 
to the free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples 
from member countries; promote the development of human resources; promote the 
development and transfer of technology in the sub-region_86 
3_ 4_1 From Closed to Open Markets in Southern Africa? 
Building on the basis of the initial project coordination mechanism that was under the 
aegis of SADCC, SADC set itself to achieve far-reaching objectives and ensure 
market integration. As the African Development Bank report suggests, the current 
integration initiatives in the continent are building on existing institutions, but at the 
same time broadening the objectives of economic cooperation and regional integration 
to include and emphasise the coordination and harmonization of macro-economic 
policies, the lowering of trade tariffs and the removal of some non-tariff barriers to 
trade; and the facilitation of capital mobility, the free movement of persons and 
improving the business environment.87 
The market integration agenda in SADC only emerged strongly when the SADC Free 
Trade Protocol was negotiated around 1995 and 1996. This was after South Africa 
had acceded to membership in 1994, and pushed for the negotiation of a trade chapter 
86 SADC Treaty, Gaborone, 1992. 
87 African Development Bank, Economic Cooperation and Regional Integration Policy, (Addis Ababa: 
African Development Bank, 2000), p.ll. 
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(see Chapter 5). 
Pressed both from within - by the magnitude of developmental challenges in various 
SADC countries (see Chapter 5) - and from without - as a result of the developments 
in the global economy and pressure to integrate - SADC was compelled to assume a 
character that was to be different from that of its predecessor. And one of the 
imperatives that the sub-region was to be faced with is with regards to transformation 
away from import substitution industrialisaiton to closer integration with global 
markets. Its agenda would be more expanded, seeking to balance the political and 
economic dimensions. 
Close integration with the global economy was gradually seen as necessary and an 
efficacious strategy to dealing with multiple developmental challenges and 
marginalisation. In addition, on first appearance, the essence of the regional 
transformation was to transcend the political agenda - narrowly defined - and sectoral 
coordination, and move towards a much deeper and wide ranging form of economic 
integration that would touch on dimensions that were never before part of its agenda, 
for example trade, monetary and fiscal policies. 
Indeed, as the African Development Bank Report suggests: 
'SADC represents an ambition to achieve a deeper and wider form of 
economic integration among members states moving beyond sectoral 
level coordination towards cooperation, convergence and eventually 
integration in areas such as monetary and fiscal policies, exchange and 
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trade regimes, and the unrestrained movement within the region of 
capitaL labour, as well as goods and services. ,88 
3.4.2. Post-Apartheid South Africa and Regional Relations 
Even before joining SADC in August 1994, the ANC had already considered South 
Africa's future options in the region, and it was clear that at the dawn of democracy 
the country would integrate positively into regional relations. As the largest economy 
in the region, with relatively developed institutions and sophisticated productive 
forces, South Africa's participation in SADC was initially considered a boon by most 
countries and by prominent African scholars. 
Asante observed that, 'Southern Africa can look forward to the closer integration of 
the dominant economy of the subcontinent into the economic and political structures 
of the region.'89 In his take, Azam suggested that South Africa's regional role could 
propel growth in Southern Africa in pretty much the same way that the Asian tigers 
(Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) led the way for Malaysia and 
Southern China.9o 
Azam further suggested that, because of South Africa's future role in Southern Africa, 
the region' ... might become the main pole of Africa's development in the medium-
88 African Development Bank, Economic Integration in Southern Africa, Volume I, (Abidjan: African 
Development Bank, 1993), p.206. 
89 SKB Asante ,Regionalism and Africa '05 Development. Macmillan: London, 1997, p.12. 
90 Paul Azam, 'Development Policy for Africa: A Research Agenda', in J Berthelemy (ed.), Wither 
African Economies? (Paris: OECD, 1995), p.84. 
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term.,9! Similarly, western countries hailed South Africa's participation in the 
regional economy as an impol1ant development that would help stem the tide of 
economic decline and poor governance in the sub-region, and help anchor regional 
economics on a sustainable growth path.92 Perhaps these views were over-optimistic 
about future realities in Southern Africa. 
These views were most likely powered by the ANC's own idealistic outlook to 
regional relations before the chilly winds of the post-l 990 economic challenges set in. 
There is little doubt that the idea that Southern Africa is a pillar upon which South 
Africa's foreign policy rests was always at the heart of the ANC's foreign policy 
approach before it assumed power.93 Consider the following assertions from its 
celebrated Reconstruction and Development Programme CROP): 
'In the long run, sustainable development in South Africa requires 
sustainable reconstruction and development in Southern Africa as a 
whole. Otherwise, the region will face continued high unemployment 
and underemployment, leading to labour migration and brain drain to 
more industrialised areas. ,94 
In this regard, it is clear that the ANC was unequivocal in placing South Africa at the 
heart of regional relations, and henceforth regarded its destiny as intricately bound 
91 ibid. 
92 See B Stephanie and B Horst, 'A turning Point for Southern Africa', Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Observer, April/May 1994. Paris: OECD, 1994. 
93 ANC Working Group, 'Views from the Practitioners', In Greg Mills (ed.), From Pariah to 
Participant: South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-1994. Johannesburg: South African 
Institute of International Affairs, 1994, pp.220-226. 
94 African National Congress, Reconstruction and Development Programme. Johannesburg: Umanyano 
Publications, 1994, p. 119. 
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with the political and economic character of the region. As such, the ANC considered 
it essential that South Africa's economic interests be balanced with the developmental 
needs of the region. And indeed this consideration initially informed the thinking of 
the new governing elite that assumed power in April 1994. 
Some of the broad pronouncements which were articulated by the ANC were later 
incorporated into South Africa's foreign policy approach post-apartheid. Some of 
these principles captured in the Department of Foreign Affairs' Strategic Plan 2004. 
This Strategic Plan, which purports to guide South Africa's foreign policy conduct, 
expresses a ' ... commitment to economic development through regional integration 
and development in the Southern African Development Community and the Southern 
Africa Customs Union'. Furthermore, it places emphasis on the' .. .interaction with 
African partners as equals' .95 Yet, the reality on the ground, especially in the region, 
presents a different picture. This will be sketched out in Chapter 5. 
3.5 Conclusion 
South Africa has since the early 1970s, at the height of the Cold War, until the late 
1980s played something of an aggressive hegemon in Southern Africa with a twin-
track strategy: to contain perceived threats to its Apartheid rule as well as to limit the 
space for the expansion of communist influence in neighbouring states. These two 
realities colluded to fashion a centre of gravity for South Africa's mainly security-
oriented strategy. South Africa's main liberation movement, the ANC was sheltered 
95 Department of Foreign Affairs Strategic Plan March 2004. Pretoria: Department of Foreign Affairs, 
2004, p.18. 
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in the neighbouring independent states and received political and material succour 
from mainly communist aligned countries. This constituted a security threat for the 
white minority government in South Africa; and brought it to close relationship with 
the US whose concern was to limit the spread of communism in Africa. 
South Africa's destabilisation policies fermented a strongly security conscious region, 
which was also one of the marked features of the SADCC. Indeed SADCC's 
emergence was a response to the threat that South Africa posed to the fragile 
independent states in the sub-region after independence; and on this basis sought to 
cement regional solidarity and unity. Its agenda was therefore strongly political and 
reflected the primacy placed on politics in the Cold War era, especially within a 
regional context where South Africa was a source of insecurity. In this connection, the 
internal developments within South Africa, especially with regards to political 
reforms in the 1990s, were of great interest to SADCC countries. 
There is no doubt that SADCC's agenda was very narrow and its existence - or rather 
its usefulness - was in many ways conditional upon the socio-political context within 
South Africa. When this no longer constituted a problem in the early 1990s SADC 
was faced with stark options: to cease to exist or to re-orient its agenda. 
The promising prospects presented by post-apartheid South Africa's place in regional 
relations gave force to the continuation of SADCC on a much stronger foundation and 
with a clearly articulated agenda that sought to transcend the Cold War and apartheid 
context. Indeed, democratic South Africa, with the ANC at its helm, was expected not 
only to represent in symbolic form the reversal of the apartheid legacy, but to make a 
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significant material contribution to the region as part of rolling back the damages 
wrought by the apartheid government. The ANC's difficult domestic situation -
having to deal with economic recession, rising unemployment and deteriorating social 
conditions - and pressure to integrate closely with the global economy would blight 
its idealism in the sub-region. 
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CHAPTER 4: Global Challenges and Domestic Forces: Towards a Strategic 
Competitive Regionalism 
Southern Africa is in many ways a unique sub-region. As clearly demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, its evolution as a sub-region has not been without difficulties, both 
pol itically and economically. The political element is in relation to the adversarial 
nature of the relations that prevailed between South Africa and the rest of the sub-
region. Economically, the challenges that Southern Africa faced and continues to 
grapple with are not very dissimilar to those found elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
These are delineated in Chapter 1. Much of these challenges have to do with supply-
side difficulties in the economy and generally poor state of social development. Thus, 
in quite substantive respect, regionalism in Southern Africa diverges from those to be 
found in developed and semi-peripheral developing areas (or that involves middle-
income countries). 
It is worth highlighting that, at the political level, even after the demise of apartheid, 
both the form and the substance of regionalism were still to be defined by realities 
obtaining within South Africa, albeit under new socio-political conditions. During the 
apartheid era the enemy that SADCC countries were confronted with was clearly 
identifiable and the outlines of a common agenda were visible. In the post-apartheid 
era state actors in the region are confronted with complex challenges whose sources 
are varied: global, domestic and intra-regional. Having already sketched out some of 
the global and developmental challenges that Southern Africa has had to deal with, 
and continuing with the theme of strategic competitive regionalism, this chapter will 
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concern itself with the domestic sources of South Africa's regional and multilateral 
strategies. 
This thesis discusses regionalism from the vantage point of South Africa's integration 
into global economic relations. It looks at South Africa as a core regional state in 
Southern Africa, using regionalism as an instrument to achieve complementary 
objectives related to domestic capital project or competitiveness; growth and 
developmental concerns; and political objective of securing long-term influence in 
regional and global economic spaces. In this regard, and to the extent that it is 
influenced by and anchored in South Africa's domestic growth considerations, the 
form regionalism assumes in Southern Africa can thus be characterised as strategic 
competitive regionalism. The outlines of this form of regionalism are set out in detail 
in Chapter 2. As already pointed out in Chapter 2, this form of regionalism 
corresponds to a particular state form, namely 'strategic' developmental state. 
In short, this chapter limits itself to domestic level processes, with specific focus on 
South Africa's political economy and its repositioning in the regional and global 
political economy, post-l 994. An understanding of South Africa's political economy 
and the vicissitudes that shaped it in the early 1990s is crucial in conceptualising the 
emergence of 'new Regionalism' in Southern Africa, and specifically what this thesis 
characterises as strategic competitive form regionalism assumes. This understanding 
helps us 'unpack' the domestic forces underlying state actors' regional and global 
strategies, and enable us to grasp the crucial linkages that exist between domestic, 
regional and global level processes. It is important therefore to stress that the nature of 
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the state-society nexus at the domestic level defines the character and the extent of 
state actors' involvement in regional and global level processes. 
The chapter covers six interrelated areas. First it surveys South Africa's changing 
political economy since the country became a democracy in 1994. More emphasis is 
placed on the economic reforms between 1994 and 2002. Second, it looks at the 
domestic-global nexus, making an observation of the extent to which global forces 
have crystallised into domestic level processes and influenced the institutional and 
policy architecture of the state. Third, it examines the macro-economic framework 
which became one of the foundational stones of South Africa's economic reform 
programme. Here, the contradictions in South Africa's political and economic 
transition are underlined. 
The fourth section concerns shifts in South Africa's trade policy, highlighting 
especially the transition between import-substitution and export-oriented strategy, as 
well as South Africa's continued liberalisation process. The fifth section deals with 
South Africa's industrial policy framework, in particular the integrated manufacturing 
strategy and microeconomic reform strategy. This also looks at adjustment issues and 
how these are dealt with institutionally. Finally, the sixth section examines the linkage 
between the domestic capital project and the regional space. This lays a ground for a 
discussion in Chapter 5 of South Africa's trade relations in Southern Africa. 
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4.1 South Africa's changing political economy 
-1.1.1 An Orcrl'icw: Domestic Growth Concerns 
Prior to achieving its historical breakthrough as a democratic country in 1994, South 
Africa's economy went into a period of decline. This was partly a result of decades of 
import-substitution industrialisation, international isolation, contracting domestic 
market and declining growth rates! (see also Chapter 3). When the African National 
Congress (ANC), a former liberation movement, finally assumed power in 1994 there 
was no doubt that the new incumbents would have to prepare themselves for far-
reaching and indefinite economic restructuring process. 
This period, it must be noted, coincided with global changes that saw the ascendance 
of neo-liberal politics and the gradual rolling back of the state from the market-place. 
South Africa was not immune to these global vicissitudes. In fact, the entire phase of 
political transition and economic restructuring took place against this background and 
was shaped by it. There were, indeed, strong linkages between the new political 
dispensation in South Africa and the changes that were shaping the global economy. 
Gill observed that: 
'The political economy of the South African transition away from the 
apartheid regime - like those occurring in the former communist ruled 
1 See Nicoli Nattrass, 'Economic Restructuring in South Africa: The Debate Continues', Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Volume 20 (4), December 1994; Paul Williams and Ian Taylor, 'Neo-
liberalism and the Political Economy of the New South Africa', New Political Economy, Volume 5 (1), 
2000, pp.21-40. 
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nations - took place in the context of internal and external pressure to 
adopt nco-liberal reforms: such reforms will integrate the nation more 
comprehensively into structures of the global political economy'? 
This political transition from apartheid to democracy was to a considerable extent a 
leap into the unknown, containing both uncertainties and a sense of euphoria. One of 
the major milestones in the economic reform process was the overhauling of the 
import-substitution industrialisaiton programme in order to break out of the 
protectionist mould and leap into an outward-oriented growth trajectory. 
The import-substitution industrialisation programme dates back to the 1920s, and was 
crafted partly to reduce reliance on exports of agricultural produce and gold; spur 
industrialisation with employment creation for whites in manufacturing industries; 
and to assist with developing greater economic independence from Britain.3 Over the 
years, this accumulation strategy created anti-export bias in the economy and 
maintained high levels of import controls through various instruments, including 
quantitative restrictions.4 This is also said to have ' ... generated uncompetitive 
manufacturing sectors which absorbed rather than produced foreign exchange.'5 Other 
effects of this were in regards to inefficiencies generated in the protected industries as 
well as high domestic prices for products in protected sectors. 
2 Stephen Gill (ed.), Global Structural Change and Multi/ateratism in Globati:ation, Democrati:ation, 
and A/ulti/ateratism, (New York: United Nations University Press, 1997), p.3 
J Michael Bleaney, Alan Hirsch, Merle Holden, and Carolyn Jenkins, 'South Africa', In Ademola 
Oyejide, Benno Ndulu and William J. Gunning, Regional Integration and Trade Liberali=ation in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Volume 2. (Macmillan: London, 1999), p.397; Rashaad Cassim, Donald Onyango, and 
Dirk E. van Seventer, 'The State of Trade Policy in South Africa: A Review', Trade and Industrial 
Policy Secretariat, December 2002. www.tips.org.za. 
4 On the historical evolution of South Africa's trade policy, see Michael Bleaney, Alan Hirsch, Merle 
Holden, and Carolyn Jenkins, op.cit. 
5 Nicoli Nattrass, op.cit., p.521. 
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Much of the economy was resource-based. Gold mining constituted the core of the 
mining and mineral processing industry. It accounted for 70 percent of mining exports 
and employment. and 80 percent of revenue in the 1980s.6 According to the Macro-
Economic Research Group (MERG) report7, mining exhibited very weak backward 
linkages, and this emphasised the importance of down-stream beneficiation in the 
industry.g One of the key challenges of trade policy reform was to reduce the anti-
export bias. ensure liberalisation on the import side through elimination of 
quantitative restrictions. and integrate firmly into the global economy. The economic 
reforms acted to gradually shift incentives away from import-substituting activities 
and towards export orientation.9 However, this is as yet an incomplete project. 
The long period of decline which began in 1975 until the early 1990s was 
symptomatic of the structural rigidities in the domestic economy. The effect of this 
decline was strongly manifest in the falling prices of mining commodities, in 
particular gold exports, low levels of gross domestic savings and gross domestic fixed 
investment, a decline in formal sector employment in the ] 990s, a stagnation of 
manufacturing employment since 1975, declining productivity levels and a falling 
10 
exchange rate. 
6 Macro-economic Research Group, 'Making Democracy Work: A Framework for Macro-economic 
Policy in South Africa', A Report from the Macro-economic Research Group (MERG), (Belville: 
Centre for Development Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1993), p.217. Some of its projections 
included a ten year plan to boost growth to 5 percent in 2004 and generate 300 jobs a year. For a 
critique ofMERG see Nicoli Nattrass, op.cit .. pp.517-543. 
7 This report was produced by Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) -aligned Economists. 
Its general tone could be said to be social-democratic, albeit with some degree of neo-liberal elements 
especially in its trade and monetary policy recommendations. 
8 ibid 
9 Yvonne Tsikata, 'Liberalization and Trade Performance in South Africa', U'orld Bank Southern 
Africa Department, Discussion Paper 13, 1997, p.9. www.worldbank.org 
10 Gavin Maasdorp and Adrian Saville, A Special Study on the SADC Economies ~ Waiting for South 
Africa', South African Institute of International Affairs. Occasional Paper No.2, July 1994, Wits. 
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Thus it was a combination of external developments reflected in the recession in the 
world economy, South Africa's political and economic isolation in the 1970s and 
1980s, the hang-over of military expenditure of the apartheid regime in the 1970s and 
1980s, and internal domestic crisis brought to bear by the stunted import-substitution 
industrialisation strategy, that buffeted the South African economy. These 
developments, much of them already discussed in Chapters I and 3, also coincided 
with the rise into prominence of the doctrine of 'Thatcherism' and 'Reagonomics', 
otherwise known as neo-Iiberalism, characterised chiefly by the gradual reduction of 
the role of the state in the economy, preference for conservative fiscal policies, liberal 
exchange controls, labour market reforms, export-oriented growth and privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises. Or, what Kagarlitsky aptly characterises as 'new realism' .11 
Market reforms were, according to these views, the best possible mechanism to 
resuscitate the economy through price adjustment and efficient allocation of 
resources. To South Africa's credit, and as former chief trade negotiator confirmed, 
unlike in many other countries in Africa, structural reforms were not subject to the 
smothering dictates of the International Financial Institutions (IFls).12 The state actors 
pre-empted these reforms before they were prodded to do so by the IFls, thus ensuring 
flexibility in implementing them, taking into cognisance deep structural failures in the 
economy and the resultant effects on employment levels. This does not mean that 
South Africa's state actors were unconstrained by the neo-liberal global order, but had 
a relative flexibility in their economic policy making space. 
11 Boris Kagarlitsky . . "ell' Realism. Nell' Barbarism, (London: Pluto Press, 1999). 
12 Interview with Bahle Sibisi, fonner Deputy Director-General: Enterprise and Industry Division, 
Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa; interview held on 24 September 2004, Johannesburg. 
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The economic reform process that continued well into the ANC's rule - and indeed 
taking a much robust shape during ANC's second term in office - targeted specific 
economic sectors. namely mining and agriculture. The largely minerals-driven 
economy which had, since the 19th century, acted as a source of foreign exchange 
earnings as well as employment generator began to show signs of strain in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. This was largely due to declining prices and weak demand for 
minerals products. 
The agricultural sector suffered a similar fate, and was struggling to weather periodic 
droughts, and manifested low levels of return on investment, low levels of liquidity 
and a steady build-up of debt. 13 Indeed, the new political class in 1994 inherited an 
economy on a declining mode. It was in a worst shape that Marais characterised it as 
'bed-ridden,.14 Gelb has characterised this economic crisis as ' ... a crisis of production 
and supply-side', which means that it was rooted in the very nature of the production 
structure and growth path.15 
In the early 1990s, GOP growth rates declined along with the declining state of gross 
fixed investment, coupled with high rates of capital flight, private investment was at a 
low rate, unemployment figures soared, and the economy suffered a chronic balance 
of payment difficulties. Indeed, with the gross fixed investment declining, there was 
no doubt that huge social costs would be incurred in the economy. Job losses in the 
formal sector of the economy, excluding agriculture, is estimated to have been about 
DHein Marais, The Political Economy o/South A/rica: Limits to Change. (Zed Books: London, 2001), 
p.103 
14 ibid 
15 Stephen Gelb, 'Inequality in South Africa: Nature, causes and responses'. A Report prepared/or the 
UK Department/or International Development (DFID), South Africa office, 2003, p.37. 
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400 000 between 1989 and 1993. 16 This resulted from the closure of a number of 
mining sites whieh were deemed unprofitable. As Marais noted, 
'In broad terms, the crisis reflected the break-down of the post-war 
accumulation strategy based on primary products exports and inward 
industrialisation (including import-substitution industrialisation) based 
on violently regimented labour supply' .17 
This accumulation strategy was no longer appropriate for the new economic demands 
and, coupled with low levels of productivity, it was becoming quite evident that a 
decisive break with import-substitution was long overdue. Bell and Wadula have 
observed that this ensured an ' .. .involuntary shift to export-oriented industrialisation 
(EOI) in conditions of economic crisis. 18 , Hence it was becoming increasingly urgent 
to find a new strategy that emphasised beneficiation and export thrust. 
In the face of the declining state of the economy, it became clear that a number of 
changes had to be effected in order to animate productivity and place the economy on 
a sustained growth trajectory and give it a more robust face. As already pointed out in 
the preceding overview, the lSI programme which was a dirigiste growth approach, 
based on the strategy of limiting imports of manufactured goods and offering 
protection for domestic producers using panoply of import controls and quantitative 
16 Hein Marais, op.cit, p. 100; Stephen Gelb, op.cit .. 2003, pp.29-30. 
17 Hein Marais, op.cit. 
]8 Trevor Bell and Nkosi Madula, Where Has All The Growth Gone? South African Manufacturing 
Industry 1970-2000, A paper presented at the 2001 Annual Forum, Trade and Industrial Policy 
Strategies (TIPS), 10-12 September 2001. www.tips.org.za 
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restrictions. was no longer able to hold ground. It was unsuited to the emergent 
challenges of the global economy. 
Prior to trade rci(mns, South Africa's trade pattern was characterised by dominance of 
primary products in its export basket, mainly metals and minerals, and importation of 
capital goods and technological products. 19 These trade patterns were hardly a good 
recipe for economic success in the 1990s. With economic malaise deepening, the 
country was finding it untenable to rely on commodity exports for foreign exchange 
or depend on the mining sector for employment creation. Primary exports were 
declining in importance in world trade. The sluggishness of the world demand for 
primary products, Singer and Ansari argue, was not only a function of a change in the 
structure of production in developed economies but also of protectionist policies such 
as, for example, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Europe.20 
Informed by these trends, export-oriented manufacturing and enhanced 
competitiveness became a central plank in government's growth strategy.21 This was 
long predicted by a study commissioned in the early 1990s undertaken by the Macro-
Economic Research Group (MERG), comprising of researchers sympathetic to trade 
unions and the South African Communist Party (SACP), and chaired by Trevor 
Manuel, the current Minister of Finance. 
19 Macro-economic Research Group, op.cit .. p.235. 
20 Hans W. Singer and Javed A. Ansari, Rich and Poor Countries: Consequences of International 
Disorder, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.74-75. 
21 Hein Marais, op.cit .. pIl3. 
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-1.1.2 The Era of Refhrms 
The MERG report noted that in the long-term the gold mining industry would decline 
in importance as a pillar of exports; and further suggested that, ' ... alternative exports 
will have to be found if increasing balance of payment constraints are to be 
avoided" .22 Indeed, moving out of the clutches of a mineral and energy focused 
economy was set to be one of the goals economic reform programme, whose 
foundations had already been laid between the period of 1992 and ] 993 by the then 
Minister of Finance, Derek Keys. At the height of the transitional period, around 
1993, the interim government that was installed to ease the country into a democratic 
dispensation, economic liberalisation was highlighted as one of the important areas to 
be implemented. The interim government consisted of the elite that belonged to the 
governing party during apartheid and members of the soon to be governing elite, 
ANC. 
Examining the economic reform process was therefore managed as part of the 
negotiated settlement that characterise South Africa's transition into democracy. For 
example, a neo-corporatist mechanism in the form of a National Economic Forum 
(NEF) was established to act as a consensus-seeking instrument for the development 
of an economic pact for the future. The NEF consisted of ANC's 'economic' 
mandarins, the trade union leadership, organised business and fractions of the former 
Nationalist Party government. It must be underlined that the ANC was generally 
inexperienced in economic policy making as it was a liberation movement and never 
had to propound solid policies except broad pronouncements. 
22 Macro-economic Research Group, op.cit .. p.217. 
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At the heart of the discussions within this forum was: ' ... how do we lock ourselves 
into the global economy as part of dealing with the structural difficulties in the 
domestic economy and ensure sustainable growth and competitiveness?,23 This did 
not consider the domestic economy in isolation, but within the broader context of the 
global economy, especially in view of the fact that the Uruguay Round was near its 
conclusion (see discussion below). The NEF also negotiated South Africa's offer to 
the GAIT (see also Chapter 6). 
It was in this context that policy makers made a decision to integrate into the global 
economy in a 'beneficial manner. ,24 There was also an understanding amongst the 
actors involved that it would be politically untenable to integrate into the global 
economy in isolation from the larger Southern African region. South Africa 
desperately sought to break the political isolation that it suffered in the region and 
internationally; and, as Draper argued, wanted to ' ... promote economic 
competitiveness in a context of integration.'25 In this regard, South Africa was 
confronted with a double-edged challenge: that of integrating its economy into the 
global economic order so it could effectively deal with its domestic constraints, and at 
the same time demonstrate sensitivity towards the Southern African sub-region given 
years of tensions between the two, and the state of underdevelopment of the region 
(see Chapter 3). 
23 Interview with Bahle Sibisi, op.cit. 
24 ibid 
2~ Peter Draper, 'Getting Trade Policy Off The Hook: The South African Case', In Peter Draper (eds.) 
(Forthcoming),2005. 
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One of the senior officials in the Department of Trade and Industry, Bahle Sibisi. who 
was part of the first layer of bureaucrats to take charge of economic transformation, 
remarked that organised business were initially suspicious of the SA DC project· ... as 
they did not perceive it to be carrying benefits for South Africa's economy because of 
small markets and limited purchasing power in the region. Instead they viewed it as a 
political project than a profitable economic enterprise.'26 
For the ANC government, the important consideration was to link the imperative of 
domestic economic growth to the growth and development of the region, and this was 
viewed in symbiotic terms. However, as will be shown in Chapter 5, this did not quite 
achieve its intended objectives. Meanwhile, the challenge to restructure the economy 
was of immediate concern and the technical capacity to do so was not in abundant 
supply. In the process mistakes were committed and at times policy direction was 
sporadic. The next section will sketch the relationship between the domestic policy 
challenges in South Africa and the global changes that were already looming on the 
horizon. 
4.2 Domestic challenges and State's responses 
Before looking at global challenges that fashioned the context for South Africa's 
economic reforms and the various actors that were affected or participated in this 
reform process, a brief analysis of South Africa's socio-economic structure would be 
necessary in order to appropriately contextualise the country's position in global 
economic relations and the challenges it faced in its multi-level engagements. 
26 ibid. 
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-1.2.1 South /Ui'ica 's Socio-Ecor1ofl1ic Structure 
South Africa's economic structure is highly polarised. It is characterised by ' .. .Iarge 
disparities between the major metropolitan area and the poor, traditionally black rural 
area.,27 This economic duality in the South African economy is, according to Davies, 
a reality of 'two poles of a single integrated political economy .. .'28 One pole is 
characterised by well-developed and relatively dynamic elements of the economy, 
while the other is largely disarticulated from the formal sectors and marginalized from 
the global economy. Davies traces the historical development of the dual structure of 
South Africa's economy to the emergence of a particular form of economic 
production in the 19th century during the gold and diamond rush.29 
This duality was accentuated by various apartheid policies since the Nationalist Party 
rule from 1948. These policies include those that were aimed at preserving labour 
reserves in rural homelands and offering differentiated education system along racial 
lines. The effect of such policies still reverberate across the country. In the economy, 
for example, there remains a sharp divide between rural and urban areas and, to a 
considerable degree, this corresponds to the country's racial profile. According to 
Castells: 
27Colin McCarthy, 'South African Trade and Industrial Policy in a Regional Context', In Lennart 
Peters son, Post-Apartheid South Africa: Economic Challenges and Policies for the Future, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), p.80. 
28 Rob Davies, 'Some notes on the Issue of Dualism', New Agenda: South African Journal of Social 
and Economic Policy, Issue 14, Second Quarter 2004, p.31. 
29 Rob Davies, 1998, op.cit. 
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'Between 36 and 53 percent of South Africans are estimated to live below the 
poverty line. Poverty is overwhelmingly concentrated in the African and 
coloured population: 95 percent of the poor are African, and 65 percent of 
Africans arc poor, compared with 33 percent of the coloured population, 2.5 
percent of Asians and 0.7 percent ofwhites."'o 
About 75 percent of the poor, the majority of whom are black, live in the rural areas; 
and 74 percent of the rural population is poor compared to 41 percent of the urban and 
20 percent of the metropolitan populations.3 ! The gravity of South Africa's structural 
difficulties is also compounded by highly uneven patterns of income distribution, 
making South Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world. It has a Gini 
coefficient of 0.65, lagging behind Brazil at 0.61, Mexico at 0.50 and 0.48 for 
Malaysia.32 
In 2002, South Africa's official unemployment rate stood at 26.7 per cent, with 
unofficial estimates of up to 40 per cent.33 The distribution of economic activity 
within the country is also highly uneven, with the Gauteng province acting as the 
economic hub generating about 37.7 percent of GOP, followed by Western Cape with 
14.2 per cent of the GOp.34 The dualism of South Africa's economy was aptly 
captured by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which pointed out that, 'South Africa 
30 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium, (Oxford: Blackwells, 1998), p.124. 
31 Rob Davies, op.cit., p.80. 
32 Manuel Castells, op.cit., 124. 
33 See Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002. www.eiu.com; and Statistics South Africa. 
www.statssa.gov.za 
34 Economist Intelligence Unit. www.eiu.com 
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encompasses displays of atlluence the equal of any in the developed world and levels 
t' . d . h d I· . ,35 o poverty assocIate WIt eve opmg countries.· 
This duality reflects on the one hand, a highly productive and modern sector which is 
a source of national wealth creation and is fairly integrated into the global networks of 
production and finance global chains of distribution and supply. It is endowed with 
relatively skilled human capital and utilises fairly advanced technologies. On the other 
hand it possesses a 'backwash' sector which includes informal economic activity, 
subsistence rural agricultural production, and large traces of poverty both in the urban 
and rural black communities, similar to large parts of the continent. 
In his weekly journal, the ANC President, Thabo Mbeki, highlighted the differences 
between what he calls the 'First' and the 'Second' Economy when he argued that: 
'The First Economy is modem, produces the bulk of our country's 
wealth, and is integrated within the global economy. The Second 
Economy (or the Marginalised Economy) is characterised by 
underdevelopment, contributes little to the GOP, contains a big 
percentage of our population, incorporates the poorest of our rural and 
urban poor, is structurally disconnected from both the First and the 
global economy, and is incapable of self-generated growth and 
development. ,36 
35 ibid. 
36 Thabo Mbeki, 'Meeting the Challenge of the Second Economy', ANC Today, Volume 3 (45), 14-15 
November 2003. 
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The DTI's medium-term strategy framework also notes that 'the South African 
economy is dualistic in nature: one economy is characterised by 'first world' 
competitive enterprises with access to economic infrastructure and services; and the 
other is marginaliscd and characterised by a lack of access to infrastructure and basic 
services' .37 The role of economic transformation largely falls on the DTI and this 
work is coordinated within the economic cluster which it chairs. 
There has been a general sense that the first five years of South Africa's economic 
reform devoted much of its attention on the macro-economic adjustments and 
international trade engagements, and that micro-economic forces were largely 
ignored. It was not until early 2001, that a detailed work on industrial strategy was 
undertaken.38 Micro-economic reforms were to be the linchpin of the next phase of 
economic reform agenda, beginning from 2001 with 2014 as a target date for the 
realisation of the strategic vision. 
In Mbcki's second term of office, commencing in 2004, the economic reform agenda, 
with micro-economic strategy as a cornerstone, was again strongly highlighted. More 
emphasis was placed on integrating the 'Second Economy' to its more developed 
counterpart and for dynamism to be infused in the overall structure of the economy. 
This also witnessed the change of political leadership in the DTI, with Alec Erwin 
who, during his tenure, was heavily engaged in international trade diplomacy, 
replaced by Mandisi Mpahlwa, previously a Deputy Finance Minister. Although this 
was initially perceived an enigmatic development, it soon became clear that it 
J7 The Department of Trade and Industry, Medium-Term Strategy Framework, Pretoria, DTI, 2003, p.8. 
3R South African Labour Bulletin, 'The dti's integrated manufacturing strateb'Y: Is it all just packaging?, 
South African Labour Bulletin, Volume 26 (3), June 2002, pp.8-11. 
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rcllected a shin of emphasis away from the international trade arena to domestic 
realities; or. at least. to re-balance the two in a manner that shifts weight to the home 
front. 
A senior government official at the DTI remarked that although the new Minister had 
not yet made any big policy statements, what could be discerned is that: 
'The large part of his brief from the President requires greater attention 
to the Second Economy... there is a sense that with the previous 
Minister of Trade and Industry, policy interventions in this area were 
not well articulated even though there has always been an understanding 
of its importance. It would therefore seem Mpahlwa [the new Minister] 
has been appointed mainly to look closer at the Second Economy. In the 
past, required interventions were not sufficiently elaborated; and 
challenges were not sufficiently analysed.'39 
He also pointed out that: 
'Our [South Africa's] trade strategies are linked to domestic 
developmental challenges, including job creation, enterprise 
development. opening of economic opportunities for previously 
marginalized groups in society. and expansion of SMME sector which 
is one of the key vehicles to facilitate inclusion of the majority of the 
39 Confidential interview at the Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria. 12 November 2004. 
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people in the economy. Access to finance has been one of the obstacles 
d I . I' . .j() to eve opll1g t lIS sector.· 
South Africa' s external trade strategies were being coated with a domestic 
developmental framework and, in essence, they were to service it rather than be the 
end in themselves. As the official further remarked, 'South Africa has to walk on all 
legs in dealing with its economic challenges and policy interventions.,41 
This policy shift could also have been motivated by the realisation that the 
intensification of the process of globalisation, especially increased trade Iiberalisation, 
has a potential to further slice up some constituent parts of the First Economy, 
especially nodes of production that are no longer compatible with global production 
trends, and push them to the 'Second Economy'. Hence embedding external trade 
strategies in a domestic developmental context has a stronger purchase in South 
Africa's regional and multilateral trade strategies. 
4.2.2 Domestic policy institutions 
The initial phase of democratic transition, which could be said to have taken place 
roughly between 1994 and 1999, witnessed global economic forces strongly minted in 
government's policy processes and institutional archictecture. Certain components of 
national state began to assume a pre-eminent position. What was experienced in South 
Africa during this period was no different from what most developing and developed 
40 ibid 
41 ibid 
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countries were going through, albeit with differential capabilities. For South Africa, 
the socio-economic picture discussed earlier also informed the context within which 
the liberalisation process was undertaken. 
In terms of how various state agencies are arrayed, the Treasury and an independent 
Reserve Bank occupy an elevated position, and have a considerable degree for 
making monetary policy (in the case of the Reserve Bank) and fiscal policy (in the 
case of Treasury). There are other agencies that, in varying degrees, have a significant 
role in linking the domestic and the global spheres. These include, for example, 
Foreign Affairs (DFA), Trade and Industry (DTI), Trade and Investment South Africa 
(TISA) (an agency that is part of the OTI but has limited autonomy), Minerals and 
Energy, Public Enterprises (with a clear mandate to restructure state owned 
enterprises), and Revenue Services. This development is not unique to South Africa. 
Indeed most developing countries have experienced similar shifts, particularly in their 
domestic policy architecture, as a result of changes in the global political economy. 
The agencies noted above, as Gill has observed: 
'Tend to give priority to market efficiency, and in particular the virtues 
of trade, foreign investment and foreign exchange markets; the control 
of inflation and public expenditure; and the private sector relative to the 
public.,42 
Greater policy coordination amongst various government departments is retained 
through the highly structured and innovative cluster system designed to create 
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synerglcs between related government ministries, expedite and monitor policy 
implcmcntation:n But this has also ignited turf battles, especially between the 
Department of Trade and Industry (0'1'1) and the Department of foreign Affairs 
(DFA). There are two key inter-governmental clusters: Economics and Investment 
Cluster which focuses on domestic economic policy coordination; and the 
International Relations. Peace and Security (IRPS) Cluster whose focus is on external 
engagements including international trade negotiations.44 
Nonetheless, the core government departments or agencies alluded to earlier were and 
are still viewed as critical in the linkage between the domestic and the global 
economy. This illustrates the point made by Sassen about global processes 
materialising or embedded in national territories - a development which has shaped 
the institutional structure of government and affected its legislative or regulatory 
mechanisms.45 Gill characterises this process as institutionalisation of 'disciplinary 
neo-liberalism at the macro-level power in the quasi-legal restructuring of state and 
international political forms: constitutionalism. ,46 
According to Gill this discourse, originating in the global level pervades domestic 
policy processes, in particular through macro-economic policies, with focus on 
41 Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
p.87. 
43 Susan Strange and John Stopford, Rival States and Rival Firms: Competition for world market 
shares, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); in their formulation of the concept of 
'triangular diplomacy' argue that bargains are not only limited to firm-firm, government-government, 
and firm-firm, but they also take place between various government ministries or departments. In South 
Africa, this bargain is best expressed in the inter-governmental cluster system and other inter-
ministerial structures at provincial level. 
44 Peter Draper, op.cit .. 2005. 
45 See Saskia Sassen, 'Embedding the Global in the National', In David. A Smith, Dorothy 1. Solinger 
and Steven C. Topik (eds.), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, (London: Routledge, 
1999), p.162. 
46 Stephen Gill, op.cit., 2003, p.131. 
165 
· ... fight against inllation,.J7, in order to maintain price stability and guard against fitful 
exchange rate lluctuations that could send mixed pricc signals. As previously alluded 
to. this emergent normative force is often articulated by those ministries and agencies 
that stand at the intersection of the domestic and the global economy. Although in 
South Africa's case this. initially, was not forced by external institutions, nonetheless 
South Africa was very much conditioned by ideological spaces that were inevitably 
going to articulate themselves within the country's policy and institutional structures. 
The adoption of a broadly neo-liberal macro-economic framework in 1996 attested to 
this (see discussion below). 
4.2.3 Inter-governmental Tensions 
The guardianship of economic transformation lies with the ministries and agencies 
noted earlier, and other layers of government are positioned further down in the 
hierarchy. The Department of Trade and Industry plays a central role in formulating 
and implementing South Africa's trade and industrial policies and taking a lead in 
driving commercial diplomacy. The National Treasury plays guardianship over the 
fiscal policy and expenditure patterns in other departments. It also plays a somewhat 
surveillance role to ensure the progress of liberalisation. For example, it is believed to 
be putting pressure on the DTI to liberalise in line with the macro-economic policy.48 
47 ibid 
48 Peter Draper, 'To Liberalise or not to liberalise? A review of South African Government's Trade 
Policy', South African Institute qf International Affairs Working Paper, May 2003, p.8. 
www.saiia.org.za 
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Regarding the DTI, there arc a range of other institutions that supports its vision49: 
• International Trade and Economic Development Division (ITEDD) - engages 
in trade negotiations (bilateral, regional and multilateral); 
• Enterprise and Industry Division (EID) - interacts with industry groups, 
develops policies on supply-side incentives or support measures, and is mainly 
concerned with industry competitiveness, sectoral strategies, small business 
development, and black economic empowerment; 
• International Trade and Administration Commission (IT AC) - administers 
trade policy and is responsible for trade remedies; 
• Trade and Investment South Africa (TISA) - promotes exports and 
investments. 
There are at times tensions between various governments, and these tend to mainly be 
over policy implementation or on how each understands its function in relation to 
others, and this is despite the existence of the interdepartmental coordination 
mechanism or cluster system. Tensions are a natural feature of intra-governmental 
relations in a democratic state, more so in a developmental state undergoing 
significant political and economic changes as South Africa is. Johnson has argued 
that, 'Within the developmental state there is a contention for power among many 
bureaucratic centers, including finance, economic planning, foreign affairs, and so 
forth. ,50 There are at times tensions between not only various government 
49 See Peter Draper, op.cit., 2005. He also provides an extensive overview of South Africa's economic 
policy making process and various government agencies and institutions involved. 
so Chalmers Johnson. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), p.26. 
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departments but also agencies within departments, for example between the trade 
negotiations and enterprise and industry agencies. 
Between government departments, the OF A and the OTi have at times collided over 
the shape of foreign economic strategy. The OF A is seen as Africanist with shades of 
internationalism, and the OTl, especially the trade division is viewed as more 
mercantilist.'] The DTI has its own foreign economic representatives who deal with 
trade negotiations, and the OF A has its own and deals with broader aspects of 
international diplomacy. 
Also, there are intermittent tensions between the National Treasury and the OTi over 
the extent of government's commitment in creating incentives for industry. The 
National Treasury is seen as restrictive when it comes to the expenditure side as well 
as putting pressure on ensuring that the deficit target is achieved.52 These differences 
will not be explored at length here. Suffice to say that, at the heart of its global 
strategy, South Africa is concerned with international competitiveness and integration 
into the global economy.53 Indeed, this is the logic that underlines South Africa's 
regional and multilateral trade strategies. 
As noted before, the trend of promoting international competitiveness is not unique to 
South Africa. and has indeed characterised domestic restructuring in line with global 
changes in most developing countries. Stopford and Strange observed more than a 
decade ago, that ' ... national choices of industrial policy and efficiency in economic 
,) Confidential Interview at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, July 2004. 
,2 Interview with Nimrod Zalk, Chief Director: Strategic Competitiveness, Department of Trade and 
Industry, Pretoria, 13 July 2004 
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management are beginning to override choices of foreign or defence policy as the 
primary influence on how resources are alloeated.54 In 1987, Cox noted that' ... the 
nco-liberal state gives priority to those central agencies of government that act as 
links between the world economy and the national economy: finance ministries and 
treasuries and foreign trade and investment agencies, function in close coordination 
with the offices of presidents and prime ministers.'55 
4.3 Macroeconomic Reforms 
4.3.1 Ideational Shift in Economic Debate 
The character of the global order - neo-liberal - and the nature of the domestic 
economic crisis acted to produce the kind of economic policy preferences adopted by 
the new government. In the face of this domestic crisis and powerful global market 
forces, choices for the new government were presented in stark terms - reform or face 
the precipice. As Gelb puts it, 'Certain political and economic imperatives ruled out 
some options and weighted social choices towards others,.56 Giving force to reform 
considerations, South Africa was left with little choice but to lock its reform agenda 
into multilateral trade processes and integrate closely with global markets. This was, 
however, preceded by economic debates with the ANC and its alliance partners -
53 ibid. 
54 Susan Strange and John Stopford, op.cit., p.1 
55 Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, 
(Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1987), p.228. 
56 Stephen Gelb, op.cit., 2003, p.29. 
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COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SAC»). But these debates were 
broad rather than going into specifics. 
There were also discussions taking place within the business community and 
intellectuals that were close to business' positions, about possible development 
trajectories in South Africa. By and large, business perspectives, especially orthodox 
views of economic policy and restructuring prevailed. The broader systemic context 
gave a strong impetus to the propagation and eventual triumph of such perspectives. 
Also, positions within the ANC were shifting away from strong emphasis on 
nationalisation and strongly Keynesian economics towards those that emphasise neo-
liberal type structural adjustment.;? Some of these debates and contending approaches 
are covered in great detail in various works on South Africa's political transition.58 
It is important though to point out a number of factors shaping economic policy 
development in South Africa. The multi-class character of the ruling African National 
Congress (ANC), its lack of preparedness for the new global challenges, insufficient 
grounding in economic policy, the general weakness of the 'left' strand of the ruling 
party - something which was symptomatic of the waning influence of socialist 
thinking after the collapse of the Soviet Union - had all contributed to a shift 
rightward in economic policy choices.59 The ANC was also faced with the challenge 
of transforming itself from a mass-based liberation movement to a modern political 
51 For a detailed discussion of shifts in economic thinking within the ANC, see Nicoli Nattrass, 
'Politics and Economics in ANC Economic Policy', African Affairs, Volume 93 (372), July 1994, 
pp.343-360. 
58 Nicoli Nattrass, op.cit., 1994; Paul Williams and Ian Taylor, op.cit; Patrick Bond, Elite Transition: 
From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa, (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Hein Marais, op.cit; 
Taylor, Stuck in Middle: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2001); Stephen Gelb, op.cit .. 2003. 
59 ibid 
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party and demonstrate that it could face contemporary challenges head-on while 
confronting the social legacy of apartheid. Although this period generated euphoria it 
was. indeed. a trying period for the ANC and the one that promised to be steeper 
ahead. 
With regards to implementing the reform process, there was a real pressure, given the 
ailing state of the economy, to stabilise macroeconomic aggregates and stem the 
deficit tide if social spending was to be sustainable in future. Macroeconomic stability 
was also viewed as important from government's perspective to ground an outward-
oriented strategy. Bhagwati emphasises the importance of macroeconomic stability in 
economic reforms if inflation is to be contained from having an adverse effect on 
export performance.6o It is apparent that this consideration played an important part in 
shaping the government's approach to macroeconomic stability. And this was 
accompanied by strong preference for inflation targeting by the independent Reserve 
Bank. Macroeconomic stability was thus seen as essential for an outward-oriented 
strategy and to help deal with the structural challenges in the economy. 
The neo-liberal reforms that were the essence of this approach were captured in a 
document called Growth, Employment and Re-distribution (GEAR). As Kagarlitsky 
observes, ' ... the African National Congress government, with the active participation 
of the representatives of the Communist party and the trade unions began in 1995 and 
1996 to put a consistent neo-liberal programme into practice.'61 The premium placed 
on neo-liberal strategy was on correcting the macro-economic environment, and as 
60 Jagdish Bhagwati, 'Trading for development: how to assist poor countries', In Mike Moore (ed.), 
Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p.116. 
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such it toned down the 'basic needs' approach advocated in the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) which was the ANC election manifesto launched in 
1994. and derived a popular support amongst the workers, the unemployed, and the 
. 62 poor In general. 
However, even the RDP, which was regarded as broadly 'social-democratic', and 
formulated long before neo-liberal macro-economic policies were set in train, had also 
affirmed South Africa's liberalisation project. For example, RDP stated, in reference 
to systemic generated pressures, that South Africa's economy' ... must adjust to these 
pressures if we are to sustain economic growth and continue to develop a large 
domestic manufacturing sector that makes greater use of our own raw materials and 
minerals' .63 So, in essence, the winds of liberalisation took effect before the actual 
macro-economic policy reforms were set implemented. The GEAR strategy served to 
accelerate them. 
The RDP was too broad, playing to varIOUS constituencies and trying to strike a 
balance with disparate voices in keeping with the ANC's multi-class character. It was, 
as Kagarlitsky has noted, inoffensive to the old ruling elite and generally ideological 
neutral.64 Even though genuine in its commitment to correct social inequalities it 
failed to measure up as a serious programme for governance nor was there any 
momentum generated by the ruling class to weave its strong social-democratic 
elements into a future policy programme. It existed rather as a symbol of what the 
61 Boris Kagarlitsky, op.cil., p.44. 
62 The key programmes of the RDP included: meeting the basic needs, developing human resources, 
building the economy, democratising the state and society and implementation. 
63 Reconstruction and Development Programme, op.cil .. plO. 
64 Boris Kagarlitsky, Op.cil .• pp.44-45. 
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ruling party historically stood for and a broadcast of wishes that struck a cord with the 
ruling power's largest constituency - thc uncmployed and the poor - to be evoked 
during elections. 
The GEAR strategy launched in June 1996 eclipsed the RDP and was more specific 
and systematic. Its audience existed largely outside of South Africa. It was essentially 
designed to send signals to transnational capital that South Africa was a fertile 
ground. with policy credibility, for investment. Though the GEAR framework was an 
unpopular strategy from the outset, the government pursued it relentlessly for close to 
five years, ignoring protestations by its labour allies and other grassroots civil society 
interests. GEAR signified the emergence of a new hegemonic project and 
internalisation of the forces of globalisation in South Africa's domestic political and 
economic scene. 
Government's initial focus on macro-economic stabilisation has led some 
commentators to conclude that South African government is neo-liberal and beholden 
to foreign investor interests.65 Gelb argues that it is too simplistic a view to impute a 
neo-liberal label; and further notes rather that, 'It is important to distinguish between 
the policy documents as written, the policies as implemented and the underlying 
growth models·.66 This framework was put in place in order to respond to a particular 
conjunctural challenge associated with the declining state of the economy, and was 
meant to be a stabilisation programme. 
6S Patrick Bond, op.cil., pp.l92-pp.195. 
66 Stephen Gelb, op.cit., 2003, p.35. 
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On the positive side, the strategy managed to achieve budget deficit reduction to 
levels aimed at by government - below 3 percent - and improved predictability in 
monetary policy with managed inflation and interest rate levels; and created the basis 
for future social spending. However, in the immediate, it failed where it counted the 
most: stemming the tide of job losses and creating new jobs. 
Moreover, South Africa's socio-economic structure was to a greater degree left intact, 
a reality which would haunt the political elite for many years to come. Having failed 
to deliver on its promises, and coming under sustained attack from the trade unions 
and grassroots civil society movements, the strategy was thus quietly abandoned in 
favour of micro economic reform programmes (see discussion below). 
4.4 South Africa's Trade Policies 
4.4.1 Developments in South Africa's Trade Policy 
Historically, South Africa's trade policy exhibited a set of ' ... protectionist, policy 
preferences, including import substitution industrialisation, development of 'strategic' 
industries (in coal, arms and oil) and deliberate development of mineral-related 
exports through upstream beneficiation. ,67 It operated through a byzantine maze of 
protectionist policies, including a host of price controls, quantitative restrictions and 
67 John D. Lewis, 'Reform and Opportunity: The changing role of trade in South Africa and SADC', 
Africa Region Working Paper Series, No. 14, World Bank, 2001, p.2. www.worldbank.org; Yvonne 
Tsikata, 'Liberalization and Trade Performance in South Africa', World Bank Southern Africa 
Department, Discussion Paper 13, 1997, pj. www.worldbank.org 
174 
compkx tariff lines. and this served to perpetuate anti-export bias.68 Although trade 
liberalisation began in the 1970s with the introduction of export subsidies, undergoing 
various liberalisation episodes - the first taking place between 1972 and 1977, 
followed by a second episode between 1983 and 1990 - it was only in 1994 when the 
country locked its tariff liberalisation into the GAIT at the closure of Uruguay Round 
that fundamental refonns were undertaken. 
This period was known as the third episode of trade liberalisation.69 In April 1994, 
South Africa signed the Marrakech Agreement, abiding itself by the disciplines of the 
GATT and committing to liberalise its trade regime - a change that signified a policy 
shift from an inward-looking to an externally oriented economy.70 South Africa's offer 
to GAIT was made on behalf of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).71 The 
import-substitution industrialisation (lSI) programme, with its accompanying high 
tariff walls, and high dependence on primary products, was finally given its last rites. 
Indeed, as Cassim and Zarenda have contended, 'It was purely fortuitous that the 
installation of the democratic led government coincided with the conclusion of the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GA IT).'72 This was a powerful 
development for South Africa and, indeed, the clearest signifier of South Africa's 
decisive break with lSI and embrace of export-oriented policy trajectory. Export 
68 John D. Lewis, op.cit., p.lO; Yvonne Tsikata, op.cit., p.ii. 
69 see Michael Bleaney, Alan Hirsch, Merle Holden and Carolyn Jenkins, op.cit; Cassim, Onyango and 
van Seventer, op.cit., 2002. 
70 Colin McCarthy, 'South African Trade and Industrial Policy in a Regional Context, in Lennart 
Petersson, Post-Apartheid South Africa: Economic Challenges and Policies for the Future, (London: 
Routledge, 1998), p.64. 
71 This is the oldest customs union in the world, formed in 1910 and made up of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. South Africa is the anchor of this customs union dominating its 
trade and industrial policies, and to some extent monetary policy. 
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promotion soon became one of the important pillars of South Africa's growth 
strategy. and was driven largely by DTI. 
The process of lowering and simplification of tariffs was undertaken between 1995 
and largely completed in 2002. It is important to note that South Africa's 
liberalisation process was, unlike developments in most parts of the continent, fairly 
autonomous and was dictated primarily by structural factors in the economy, rather 
than blindly following ideological perspective, initially. This does not suggest that 
ideology did not play a role, especially in view of the predominance of neo-liberal 
developmental paradigm, but this was not, from the outset, a primary reference point 
for policy thinking when reforms began. 
However, ideology weaved itself gradually and subtly into the institutional structures 
and policy frameworks of government. As Payne has suggested: 
'Nearly all states responded to the structural power of international 
capital, seeking nationally to put in place an appropriate set of policies 
and institutions to attract inward foreign investment and, in some cases, 
extend the openness of the world economy.'73 
Accession to GAIT had also served to lock in policy reforms. This is also confirmed 
by B1eaney et al who note that: 
72 Rashaad Cassim and Harry Zarenda, 'South Africa's Trade Policy Paradigm - Evolution or 
Innovation', In Elizabeth Sidropoulos (eds.), South Africa's Foreign Policy 1994-2004: Apartheid 
Past. Renaissance Future, (Wits: South African Institute ofIntemational Affairs, 2004), p.106. 
73 Anthony Payne, 'The New Political Economy of Area Studies', Millennium Journal of international 
Studies, Volume 27 (2) 1998, p.26 I. 
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·the reforms that have taken place in South Africa have not been part of 
a general and formal structural adjustment programme, and only very 
recently have the requirements of an external agency (the WTO) begun 
to drive trade reform. Changes occurred in response to problems that 
h . . h ,74 ave ansen In t e economy. 
This restructuring was also reflective of the wider trade policy reforms in both the 
developing and the developed world in the 1980s. In addition, 'The dynamic 
performance of the export-oriented South and East Asian countries has had a 
demonstration effect on other countries and has influenced prevailing economic 
philosophies' (see Chapter I ).75 Furthermore, the traditional space for dirigisme 
industrial promotion had been significantly narrowed by the multilateral trade regime. 
An export incentive scheme, the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS)76, was 
introduced in April 1990, and it sought to address anti-export bias and shift incentive 
structure in the economy towards benefiting manufactured exports.77 This was based 
on tax free grants tied to phases of higher value-added and domestic content.78 
As South Africa did not have a market size that gave it a bargaining capacity in the 
international trading system such incentive was regarded as important in encouraging 
74 Michael Bleaney et ai, op.cit .. pA09. 
75 Manuel R. Argosin and Dianna Tussie, (eds.), Trade and Growth: New Dilemmas in Trade Policy. 
(London: Macmillan, 1993), p.2. 
76 The GElS was implemented in 1990, and it provided subsidy to exporters of manufacturers in 
proportion to the volume of exports, the stage of manufacture (favouring final goods), and the use of 
local input, modified by an exchange rate factor. see John D. Lewis, op.cit.. for a detailed discussion 
on the processes leading to its phasing away in 1997. 
77 Rashaad Cassim et al .. op.cit .. 2002, p.7. 
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the inward-flows of foreign capital as well as ensuring competitiveness of domestic 
industries. Although the GElS went some way in incentivising value-added exports, it 
was a very expensive scheme. It had a corrosive effect on the national budget, costing 
the government about R2 billion annually.79 This incentive scheme was also 
considered incompatible with GATT, and South Africa was forced to phase it out over 
a three year period, from 1995. It finally came to an end on 11 July 1997. Along with 
the commitment to phase out GElS, South Africa also made efforts towards 
elimination of quantitative restrictions.so A host of other supply-side measures which 
did not breach GATT norms were ushered in over time. 
These measures included: export marketing assistance schemes; small, mIcro and 
medium enterprise (SMMEs) support programmes, especially to correct 'market 
failures' where small and micro enterprises found it difficult to access conventional 
financing mechanisms; collaborative initiatives encouraged by government between 
universities and industry for technological development; strategic investment 
incentive programme (SIP), which provides tax relief and is designed to encourage 
investment by local and foreign capital in South African industry operations, and 
contribute to competitiveness of certain sectors; spatial development initiatives to 
bridge geographic differences in the spread of economic activities; Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) programmes, aimed at encouraging the development of black 
entrepreneurs and demographic diversification of equity ownership in the economy.81 
78 Colin McCarthy, op.cit., 1998, p.7D. 
79 Bleaney et ai, op. cit. , p.4D7 and Cassim et.al, op.cil., p.7; c.f. remarks by Friedrich List that export 
subsidies are useless and unnecessary, and could encourage other countries to retaliate. See, Friedrich 
List, The Natural System of Political Economy, (London: Frank Cass, 183711983), p.123; See also 
Wyn Grant's caution on the potential cost of certain industrial policy measures, especially their drain 
on public money, Wyn Grant, Industrial Policy, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1995), p.xi. 
80 Yvonne Tsikata, op.cit., p.4. 
Sl Interview with Nimrod Zalk, op.cil. 
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These incentive programmes also include the use of public procurement to favour 
previously disadvantaged groups. In making a linkage between South Africa's 
internal challenges and external strategies, the former Head of International Trade 
Division and the current South Africa's Permanent Head of Delegation to the WTO, 
Faizel Ismail, asserted that in all South Africa's international work, the starting points 
are basic development objectives: increasing the level of jobs, expanding the Small 
and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), and advancing black economic empowerment, 
while ensuring greater integration of the Southern African region.82 To the extent that 
a regional strategy is employed to pursue South Africa strategic objectives it can thus 
be characterised as strategic competitive regionalism as it is primarily informed by 
South Africa's own domestic economic realities and developmental concerns. 
4.4.2 South Africa 'sOffer to the WTO 
In its liberalisation effort, South Africa's offer to the WTO was to reduce tariff 
categories from over hundred to six and this was to be at the rates of zero, five, ten, 
fifteen, twenty, and thirty percent. The exempted sectors were clothing and textiles 
and the automotive sectors, and these were given eight years to liberalise at the same 
level of offer as other sectors.S3 Furthermore, South Africa also made commitments to 
82 Faizel Ismail presentation at the TIPS-IGD WTO Symposium, Proceedings of a Consultative 
Symposium, The Multilateral Trading System and the Road to Doha: Challenges for South Africa, 7-8 
August 200 I, Pretoria. 
83 Cassim et.al. op.cit .. 2002, p.ll. 
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reduce domestic subsidies, and these to be phased out at 1986-88 base by 20 percent 
. . d S-l over a SIX year peno . 
Draper notes that 'The reforms initiated in 1994 at the culmination of the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations led to a significant reorganisation of South 
Africa's tariff structure.'85 South Africa's taritT rates were to be reduced from about 
210 in 1990 to 6 in 1996.86 South Africa's five-year GATT offer, as documented by 
Tsikata87, can be summarised as follows: 
• reduction of the number of tariff lines by 15 percent in the first year 
and by 30 percent or higher at the end of the Offer period; 
• conversion of all Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) on agricultural 
imports to ad valorem rates; 
• lowering of agricultural tariffs by a minimum of 15 percent 
individually and by 21 percent on average; 
• reduction of agricultural subsidies by an export-weighted amount of 36 
percent; 
• replacement of all formula duties with tariffs; 
• phasing out of export subsidies - the GElS - by the end of 1997. 
Almost a decade later, South Africa's tariff structure remains cumbersome with slow 
movement towards tariff liberalisation, and there remain over 45 tariff categories in 
84 Piritta Sorsa, 'Sub-Saharan African Own Commitments in the Uruguay Round - Myth or Reality?, 
World Economy, Volume 19, 1996 (3), p.293. 
85 Peter Draper, op.cit., 2003, p.g. 
86 Paul Kalenga, 'Regional Trade Integration in Southern Africa: Critical Policy Issues', DPRU 
Working Papers, No 00/42. September 2000.), p.6. 
87 Yvonne Tsikata, op.cit., pA. 
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the economy.ss In addition, South Africa still has high tariff peaks and these are 
mostly to be found in the automotive industry.89 
To a greater degree, even though quite evidently the liberalisation process is largely 
couched within reforms that are broadly consistent with neo-liberalism, trade policy 
process is highly managed than simply laissez faire, and is linked to broader macro-
economic and developmental approach. As the current South African chief trade 
negotiator, Xavier Carim, has noted, 'The key foci of trade policy are to advance the 
reform and restructuring of the economy, to enhance economic competitiveness, and 
to incrcasc thc capacity of firms to compete in an increasingly integrated world 
economy' .90 To capture the complex challenges that South Africa faced in the 
domestic, regional and global fronts and the type of strategies suited to deal with 
these, a global economic strategy was elaborated by officials at the DTI. 
4.4.3 South Africa's Global Economic Strategy 
South Africa's global economic strategy, which was formulated roughly around 2000, 
sets out South Africa's key foreign economic policy priorities. At the core of it is the 
expansion of South Africa's trade negotiations agenda, and diversification away from 
traditional markets in the EU and the US. The strategy sets out to achieve geographic 
diversification of South Africa's exports away from traditional markets towards Asia 
and Latin America. It also aims to lower the proportion of exports going to Europe to 
88 Rashaad Cassim, Presentation to the closed workshop of the International Economic Development 
Division, Department ofTrade and Industry (DTI), 08 - 09 January 2001. 
89 ibid. 
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about 25 percent of total exports.''!] It is likely that this is motivated by the view that 
these are dynamic markets in which South Africa can export products that are reflect 
its (potential) dynamic comparative advantage; and that perhaps, reliance on 
traditional markets may create uncertainties when demand slows in those markets. 
The table below sketches the direction of South African trade. 
Table 4.1: Destination of South African Trade: 
Region Share of total exports (%) Share oftotal imports 
2000 2003 2000 2003 
Americas 17 14 15 14 
Africa 16 16 2 3 
Asia and 28 30 39 37 
Oceania 
Europe 39 39 44 45 
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 2004. 
The Global Economic Strategy, together with other policy initiatives such as New 
Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Integrated Manufacturing 
Strategy, is indicative of South Africa's determination to carve a larger role for itself 
in global economic relations. Indeed, apart from tariff liberalisation, South Africa has 
a wider ambition to be part of varied external trade engagements. Its agenda, through 
the DTI, includes' ... negotiating bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements 
aimed at growing and diversifying South Africa's export markets, and encouraging 
90 Xavier Carim, 'Trade Policy in a Coherent Macro-economic Framework', TIPS Policy Perspectives 
No.2 May 2003. www.tips.org.za. 
91 Department of Trade and Industry, A Guide to the Microeconomic Reform Strategy: A Discussion 
Paper from the DTI of South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, May 2002. 
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foreign direct investment. .92 At the heart of this approach are considerations of 
international competitiveness and domestic developmental concerns. 
The regional and multilateral dimensions are explored in-depth in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively. South Africa is part of the SAOC and plays an important role in SADC 
Trade Protocol which came into force in 2000 and is aimed at establishing a SAOC 
Free Trade Area by 2008 (see Chapter 5). It is also part of a customs union with four 
other SAOC countries - Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland - and has 
recently finalised a new Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement with 
these countries.93 
South Africa has also signed an EU-South Africa Trade and Development 
Cooperation (TOCA) in 1999; is currently engaged, together with its SACU partners, 
in negotiations with the US for a Free Trade Area; and has a number of bilateral trade 
negotiations lined up, including with South America's Common Market 
(MERCOSUR) led by Brazil, India, China, and Nigeria. This demonstrates the 
seriousness with which the country takes strategic competitive realities, and seeks to 
use regionalism to deal with domestic growth challenges and integrate firmly in wider 
global processes. 
This then takes us to the next section that closely examines South Africa's industrial 
policy framework. 
92 Department of Trade and Industry, fTEDD Report on South Africa's Trade Negotiations, mimeo. 
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4.5 South Africa's Industrial Policy Framework 
-1.5.1 Integra/cd lIfam{j'actllring Strategy 
As discussed in Chapter 2. there is a strong relationship between trade policy and 
industrial policy in defining the positioning of the domestic economy, in particular 
specific sectors, in relation to global markets and competitive pressures. Trade 
negotiations, in the ultimate, seek to grow and diversifY South Africa's export markets 
with strong emphasis on value-added manufactured exports. Matona of the OTI 
remarked that South Africa views trade policy as ' ... an extension of industrial policy 
. fd I ,94 at a certam stage 0 eve opment. 
Government's strategy places emphasis on beneficiation of natural resources, 
knowledge intensity, and export orientation.95 This is very much in line with the 
recommendations made by the MERG report, quoted earlier, in the early 1990s, 
pointing to the importance of back-ward linkages in minerals production.96 Rather 
than adopting incentive neutral stance which is associated with narrow 'neo-classical' 
approaches, the government has opted for 'activist' industrial strategy framework in 
93 South Africa's regional trade policy is centred mainly on SADC and SACU. South Africa's 
participation in the SADC Protocol on Trade and its recent renegotiation of the 1969 SACU agreement 
expresses regional commitments in its trade policy and strategy approach. 
94 Interview with Tshediso Matona, Deputy Director-General: International Trade and Economic 
Development Division (ITEDD), 12 November 2004, Pretoria. 
9S Department of Trade and Industry, Accelerating Growth and Development: The Contribution of the 
Integrated Manufacturing Strategy. DTI, Pretoria, 2002, p.22. www.thedti.gov.za 
96 Backward linkages refers to the process of drawing primary inputs, e.g., from manufacturing for 
production in the primary sector e.g. mining to create value (or beneficiation). This is often contrasted 
with forward-linkages, which refers to the usage of inputs drawn from the broader primary sector e.g. 
iron, steel, basic chemicals and petroleum etc. The use of platinum in catalytic conversion is one 
example. 
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order to cfTectivcly expedite South Africa's integration into the global economy and at 
. b I I d . b' . 97 thc same tllnc a :lI1CC growt 1 an eqUIty 0 ~ectIvcs. 
This VICW is attcsted to by thc fact that recently the President has promoted Rob 
Davies. a former academic and a leading member of the SACP, to DTI as one of the 
two Deputy Ministers. He is generally known to favour industrial policy measures 
where state plays an active role. and he is associated with protectionist tendencies.98 
While it is still not very clear yet what the exact nature of South Africa's industrial 
policy is. and what concrete shape it might assume in the future, evidence so far 
suggests that government is set to playa guiding role without necessarily hindering 
the outward-oriented path that it pronounced in its policy framework. A balance 
between an active government role and encouragement of the business sector to be 
more competitive and in global markets seems to be a favoured approach. 
In elaborating on the role of the state in the economy, Argosin and Tussie have argued 
for example that, ' ... strong government guidance of the economy and the retention of 
incentive selectivity are more likely to induce outward-oriented growth than passive 
government policies' .99 Similarly, Wyn Grant observes that a relationship between 
state and society. especially fostering government-business relationship, ' ... permits a 
more effective, longsighted response to changing economic circumstances and leads 
97 Interview with Nimrod Zalk, op.cit. 
98 This view benefited from informal discussions held in Geneva with a senior government official at 
the DTI. Rob Davies has for a long time, as ANC Member of Parliament, chaired the Portfolio 
Committee on Trade and Industry before he was moved to chair Finance in 2004. He has also written 
extensively on regionalism during his previous role as an academic. 
qq Manuel R. Argosin and Dianna Tussie, op.cil. p.3. 
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to a higher growth trajectory: I ()O Some of the broader debates on industrial policy are 
covered in Chapter 2. 
Michael Porter notes that the driving force for prosperity IS no longer macro-
economic policy. it is microeconomic policy; ' ... it has to do with the microeconomic 
foundation in the country that supports high level productivity in business.' 101 South 
Africa's integrated manufacturing strategy draws heavily on Porter. In its Integrated 
Manufacturing Strategy. the DTI states that, 'Michael Porter's work on clusters and 
the importance of the interaction of private and public sectors around specific actions 
is a methodology that the government and the dti have consciously used.' 102 
Porter articulates a cluster approach - which South Africa has adapted - within the 
context of a microeconomic strategy geared towards enhancing a nation's competitive 
advantage. I 03 He notes that' ... government' s more decisive influences are often at the 
micro level: 104 In defining the cluster approach, he suggests that these are 
' ... geographic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, 
service providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions (for example 
universities. and trade associations) in particular fields that compete but also 
cooperate.' 105 The assumption underlying a microeconomic strategy is that 
productivity in a country's economy is a function of the productivity of firms in the 
economy. 
100 Wyn Grant, Industrial Policy, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1995), p.ix. 
101 Michael Porter, in UNCT AD symposium: Regional Integration and the Global Economy, (Geneva: 
UNCT AD Publications, October 2000), p.98. 
10: Department of Trade and Industry,lntegrated Manufacturing Strategy, op.cit., p.26. 
10.1 Michael Porter, On Competition, (Harvard: Harvard Business Review, 1998), p.l98. 
104 ibid 
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In South Africa. this cluster perspective informs an approach which is aimed at 
idcnti fying a number of sectors and product areas in which an investment and export 
strategy is focused.lor, The macro-economic stability needed for this approach has 
already been embarked upon between 1996 and 2000. The second wave of reform, 
especially since 200 I. focused its attention on micro-economic strategy, targeting 
specific 'stratcgic sectors' in the economy. 
What could be the explanation for opting for a cluster approach in the South African 
context? This question is particularly pertinent given the fact that South Africa's 
economy hardly exhibits the traits found in countries that Porter used as case studies -
most of which are developed economies with relatively levels of productivity. 
Perhaps. the cluster model could be applied or adapted to middle-income countries 
such as South Africa, and its attraction lies in the fact that, as Porter suggests, clusters 
are a .... driving force in increasing exports and [are] magnets for attracting foreign 
investment.,I07 In this sense, they fit in with South Africa's overall orientation as a 
'strategic' developmental state and build on the dimension of 'strategic competitive 
regionalism'. There are also other factors that account for this preference, and these 
relate to issues of competitiveness and domestic supply constraints. 
On the former, middle-income countries like South Africa are facing pressure to 
restructure their economies in the light of growing competitiveness of countries like 
China and India in labour-intensive manufacturing products, and this is on the basis of 
cost and scale. The challenge then is to move up the technology value-chain. As the 
10~ ibid. pp.197-198. 
106 ibid 
107 ibid. p.199. 
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recent study by a global strategy consulting firm, Mckinsey & Co suggests, countries 
can no longer compde on the basis of low-cost strategy, especially so in view of 
China's entry into global markets. 109 Pempel observes that: 
. Because a fundamental goal of the developmental state is the 
improvement of its economic conditions relative to other states, any 
country aspiring to development must choose its strategy within the 
broader context of regional and international power balances.'109 
Clusters partly fulfil this function, especially to facilitate movement up the value-
chain and approapriately sheperding domestic industries' competitive strategies in 
global markets. Secondly, there are supply side constraints that inhibit productivity at 
the mieroeconomic level. These include those to do with technology and R&D 
support, infrastructure development, access to finance, development of 
entrepreneurship, input cost and price efficiency, skills, supply chains and logistics. 110 
Essentially, the cluster approach, built around 'strategic' growth sectors, seeks to 
attract investment; deal with efficiency issues; improve technological platforms and 
enhance overall competitiveness. The growth sectors forming part of South Africa's 
micro-economic reform strategy were highlighted by the South African President, 
Thabo Mbeki, during his State of the Nation Address in 2003. 111 
108 Diana Farrel, Antonio Puron, amd Jaana Remes, 'Beyond Cheap Labour: Lessons for Developing 
Countries', Mckinsey Quarterly, Issue 1,2005, p.98. 
109 TJ Pempel, 'The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy', In Meredith Woo-
Cumings (ed.), The Developmental State, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), p.147. 
110 Department of Trade and Industry, A Guide to the Microeconomic Reform Strategy: A Discussion 
Paper from the dti of South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, May 2002. 
www.thedti.gov.za 
III President Thabo Mbeki, State of the Nation Address, 14 February 2003, www.anc.org.za 
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The sectors identified for targeting in Mbeki's address were: agriculture; mining; 
tourism: cultural industries; information technologies; clothing and textiles; vehicle 
manufacturing: chemicals: aerospace sector; call centres and back office business 
processing (see Chapter 1). Agriculture and mining for example are targeted for 
value-added processes. In mining the focus would be on beneficiation; and in 
agriculture emphasis will shift towards agro-processing to ensure 'high value, 
technologically-advanced processed agricultural products' 112 in the export basket. 
It is far from clear whether the Department of Trade and Industry has the requisite 
capacity to gather detailed economic intelligence on the structure of the world markets 
and niche areas in which domestic industries could be propelled towards 
competitiveness. What is perhaps expressed in the industrial policy framework is 
more an economic vision which would still need a distilled and detailed micro-
economic strategy or industrial policy that is based on the competitive position of 
individual firms. However, the target date - 2014 - for the implementation of the 
vision seems to have been arbitrarily chosen rather than based on any rigorous 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the structure of the global economy over a 
long period of time. 
Nonetheless, government-industry consultation is largely focused on the export 
sectors noted earlier, and this serves both to inform industry groups of government's 
strategic thinking as well as to gain feedback from industry. The DTI is in the process 
of appointing managers to oversee each of these sectoral areas and to interact with 
112 Department of Trade and Industry, Integrated Manufacturing Strategy. op.cit .. p.30. 
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relevant industry groups on government strategies. 1I3 The government's global 
economic strategy notes that, 'Forging partnerships and intensifYing co-ordination 
between government and exporters is essential for the success of our global strategy. 
Success requires a shared and detailed appreciation of the strengths, weaknesses and 
dynamics of South African industry and industrial policy at the sectoral level' .114 
As set out in the government's integrated manufacturing strategy, specific focus in 
each sector includes: employment generation, value addition, production for the 
domestic market as well as export growth, small business development and black 
economic empowerment. The targeted sectors identified earlier are to be placed on 
'knowledge-intensive, export-oriented trajectory' .115 Although there is a discernible 
shift towards value-added in the economy, there is no evidence that such a shift has 
indeed generated the promised employment and diversified export growth both in the 
traditional markets as well as beyond. 
According to a report jointly published by the OTI and the Bureau for Economic 
Research (BER), and academic research unit attached to the University of 
Stellenbosch, manufacturing growth slowed down at the end of2002, and came under 
further pressure at the beginning of 2003. This is attributed to slow down in retail 
conditions due to increase in interest rates and inflation in 2002; pressure on exports 
due to poor global economic growth; and a strong currency, which serves to reduce 
113 This is based on a DTI job advertisement on the 04 March 2005. www.thedti.gov.za 
114 Faizellsmail, Xavier Carim and Peter Draper, 'South Africa's Global Economic Strategy: A Policy 
Framework and Key Elements', The Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, 2001.p.5. 
115 Department of Trade and Industry, Accelerating Growth and Development: The Contribution of the 
Integrated Manufacturing Strategy, DTI, Pretoria, 2002, p.22. www.thedti.gov.za. p22 
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demands on exports. 116 It is worth noting that despite the existing efforts at spurring 
competitiveness over the decade, since the onset of restructuring, primary products 
and resource-based manufactures still constitute a significant share of South Africa's 
exports compared to other developing countries. 117 However, the significance of these 
is gradually declining. 
In a follow up document to the integrated manufacturing strategy, the DTI identified 
four critical areas that are targeted by South Africa's micro-economic reforms. ll8 
These were cross cutting issues, rcJated to technology, human resource development, 
and access to finance and infrastructure; competitive input sector (utilities), chiefly 
transport, telecommunications, energy, and water; prioritised growth sectors, mainly 
chemicals, agro-processing, automotive industry, tourism, clothing and textiles, 
mining, metals and minerals, information and communications technology; cultural 
industries; services and aerospace; and equity and growth, focusing especially on 
black economic empowerment, small business development, women empowerment, 
employment and geographic spread. 
The Department of Trade and Industry's Chief Director for Strategic 
Competitiveness, Nimrod Zalk, has admitted that South Africa' ... still has a long way 
to go before it reaches the goal of achieving international competitiveness in its 
manufacturing, but there are positive signs from time to time on certain product 
116 Bureau for Economic Research and Department of Trade and Industry. 10 Apri12003, Stellenbosch 
University. www.sun.ac.za 
117 Philip Alves and David E. Kaplan, 'SA's Declining Export Shares: The Developing Country 
Challenge', Trade and Industry Monitor. Volume 30 June 2004, pp.3-4. 
118 Department of Trade and Industry, Medium-term Strategy Review Framework, Pretoria, DTI, 2003, 
p.8. www.thedti.gov.za 
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types.'! 19 Of crucial importance though is to observe the extent to which this 
microeconomic strategy, and indeed the overall government's approach to economic 
refonns. is embedded in domestic social relations. 
4.5.2 Domestic Actors and Adjustment Cost Management 
The government manages its economic reform programme in close collaboration with 
key domestic actors: organised labour, organised business, and civic representatives. 
This form of consultation is institutionalised in the National Economic Development 
and Labour Council (NEDLAC) established in ) 994 as a continuation of the NEF that 
negotiated South Africa's GAIT accession and laid the basis for liberalisation in the 
early 1990s. This neo-corporatist structure, notwithstanding its limitations with 
regards to the space for policy consultation, seeks to provide a platform for 
elaboration of shared legitimacy of social purpose. This could also be characterised as 
a societal coalitional base l20 for legitimating the state, and upon which global 
imperatives are institutionalised and made acceptable to labour. l2l 
Boris Kagalirtsky cautions that 'Reformist and liberal groupings in the ruling class 
sometimes enter into agreement with the Left in the pursuit of quite limited goals, but 
the logic of the struggle for reform takes them at times beyond their own initial 
intentions and forces them to act more decisively.' 122 In this regard, this 
119 Interview with Nimrod Zalk, Chief Director: Strategic Competitiveness Unit, Department of Trade 
and Industry, Pretoria, 13 July 2004. 
120 TJ Pempel, op.cit., p.158. 
121 Heribert Adam, Frederik Van Zyl Siabbert and Kogila Moodley, Comrades in Business: Post-
Liberation Politics in South Africa, (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1997), p.140. 
122 Boris Kargalitsky, The Dialectic of Change, (London: Verso, 1990), p.33 
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institutionalised bargaining mechanism plays some role in shaping domestic social 
and economic policies on the basis of 'social accommodation' or compromise; and on 
this basis it also deliberates on South Africa's negotiating agenda in international 
trade negotiations. 
The character of the South African state, in its outward orientation, therefore can be 
said to manifest, in a limited form, what Ruggie characterises as 'embedded 
liberal ism,.123 This character is reinforced by the state-society nexus, and this is 
reflected in the 'social compromise' between government, business and labour. 
Through this social compromise, a shared legitimacy of social purpose is constructed, 
and domestic economic stability becomes the basis upon which South Africa engages 
in regional and global level interactions. 
Ruggie, for example, alluded to the fusion of power and legitimate social purpose as a 
basis upon which political authority in the international system is projected, and 
further notes that ' ... multilateralism and domestic stability are linked to and 
conditioned by one another' .124 Ruggie's conceptualisation is largely influenced by 
Polanyi's notion of 'double movement,.125 Observing the social history of the 19th 
century, Polanyi pointed out that the extension of the market and its spread across the 
globe was tempered by powerful institutions ' ... designed to check the action of the 
market relative to labour, land, and money.'126 Rather than diffusing uninhibited, the 
123 See John G. Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation, 
(London: Routledge, 1998). 
124 ibid., pp.64-78. 
125 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1944/2001), p.79. 
126 ibid. 
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power of the market mechanism across the globe would be guarded by a counter 
movement at home, and these could be through institutional innovation. 
The form which this nco-corporatism takes in South Africa and indeed in most 
developing countries, with measures to safeguard social stability or attenuate social 
dislocation, cannot be said to be perfectly expressing Polanyi's double movement or 
Ruggie's 'embedded liberalism'. Because social measures are constantly under threat 
of being eroded by the rising tide of globalisation, South Africa's strategy can thus be 
characterised as 'embedded liberalism' in a limited form. It is conditioned by global 
structural and ideational constraints. 
With regards to existing institutional mechanisms to manage social dislocation it 
should be noted that these are not very solid. Yet they playa very useful role not only 
in managing domestic-global tensions, but also domestic social tensions. However, at 
a broader level of strategic thinking, strengthening the institutional capacity ' ... to 
deliver services and products that facilitate social and economic development' - as the 
current micro-economic reform strategy suggests - remains at the heart of 
, I' 127 government s po ICy. 
It must also be highlighted that there are problems with the extent of government's 
consultation in the NEDLAC structure, and as a result there is a sense that instead of 
extensive consultation, the government simply runs policy past.128 This could well be 
127 Department of Trade and Industry, A Guide to the Microeconomic Reform Strategy: A Discussion 
Paper from the dti of South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, May 2002. 
www.thedti.gov.za 
128 Discussion with Peter Draper, Research Fellow at the South African Institute of International 
Affairs (SAIIA) and former Head of Research in the DTI' s International Trade Division; See also Ian 
Taylor, 'The Contradictions and Continuities of South African Trade Policy', In Dominic Kelly and 
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as the result of pressure on state actors to adjust the domestic setting to global 
exigencies as well as frustration with the fetters of nco-corporatist arrangements. State 
actors view NEDLAC as lacking in coordination and' ... still stuck in the old debate 
whether to liberalise or not rather than fully supporting the existing strategy.' 129 
Draper has argued that NEDLAC is not ' ... operating optimally from the viewpoint of 
promoting effective participation in trade negotiations.' 130 In a very limited fonn, 
South Africa's trade strategy is embedded in these social partnerships. NEDLAC's 
challenges and constraints notwithstanding, social actors have, to varying degrees, 
made inputs into government's position and have also participated in multilateral 
trade negotiations as part of government's delegation. 
Much of the concerns of social actors, especially organised labour and organised 
business, are with the management of the domestic adjustment in the face of 
economic refonns and negative effects of globalisation. Essentially, NEDLAC 
provides an institutional platfonn for government, business and labour to strike a 
broad-based consensus on economic restructuring, and especially on issues of 
adjustment. Sometimes this mechanism is frustrating for government as labour and 
organised business tend to be concerned with short-tenn effects of policy, and 
government sees itself as having a long-tenn view of restructuring the economy, 
whose outcomes could affect certain protected industries and have negative 
consequences for workers. 
Wyn Grant (eds.), The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century: Actors. Issues and 
Regional Dynamics. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), pp.298-299. 
129 Interview with Tshediso Matona, op.cil. 
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Reich has suggested for example that 'managed adjustment', where 'government, 
working hand in hand with business and labour, can ease the transition out of 
declining industries and into emerging ones.' 131 He has also contended that 
diversification into more productive and competitive sectors may be a superior 
adjustment strategy. \32 It would seem therefore that in part this logic underlies South 
Africa's approach to economic reforms, but it is yet to be communicated clearly. The 
most significant deliberative event to have taken place under the aegis of NEDLAC 
was the 'Growth and Development Summit' in 2003 where government consulted on 
its gro",th strategy. 
This summit elaborated a key set of recommendations necessary to boost growth and 
job creation in the economy. These included: public investment initiatives to expand 
infrastructural development; expanded public works programme; and strengthening 
sector partnership, including paying attention to sectors that can have a strong impact 
on overall employment creation, with labour-intensive sectors prioritised (e.g. 
clothing and textiles; agriculture and agro-processing, tourism; call centres and back 
ot1ice operations; and cultural industries); local procurement; and small enterprise 
• 133 promotIOn. 
There, however, appears to be a difficult accommodation between government's long-
term economic visions and how it is articulated on the one hand, and expectations of 
certain social actors and how they view government's role in the economy on the 
other. While this at least demonstrates that state actors maintain a considerable degree 
130 Peter Draper, op.cit., 2005. 
131 Robert B. Reich, 'Making Industrial Policy', Foreign Affairs, Volume 60, 1982, p.855. 
132 ibid., p.859. 
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of insularity from particularistic interests in society, it makes things harder for the 
government as there is an existing institutional mechanism which could at any 
moment constrain the extent to which state actors are autonomous. 
4.6 South Africa's Domestic Capital in the Region 
The global economic strategy singles out Africa, and Southern Africa, in particular is 
as constituting its centrepiece. As this thesis argues, this is both for political and 
economic reasons. South Africa is more concerned with the competitiveness of its 
domestic firms in global markets. Indeed, South Africa's interests, as the thesis 
contends, is to utilise the regional space both as a destination for South African capital 
- a strategy which can best be conceptualised in terms of strategic competitive 
regionalism - and to shape evolving political processes in the region as weIl as using 
the region as a platform to build bargaining capacity in multilateral trade engagements 
(see Chapter 6). However, a regional power status in global economic relations cannot 
be achievely solely on the back of economic strategy; it has to also derive political 
legitimacy through fostering good relations, based on mutual benefit and balanced 
development, in the surrounding region. 
On paper, the global economic strategy links South Africa's domestic growth 
imperatives to overall developmental concerns of the continent and the sub-region 
(see also Chapter 3). It is pointed out for example in the strategy document that, 'This 
developmental agenda is linked to South Africa's own economic resurgence and the 
relationship can be described as mutually beneficial since it allows South African 
133 NEDLAC. Growth and Development Summit Agreement 7 June 2003. www.nedlac.org.za 
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interests to be furthered in a manner that allows for the continent's simultaneous 
d I . 134 evc opmcnt to occur. 
The extent to which this relationship is mutually beneficial is critically examined in 
Chapter 5. Rather than seeking to build itself as region-centered 'hegemon' in the 
short-term. South Africa is more concerned with increasing its stakes in the global 
level processes and finding ways to resolve its internal social contradictions -
including acute social inequalities, unemployment crisis and sluggish economic 
growth - most of which are a legacy ofthe apartheid era. 
South Africa's nascent global economic strategy - with one foot on the region and the 
other on the global or multilateral front - reflects deep concerns about strategic 
competitiveness. South Africa plays a central role in region-level process, but that is 
not where its strategic objectives find ultimate fulfilment. Similarly with the pre-l 994 
external strategy, discussed in Chapter 3, the post-apartheid strategy is set much wider 
than the immediate region. Its reach is continent-wide, and it also seeks to position 
South Africa competitively in the global political economy. 
In the continent, South Africa has an explicit objective to advance its thrust in the 
New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) through provisioning 
of leadership in its analytic and strategic content. In his 2003 Budget Speech, the 
Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, set out government's intention in the region as to 
134 Faizellsmail, Xavier Carim and Peter Draper, Op.cil.,p.5. 
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promote South Africa as a regional financial centre 'able to cater more fully for the 
needs of the A frican continent' .135 
In addition, South African government has expanded its missions In African 
countries, increased the funding for the African Union (AU) and NEPAD Secretariat. 
Budget allocation to reinforce South Africa's peace initiatives in the continent 
amounted to R 1.1 billion and an additional R427 million allocated towards enhancing 
diplomatic representation abroad in the 2004 fiscal year. 136 Foreign Exchange control 
allowance for South Africa's FDI into Africa has also increased from R750 million to 
R2 billion and foreign direct investment outside of Africa increased from R500 to Rl 
billion in 2003. J37 This clearly attests to government's determined approach to 
establish South Africa's presence and leadership in the sub-region and the continent. 
However, so far, much of South Africa's activities in the region are less of a function 
of coordinated political leadership, especially in regards to economic relations, but 
more of an expression of South Africa's capital or business' dominance. According to 
a report by Africa@Work, one of the leading think tanks on South Africa's business 
activities on the continent, there has been a noticeable growth and diversification of 
South Africa's business and investment away from traditional business of contracts in 
construction, mining, vehicle components, timber and steel. 
135 Minister of Finance, The Budget Speech. 18 February 2004, Department of National Treasury, 2004, 
p.23. www.treasury.gov.za 
136 ibid 
137 Minister of Finance, The Budget Speech, Department of National Treasury, 2002. 
www.treasury.gov.za 
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The investment drive, according to Games, favours areas such as skills training, 
education, IT and telecommunications, clinics and hcalthcare, franchising, 
advertising, property development and waste managcmcnt. 138 These build on 
traditional areas sueh as mining, eivil engineering and construction, agriculture, 
tourism and the manufacturing and service industries. 139 
Games has further observed that in 200 I, South Africa was listed as the second 
biggest investor in the SADC region with investment ofR14.8 billion, trailing multi-
state deals at R27 billion with the next highest country investor being the United 
Kingdom at R3.4 billion.14o The report is quite detailed about the spread of 'non-
traditional' areas in which investment is concentrated in the region, and the generally 
bullish state of South Africa's capital in the continent. It is noted, for example, that: 
'Among the big deals in the SADC region in 2001 and 2002 were a new 
investment of US$1.1 billion by SASOL in the Pande and Temma gas 
fields in Mozambique; a US$860 million investment by BHP Billiton, 
the IDC and Mitsubishi in the expansion of Mozal II; a US$142 million 
by Vodacom in Tanzania, and a further US$139 million investment in 
the DRC; US$56 million by Sun International in its hotel in Zambia; 
US$83 million in Pretoria Portland Zimbabwe in merger activity in 
Zimbabwe; US$6 billion by power parastatal Eskom enterprises in the 
138 Dianna Games, The Experience of Firms doing Business in Africa: A preliminary Analysis. 
University of Witwatersrand, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2003, p.l. 
www.saiaawits.ac.za 
139 Whitehouse & Associates. 'Trade, Projects and Investment: What is South Africa to Africa?', 
Traders: African Business Journal, Issue 19, August - November 2004, p.4. 
140 ibid. . . p.6. 
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Inga Project in the ORe; and US$20 million by the South African 
Airways for its stake in Air Tanzania,.141 
These trends have been evolving at a dramatic pace since the country went through 
democratic change and gained admission as a member of SADC in 1994. However, 
these investment activities have also generated or added to negative perceptions aobut 
South Africa's business behaviour in the region. The former Minister of Public 
Enterprises, Jeff Radebe, noted that, 'The fact that strong perceptions exist, that many 
South African companies and enterprises come across as arrogant, disrespectful, aloof 
and carelesss in their attitude towards the local business community, consumers, work 
seekers and even governments, is a cause for concern.' 142 These can, and often do, 
portray South Africa as a self-interested partner in regional integration or in its 
relationship with other African countries. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This section has paved the way for a more focused discussion on South Africa's role 
in regional relations since 1994. This chapter looked at South Africa's political and 
economic transition in the early 1990s and the challenges that the country faced as it 
sought to integrate itself into the global economy. It also provided a broad overview 
of South Africa's political economy during this period. In this context, the economic 
reforms, including trade and industrial policies were examined. This examination 
141 ibid 
142 Jeff Radebe, Minister of Public Enterprises (South Africa, 1999 - 2004), Keynote Address, In 
SARPN, Stability. Poverty Reduction and South African Trade and Investment in Southern Africa, 
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looked in particular at the structural changes in the South African economy from a 
closed to an export-oriented posture. It is clear that these changes in the macro and 
micro-economic policies also reflected the shifts taking place at the global level and 
pressures felt by states for structural reforms and competitiveness. 
There is no doubt that a confluence of factors, including changes that were already on 
the horizon at the systemic level; the declining state of the economy as a result of the 
huge amounts of resources expended in maintaining the apartheid edifice; recession of 
the 1980s and the atrophy of lSI strategy; South Africa's international isolation; and 
the internal pressure generated by grassroots movements in rebellion against apartheid 
have all acted to bring it down and prepare the ground for the emergence of a new 
social dispensation within the country. 
The choice of South Africa's external strategy, including its relationship with the 
immediate region, was, to a considerable extent going to be determined by both the 
internal developmental challenges and considerations for global integration. What 
emerged out of this dynamic is a particular form of regional strategy driven by 
strategic competititve considerations in its 'offensive' mode, but taking on a strongly 
mercantilist shape in its 'defensive' mode. Building on this background, the next 
chapter will critically examine South Africa's regional trade engagements. This is one 
of the key dimensions in the domestic-regional-multilateral nexus. 
Proceedings of a conference presented by SARPN and the EU's CWCT Fund, at the HSRC, Pretoria, 
29-30 March 2004. www.sarpn.org.za 
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CHAPTER 5: Strategic Competitive Regionalism and Developmental 
Challenges: South Africa in Southern Africa. 
Chapter I discussed some of the developmental challenges faced by Southern African 
countries by placing the sub-region within a broader developmental context in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Quite evidently, Southern Africa has structural similarities to most 
parts of the continent. It is generally poor and underdeveloped and relies mainly on 
primary products for exports. Five of 14 SADC countries fall under the designation of 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs); and the majority of countries in Southern Africa 
generally lack infrastructure and have poor institutions, including weak regulatory 
bodies and bureaucratic structures. The structural features of the sub-region reveal the 
extent of its marginality from the global economy. 
The socio-economic character of the sub-region did not escape South Africa's state 
actors in their determination of the country's future foreign economic strategies. 
Indeed, the sub-region was considered by South Africa as a challenge that it would 
have to contend with as part of addressing its own domestic growth and 
developmental challenges (see Chapter 4). This took on a deep sense of urgency as 
the country expedited its integration into global economic relations in the early 1990s. 
However, South Africa's regional approach has by and large betrayed a sense of 
ambivalence towards the region and this partly reflects contradictions within South 
Africa's own social structure (see Chapter 4), and the multifaceted challenges that the 
country faced as it looked both to its immediate regional neighbourhood (largely 
trapped in poverty) and towards prospects for deeper integration in the global 
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economy for economic efnciency. On the one hand, South Africa exhibits 'First 
World' economy features: it possesses complete institutions of governance, effective 
regulatory mechanisms, well-developed infrastructure, a growing proportion of capital 
markets, a thriving services sector, and a fledging manufacturing economy. Yet, on 
the other hand, South Africa's economy is afflicted with similar ills that are visited 
upon most countries in the region, with high levels of unemployment, high poverty 
rates, a growing informal economy, high illiteracy rates and a slow growing economy. 
This chapter discusses the regional dimension of South Africa's global positioning, 
locating it within South Africa's domestic developmental framework, already 
discussed in the previous chapter. The multilateral dimension which is, in no small 
measure, interlinked with the regional dimension, will be considered at great length in 
Chapter 6. This chapter looks at the political economy of trade relations in the context 
of regionalism, examining South Africa's foreign economic strategy in the region and 
the constraints it suffers at the domestic level. 
This analysis is made against the backdrop of Southern African Development 
Cooperation (SADC) Free Trade Protocol which is an important institutional driver of 
regional economic integration in the sub-region. It is also here that political tensions 
amongst SADC member countries play themselves out. This chapter builds on the 
argument already set out in Chapters 1 and 2, that considerations of strategic 
competitiveness - shaped mainly by the domestic scene - are crucial in defining South 
Africa engagements at the regional and multilateral levels. 
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5.1 Background 
5.1.1 The Economic Profile ojSADC 
As briefly highlighted earlier, large parts of SADC could be characterised as 
peripheral. Yet, in terms of the population size, the sub-region is a vast area: it has a 
population of about 190 million people, with 40 percent living in conditions of 
extreme poverty and with high levels of malnutrition, illiteracy rates and 
unemployment. 143 The size of the land is about 9.1 million squire kiiometres. l44 The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (the DRC) is by far the most populous and the poorest 
country in the region. It has a popUlation of 45.5 million, and in terms of size it is 
followed by South Africa at 43.2 miliion. 145 The sub-region has a combined GOP of 
US$176 billion. 146 
As noted earlier, the structure of trade in Southern Africa is narrow both in terms of 
product and geographic spread. The sub-region accounts for 0.3 per cent of the world 
trade and its highest export shares are in primary products which account for 1.7 per 
cent of total world exports. 147 This section will not attempt a detailed profiling of each 
SADC country, except to highlight broad trends. It will instead look at a cross-section 
of countries, mainly those that belong to SACU, and Mauritius (generally known as 
liberalisers or reformers). Zimbabwe, another country with a diversified economic 
143 Prega Ramsay. 'Poverty Reduction: A Top Priority in SADC's Integration Agenda', Southern 
African Update. Volume 13. March 2002, p.l. www.tips.org.za 
144 John D. Lewis, op.cit. 
145 UNCT AD, Sub-regional Trade Expansion in Southern Africa as a Result of the SADC Trade 
Protocol, (Geneva: International Trade Centre, UNCTAD, 2001), p.7. 
146 Prega Ramsay, op.cit. 
205 
structurc. and prcviously onc of the relatively fast liberalising economies in Southern 
Africa is also particularly strong in mining and industrial production. However, its 
economy and general structure has over the past four years faced severe strains due to 
political mismanagement by the elite. Given the complexity of the issues involved and 
the difficulties in obtaining updated data on economic indicators and patterns of trade, 
Zimbabwe will not be analysed. 
Most SADC countries, especially the least-developed country (LDC) group, 
consisting of Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia (MMTZ), share similar 
characteristics - and these will not be examined extensively here, except to highlight 
relevant aspects of their economic performance. It is important to stress that this thesis 
is not concerned with individual SADC country members. Rather, its key focus is on 
political and economic relations within the sub-region, in the context of the 
institutional framework of SADC and the multilateral trading system. More spefically, 
the interest of the thesis is on South Africa's role as a 'core' state in the sub-region. 
However, by way of a background overview, it is important to provide a picture of 
SADC s social and economic structure, especially of those countries whose 
economies have an impact on the structure of trade in the sub-region. A majority of 
countries in the sub-region are primary product dependent and their exports reflect 
their narrow production structure. Such primary commodity dependence is more acute 
for least-developed economies that also have to contend with weak institutional 
structure and poor economic performance across all dimensions. 
147 John D. Lewis, op.cil., 2001, p.35 
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The figures for share of primary products in total exports are: 46 percent for Tanzania 
and 18 percent for Mozambique. 14H Zambia is largely dependent on mining, mainly 
copper and cobalt. for mining. This sector accounts for 83 percent of Zambia's 
merchandise exports. 14Q Malawi is highly dependent on agriculture and has a narrow 
industrial base and weak inter-sectoral linkages. 150 Agriculture accounts for 42 percent 
of GDP and 81 percent of export earnings; and manufacturing accounts for 12 percent 
of GOP. lSI Malawi is a highly subsistence economy. Its main export products include 
tobacco, sugar and tea. 
Mauritius is traditionally sugar dependent for its exports, and this remains a sensitive 
sector for the country as it historically constitutes the backbone of its economy. 
However, the country is increasingly diversifying away from this sector towards 
textiles and clothing, tourism and financial services. 152 As the country firmly 
integrates itself to the global economy so are the pillars of its economy shifting from 
sugar mono-culture towards the sectors noted above. For example, its manufacturing 
sector is dominated by textiles and clothing produced in export-processing zones 
designed to attract foreign investment. 153 
While sugar cane is still the main pillar of the economyI5\ tourism and financial 
services are fast emerging as drivers of the country's economic growth. Even though 
148 John D. Lewis ef ai, op.cif. 
149 World Trade Organisation Secretariat Report on Zambia Trade Policy Review, WT/TPRlSI17. 
150 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), www.fao.org 
151 ibid. 
152 Other services sectors include electricity, gas, construction and water, and the sector contributes 
around 74 percent to Mauritius' real GDP. See ibid. 
153 World Trade Organisation Secretariat Report on Mauritius Trade Policy Review, WTITPRlS/90. 
154 According to the WTO Secretariat Review Report, Mauritius exports almost all its sugar. It benefits 
from the Sugar Protocol under the Cotonou Agreement as well as under the US African Growth and 
Opportunities Act (AGOA) since January 2001. 
207 
manufacturing contributes around 75 percent of the total value of merchandise 
exports,I<; the reliance of this sector on textiles and clothing could prove untenable in 
the face of stiff competition from China and India, sparked by the end of the Multi-
Fibre Agreement (MFA) at the beginning of2005. 156 
Compared to the rest of SADC countries, SACU countries can be generally regarded 
as reformers - especially in terms of trade and investment regime liberalisation. Their 
overarching consideration is to improve overall competitiveness and integrate firmly 
into the global economy. Historically, because of close linkages with South Africa 
through SACU, these countries' trade policies were determined by South Africa. 
Although the new SACU Agreement that was signed in 2002 and entered into force in 
2004 aims at democratising decision-making and trade policy setting within the area, 
its trade policy and negotiating capacity is still dependent on South Africa. 
Looking at individual SACU member countries, Namibia is mainly an agrarian 
economy, but also rich in minerals (diamonds),157 meat and fish - and these are major 
sources of foreign exchange and government revenue, accounting for over 60 percent 
of manufactured exports. 158 There is a considerable degree of processing taking place, 
which points to the potential for the country to develop dynamic comparative 
advantage and export competitiveness in agro-processing. In addition, through export 
development zone programme, the country seeks to expand and diversify its 
155 ibid. 
156 The sector accounts for about 85 percent of EPZ exports in value, 89 percent of EPZ employment, 
and 55 percent of the total number of EPZ companies. See WTO Trade Policy Review for Mauritius, 
op.cit. 
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manufacturing base, especially in the area oftexti1es and clothing. However, similarly 
with most of the region, primary products: mining, agriculture and fishing account for 
over 20 percent of the GOP, and the economy is largely driven by a single product -
fisheries. 1'9 The future of textiles and clothing is in precarious position due to the end 
of multi-fibre agreement. However, in the short- to medium-term this is likely to 
survive under the generalised preference schemes such as AGOA. 
Lesotho is a very small country, surrounded by mountains and with no easy access to 
the sea. The majority of its population - 80 percent - lives in rural areas. It does not 
generate much economic activity, and largely depends on revenues from SACU 
Customs Revenue Mechanism. Its main economic activities are in the area of textiles 
and clothing and benefits from AGOA's generalised system of preferences. In 2000, 
over 99 percent of the country's exports were destined for the US and South African 
market; and its imports originate mainly from within SACU. 160 It is thus vulnerable to 
cyclical economic slumps in these markets. Even so, it is evident that in terms of 
production and financial linkages, Lesotho is significantly disarticulated from the 
global economy. 
Similarly, Swaziland is a very small and land-locked, dualistic economy. 161 The 
country depends mainly on sugar production for its exports,162 and this sector has 
157 This is produced by Namibian Diamonds (NAMDEB) on a joint venture basis between De Beers 
and the Namibian Government, producing about 85 percent of Namibian diamonds. All diamonds are 
sold through Diamond Trading Company, owned by De Beers. 
158WTO Secretariat Report WTffPRlSl14INAM 
159 ibid. According to a WTO Secretariat Report, 95 percent of fish caught is exported as processed to 
SACU and EU markets. Fish production is apparently the main driver of economic growth. 
160 World Trade Organisation Secretariat Report, WTffPRlSIl14/LSO 
161 Consist of large-scale, commercial, irrigated, export-oriented production; and small-scale, rain fed, 
production for local consumption. 
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linkages to the industrial sector of the economy, for example, confectionery and 
bevcragcs.](,1 Swaziland also dcrivcs a significant part - 51 percent - of its national 
income from the SACU revenue pool. In 2001, food and chemicals (mainly sugar-
based flavourings) made up 60 percent of Swaziland's total exports. l64 South Africa is 
a major source of imports as well as destination of choice for the country's export 
products. Outside of SACU (mainly South Africa), the EU is the principal export 
destination. 
Botswana diverges slightly from the general trend in the sub-region, although much of 
its production and exports still reflect primary product dependence. At least it has a 
relatively developed financial subsector, and seeks to diversifY production away from 
primary product dependence towards manufacturing, services and a diverse range of 
dynamic agricultural production. 165 About 90 percent of Botswana's merchandise 
export receipts in 2001-2 were from minerals (with diamonds rising from 77 to 85 
percent; and copper and nickel declining from 11 to 3 percent).I66 Diamond is a major 
source of export earning.167 In 2001-2, primary activities, mainly mining and 
agriculture accounted for 37 percent of the GOP. Placing food security at the heart of 
its developmental strategy, the government seeks to expand production of 
horticulture, especially grapes, apples, citrus fruit and olives. 168 
162 Other export products include citrus and other fruit. Including sugar, these are heavily dependent on 
preferential access to the EU, US and South African market. Benefitting from the Cotonou Agreement 
Sugar protocol, sugar enters duty free in the EU and benefits from price support, see World Trade 
Organisation Secretariat Report, WTrrpR/SIl14/SWZ. The Secretariat Report, quoting Swaziland 
Sugar Association, note that 92 percent of the sugar produced in Swaziland is exported. 
163 ibid. 
164 ibid. 
1M See World Trade Organisation Secretariat Report, WT/TPR/SIl14/BWA 
166 ibid. 
167 Diamond mining is done by DEBSWANA, a company formed through ajoint venture between De 
Beers and the State. It mines and sells diamonds through Diamond Trading Company, which is De 
Beers market arm. The main export market is the US. 
168 ibid. 
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While Bots\\ana is ollen hailed as a success story in the region and, indeed, in the 
continent it should not be lost that much of this success is based on instutional and 
governance architecture, including better macro-economic management, rather than 
grounded on sustained and diversified economic base. Although performing much 
better than most countries in the sub-region, Botswana is still largely primary 
production based economy, and imports machinery, electrical equipment, metals, 
transport equipment and food beverages from within SACU. 169 
Some studies have suggested that there exists a potential for trade complementarity 
between SADC countries.170 Currently, the structure of complementarities reflects 
one-way trade benefit in favour of South Africa (See table 5.1 below). As noted 
earlier, the composition of South Africa's regional export basket is predominantly 
manufactured goods; and the region exports mainly primary products to South Africa 
(and SACU).171 This structure of trade would fit the classic Heckscher and Ohlin 
model of international trade.172 This is an unenviable position for the region given the 
volatility of the world markets for commodities compared to markets for 
manufactures, as well as the fact that this constitutes a poor basis for developing a 
strong bargaining power in international trade negotiations. 
169 World Trade Organisation Secretariat Report, WTffPRlS/114IBWA 
170 See UNCTAD, op. cit. , 2001; Moses Tekere and Daniel Ndlela, Study of the Compatibility C!fTrade 
Policies in the Context of Current Regional Economic Integration Processes: The Case of SADC. 
(Gaberone: SADC, March 2003). 
171 UNCTAD, op.cit .. 2001, p.9. 
!72 This is a model based on Ricardian principle of static comparative advantage. It suggests, as 
summarised by Gilpin, that 'a nation's comparative advantage is determined by the relative abundance 
and most profitable combination of its several factors of production, such as capital, labour, resources, 
management, and technology.' See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p.175; See also Susan Strange, States and Markets, 
(London: Pinter, 1988), p.180; Hirst and Thompson critique this model for its inadequacy in explaining 
intra-industry trade which is dominant within the triad (EU, North America and Asia). See, Paul Hirst 
and Grahame Thompson, Globali=ation in Question, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p.105. 
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Table 5.1: Bilateral Complementarity Indices in SADC 
Importing countries 
-- Bots Mal Maur Moz Namib RSA Swaz Tanz Zamb Zimb Average 
Exporting . 
Country 
Botswana ... 7.5 11.3 17.8 9.6 13.0 9.7 7.4 7.8 8.9 13 .0 
Malawi 13.7 ... 93 18.4 11.6 11.6 }3.0 9.3 8.1 6.6 ] 1.3 
Mauritius 16.8 11.3 ... 21.3 14.6 15.3 15.8 12.0 10.3 8.9 14.0 
Mozambique 23.2 21.8 26.7 '" 23.9 24.6 26.2 20.8 19.5 19.1 22.9 
Namibia 22.8 14.0 20.5 24.8 ... 17.1 18.8 11.5 21.0 11.3 18.0 
South Africa 53.9 48.5 54.1 59.4 54.1 ... 55.1 51.3 51.0 49.9 53.0 
Swaziland 27.9 20.4 23 .5 30.0 29.9 22.0 ... 20.6 19.0 17.6 23.4 
Tanzania 16.4 13.1 20.2 20.2 13.4 13.2 131 ... 8.9 7.1 14.0 
Zambia 19.0 12.9 19.3 23.2 14.9 16.6 14.2 12.8 ... 11.9 16.1 
Zimbabwe 13.7 14.0 18.4 20.4 10.6 11.5 11.5 10.6 9.1 ... 13.3 
Source: From IMF Workmg Paper, WP/04/227; lMF Staff CalculatIOns usmg UN COMTRADE data. 
Angola, DRC and Lesotho were excluded due to lack of data. Seychelles, even though included here, 
left SA DC towards the end of2004. 
The indices in Table 5.1 reveal asymmetric complementarity between South Africa 
and the majority of SADC countries, as discussed earlier. An IMF Working Paper by 
Khandelwal on Regional Integration in Southern Africa also reveal that the extent of 
product complementarity within SADC is very low. The product complementarity 
index ranges from 0 (which signifies no complementarity) to 100 (which express full 
complementarity). According to calculations undertaken by Khandelwal using UN-
COMTRADE database, ' ... there is complementarity between South Africa's exports 
and the imports of the rest of the region, but not vice versa.'173 What this means is that 
South Africa is able to find markets for its products in the neighbouring region while 
the reverse is not the case. As Khandelwal suggests, this situation raises concerns 
173 Padamja Khandelwal, 'COMESA and SADC: Prospects and Challenges for Regional Trade 
rntegration',IMF Working Paper WP/04/227, (Washington D.C; rnternational Monetary Fund, 2004). 
p.16. 
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regarding polarisation as ' ... investment may be attracted towards the larger and more 
industrially diversified economics in the rcgion.1!74 
This reality points to the importance of shifting away from static comparative 
advantage in primary products. Successfully chieving this would be a function of a 
mix of domestic policy refonns and regional ntegration process that places premium 
on balanced development. and flows of foreign direct investment that could act to 
facilitate vertical integration from primary to dynamic products. As the cases of 
Botswana and Namibia already indicates, policy initiative towards better management 
of macro-economic environment and diversifYing away from traditional sectors could 
go a long way in enlarging the room for development of dynamic efficiencies. This 
also needs to be accompanied by measures aimed at diversifYing destination markets 
(see discussion below). Increasing intra-SA DC trade could be a starting point. 
5.2 Regional Integration: The Post-1994 Developments 
South Africa's realignment in regional politics and economic relations in 1994 was 
undoubtedly a meaningful development which went a long way in shaping the 
strategic focus of SADC, especially in relation to intra-regional trade and integration 
into the global economy. As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, even before South Africa 
became part of regional relations, the country had already gave consideration to how 
it was going to engage with the global economy, both in view of its domestic 
circumstances and regional relations. Encapsulating the region in South Africa's 
foreign (economic) strategy was going to prove challenging. As the largest economy 
\74 ibid.. p.l? 
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in the sub-region. with relatively developed institutions and sophisticated productive 
forces. South Africa's re-integration in regional relations was initially considered a 
boon by most countries in the sub-region, until they were faced with the vexed 
question of trade integration. 
At the dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994 most actors in the sub-region were 
waiting to see what the actual character of South Africa's regional strategy would be: 
whether it would take a self-centred direction, pandering to mercantilist interests; or it 
would assume a benign shape, strongly predisposed towards making a self-sacrificing 
contribution towards regional development. Initially, during the first phases of 
democratic transition, the new political elite in South Africa articulated a strategy 
whose visage seemed favourably disposed towards the region's development and 
stressed the need for mutually beneficial relations with its regional partners (see 
Chapter 3). 
There is no doubt that at the political level, and in rhetoric, there was a strong 
realisation amongst policy makers in South Africa of the importance of the sub-region 
in South Africa's overall foreign economic strategy. As pointed out in chapter 4, the 
linkage between South Africa's economic resurgence and the region's development is 
strongly emphasised in South Africa's global economic strategy.175 Failure to 
strengthen this linkage too would certainly open up a menacing possibility for re-
emergence, ifnot continuation, of age-old tensions with a different shade. 
Hence it was immediately clear, and essential, to the new elite in South Africa to 
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place strong emphasis on the benign inclination of South Africa towards the region. 
This emphasis \vas clearly evident in South Africa's first developmental strategy, the 
RDP, when it made positive reference to the sub-region (see Chapter 3). While it was 
not exactly clear what specific approach South Africa would adopt towards the 
region, there were nevertheless strong views regarding the need for the new ANC 
government to be a lot more sensitive in relating with its regional neighbours. Some 
scholars have also argued that South Africa should playa benevolent hegemonic role 
in the sub-region, and such a role should aim at promoting balanced development. 176 
The view that South Africa would pursue relations that are geared towards mutual 
benefit, discounting narrow self-interests, was partly rooted in a lack of understanding 
of the depth of economic challenges and pressures that South Africa would grapple 
with, arising both from within the country and externally, and how this would force 
state actors to playa less than generous role in the sub-region. Indeed, as Le Pere and 
Nieuwkerk have pointed out, ' ... the ANC's idealistic leanings and the realist 
imperative of a globalised world brought into stark relief a range of tensions and 
contradictory impulses in implementing foreign policy: 177 
The first five years of South Africa's transition as a democratic state were, as 
observed in Chapter 4, the most daunting - the country was squeezed between global 
exigencies and domestic structural challenges. As such, the magnitude of challenges 
m Faizel Ismail, Xavier Carim and Peter Draper, 'South Africa's Global Economic Strategy: A Policy 
Framework and Key Elements', The Department o/Trade and Industry. Pretoria, 2001, p.5. 
176 Betil Oden, 'South African Benevolent Hegemony in Southern Africa: Impasse or High Way'? In 
Vale, Peter, Oden, Betil and Swatuk, Larry., Theory. Change and Southern Africa's Future, (London: 
Palgrave. 2001). p.183. 
177 Garth Le Pere and Anthony van Nieuwkerk, 'The Evolution of South Africa's Foreign Policy', In 
Phillip Nel and Patrick J. McGowan (eds.), Power. Wealth and Global FAJuity: An International 
Relations Texthook, (Landsdowne: UCT Press, 2002), p.253. 
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faced by the South Africa' s nascent democratic state weighed heavily on its 
developmental agenda in regional relations. Indeed, over the years since 1994, South 
Africa has struggled to reconcile its commitment to regional development with its 
strategic competitive agenda, designed to benefit domestic industries and achieve 
developmental goals (sec Chapter 4). Instead, increasingly South Africa viewed the 
region through economic competitive lenses; and consequently its trade relations with 
the sub-region have, to a considerable degree, exhibited protectionist tendencies (see 
discussion below). 
Countries in the SADC sub-region initially viewed South Africa's reintegration into 
regional processes, post-apartheid, as a benefit to be maximised in order to deal with 
the state of underdevelopment for which South Africa was partly responsible through 
its destabilisation policies of the 1970s and 1980s in the sub-region (see Chapter 3). 
Regional cooperation and integration, with South Africa at the centre, was therefore 
seen as a way of ameliorating economic malaise and as an instrument to be leverage 
for beneficial integration into the global economy. Accessing South Africa's larger 
market and effective integration into the global economy were motivating factors for 
the sub-region (see discussion below). 
The former Tanzanian Minister of Trade, Iddi Simba expressed a collective faith in 
regional cooperation and integration as a stepping stone to global integration when he 
remarked that: 
'SADC believe that a higher level of cooperation would enable the 
countries of the region to address more effectively the problems of 
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national development, and to cope with the challenges posed by a 
changing, and increasingly complex regional and global business 
environment'. J 78 
There is no doubt that the twin reality of globalisation and developmental challenges 
at the domestic level framed the way in which state actors were to justify 
regionalisation. As Prega Ramsay, SADCs Executive Secretary, has pointed out: 
'With the deepening and acceleration of its integration agenda, so as to 
become a vibrant economic and political bloc and a key player in the 
world economic arena, the region is increasingly enhancing its capacity 
and position to minimise the risks of globalisation and take advantage 
of the opportunities it presents in order to effectively deal with the 
pervasive problems of extreme and overall poverty.' 179 
Leveraging regional cooperation and integration framework to increase intra-regional 
trade, especially to enhance market access opportunities in South Africa's relatively 
larger market, and to build capacity for effective articulation in the global economy, 
seem to have been the initial attraction for a free trade agreement within SADC. A 
USAlD study suggested that: 'Greater integration of SADC economies into the world 
market could play an important role in the promotion of sustainable development and 
poverty alleviation in the region.' 180 This is an important statement coming from an 
agency that plays a central role in advising SADC on regional trade integration and 
178 Iddi Simba, op.cit .. p.19-2 I. 
179 Prega Ramsay, op.cit .. p.I. 
180 ibid. 
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helping to build capacity for its progress. However, as this chapter argues, far from 
achieving the noble objectives that are often expressed in policy positions by the elite, 
including public agencies in the sub-region, elTorts towards regional integration - let 
alone its promised developmental outcomes - have generally failed. Reasons for this 
are explored later in the Chapter. 
5.3 From Project Coordination to Regional Integration 
As the preceding section demonstrates, for most SADC countries, moving away from 
project coordination towards an integrative approach of regional relations was initially 
regarded positively, especially as this raised the prospects for increased access to 
South Africa's relatively large market. This was seen especially so in view of non-
SACU l81 SADC countries' bilateral trade deficit with South Africa. 182 As John 
Whalley and Carlo Peroni note, security of access to a larger market is a key 
consideration for smaller countries entering into a Free Trade Agreement with a 
b· t 183 19ger coun ry. 
Thus it was hoped that the SADC FT A would be cast on a benign template similar to 
that governing their relationship with the European Union; 184 and in view of the size 
181 Non-SACU SADC members are those that are not part of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) which involves South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, first established in 
1910, but renegotiated over time, with two major re-negotiations: 1969 and 1994 - 2002. 
182 Charles Harvey, Macroeconomic Policy and Trade Integration in Southern Africa, Development 
Policy Research Unit, Working Paper No. 00/39, April 2000, p.6. 
183 John Whalley and Carlo Peroni, 'The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalisation or Insurance'? 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 4626, January 1994, p.4. 
184 All SADC members, with the exception of South Africa, benefit from preference-based scheme 
governed by ACP-EU relations. This allows them to export to the EU on a non-reciprocal basis 
according to agreed quota limits for certain commodities, especially beef and sugar. This preference 
system was promulgated at the first Convention in Benin in 1975, and was subject to periodic reviews 
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of South Africa's economy, these countries had expected it to be more generous 
to\vards them. [t was not expected that South Africa would apply various forms of 
protective barriers to shut out regional exports from its domestic market (see 
discussion below). Thus, in signing up to the SADC Trade Protocol. most countries in 
the region were not expecting to take on major liberalisation obligations. Most of 
them, as noted earlier, had already opened up their domestic markets at the behest of 
IFls. If anything, they expected their trade arrangements with South Africa to be a 
one-way flow, weighted strongly in their favour. 
However. this is not how South Africa understood the terms of a possible trade 
agreement with its regional partners. From its perspective, its domestic economic 
structure and the imperative of international competitiveness is what would ultimately 
guide its regional relations. Also, having locked its economic reform process into the 
multilateral trade mechanism, South Africa would be less inclined to pursue regional 
trade relations on the basis of non-reciprocity. Much of the explanation for South 
Africa's behaviour should, however, rest on a mercantalistic mindset that was shaped 
by structural conditions of its domestic economy. Gelb has suggested that South 
Africa's policy towards the Southern Africa region in the post-1994 era continued on 
a broadly realist line, focusing narrowly on economic and political interests.! 85 
Trade and investment in the region, as already shown in Chapter 4, constituted one of 
the key planks of South Africa's regional strategy. Gelb notes for example that: 'From 
until it was finally replaced in 2000 by the Cotonou Agreement, paving the way for reciprocal trade 
relationships based on WTO norms. 
185 Stephen Gelb. South Africa's Role and Importance in Africa and for the Development of the 
African Agenda, A Report prepared for the Department of Foreign and International Development 
(DflD). Southern African Office, (Johannesburg: The Edge Institute, 2001). 
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the early 1990s, the trade and investment linkages between South Africa and the rest 
of the continent increased significantly both in quantity and in scope.' 186 It has grown 
from R5n in 1991 to R43hn in 2002. 187 
For South Africa, the SADC Trade Protocol would play an important role in further 
opening up the region to its exports, and create a sense of predictability for South 
Africa's business actors moving into the region (Chapter 5). On the other hand, 
SADC countries saw this as a pivot on which they would facilitate their economic 
growth and development and ensure firm and beneficial integration into the global 
economy. Although the protocol was signed in 1996 and entered into force in 
September 2000, progress remained elusive (see below). Regional commitment 
towards full market integration has, to a considerable degree, been characterised at 
best by inertia and at worst political neglect. 
A more elaborate, but somewhat unbalanced, analysis examining South Africa's 
relations with the sub-region was undertaken by Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan. J 88 
It argued strongly that South Africa's regional role can be understood in no other 
terms than as a selfish hegemon, and this conclusion is drawn on the basis of South 
Africa's dominance in key economic sectors in the sub-region, structural imbalances 
existing between South Africa and the rest of the sub-region, and the conduct of the 
former in trade negotiations, especially for a SADC Free Trade Protocol and a new 
customs union agreement with Botswana, Lesotho, Nambia and Swaziland. J89 
186 ibid.. 
187 Whitehouse and Associates, op.cit., p.5. 
18S ibid. 
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Ahwireng Obcng and Mcgowan's analysis is unbalanced in that it fails to take into 
considcration thc domcstic, structural constraints bequeathed by the apartheid system 
that South Africa contended with. Instead, it is obsessed with portraying South Africa 
as a selfish hegemony in a purely descriptive sense without placing this within the 
broader context of South AtTica's transition or explaining it on the basis of a sound 
theoretical framework. It should also be stressed that this understanding of hegemony 
in a regional context is quite narrow. It is informed by the traditional conception of 
power, and fails to grasp the reconstitution of the relationship between the states and 
markets and how this plays itself out in state's foreign economic policies.190 
There is no doubt that South AtTica is well aware of the difficult balance that it has to 
manage in its strategy in the region. As some commentators have long observed: 'A 
post-apartheid South Africa is likely to remain a dominant force in the region, on the 
one hand capable of contributing in decisive fashion to its security, but on the other 
perpetuating the existing fears of neighbouring states about South Africa's regional 
• , 191 pre-em1l1ence' . 
Apart from South AtTica's neo-mercantilist l92 attitude to regional trade relations, it is 
also evident that regionalisation in Southern Africa has suffered from the hiatus of 
transition from the old forms of regionalism to external orientation (see Chapter 3); 
and to a large extent still plays to nationalistic sentiments and privileges high politics 
180 ibid 
190 See Susan Strange, States and Markets, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988). 
)91 Greg Mills, 'Searching for the Eye of the Needle: South Africa and Southern Africa Security, In 
Greg Mills (eds.), From Pariah to Participant· South Africa's Evolving Foreign Relations, 1990-
1994, (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p.79. 
192 Mercantilism is broadly defined as the pursuit of current account surplus, privileging exports over 
imports. In modem economic parlance it also refers to preoccupation with market access concessions 
over unilateral trade Iiberalisation. 
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(military security and political diplomacy) over low politics (economic cooperation 
and integration). 
5.4 Towards a SADC Trade Protocol 
5.4.1 The Politics of Trade: Domestic Actors and Regional Expectations 
In previous discussions it has been established that there is a divergence between the 
regional elite's expectations of the kind of developmental role South Africa could 
play and the expectations domestic capital has of South Africa's regional role. As 
generally argued in this thesis, South Africa's regional and multilateral trade 
strategies are principally shaped by the structure of the domestic economy and the 
strategic positioning that state actors facilitate for domestic capital in regional and 
global markets. This, as shown in Chapter 4, is linked to a domestic developmental 
framework that seeks to minimise social dislocation. This has also fashioned South 
Africa's trading relations with the sub-region along mercantilist lines. 
One of the attractions for countries to pursue neo-mercantilist policies, as noted by 
Guerrieri and Padoan, is that a positive trade balance increases a country's 
international prestige, and also helps to create room within the economy for an 
expansionary policy that may diminish internal conflicts and increase consensus for 
the government. 193 This fits in with the structure of South Africa's economy and its 
orientation towards strategic competitiveness while safeguarding domestic social 
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cohesion, for example, with regards to mmllnIsmg social conllicts and generate 
employment in the economy. 
It is expected that. as the trade protocol is gradually implemented, there could arise a 
greater possibility for SADC countries to gain more access to the South African 
market. And this is likely to be the case if such an implementation is accompanied by 
clear measures to deal with non-tariff and technical barriers to trade. Arguably, no 
amount of liberalisation can shift South Africa's structural dominance in regional 
trade relations; but certainly, with the right level of political will, this can be 
narrowed. The current reality of acute structural dominance of South Africa in the 
sub-region is less comforting to most neighbouring countries. 
The most recent independent study that has disaggregated a bulk of tariff lines to 
identity incidences of liberalisation and correlation with intra-regional trade has 
concluded that in important respects South Africa maintains protection. As suggested 
by the study. with the exception of minerals and ores, and to some extent processed 
foods - tea and fish - South Africa still maintains high tariffs, especially in tobacco, 
sugar, textiles and clothing. 194 This picture is further complicated by South Africa's 
application of tariff escalation in wood products. 
Tariffs in wood products, as the study notes, ' ... remain relatively high for furniture, 
whilst SADC's unprocessed and semi processed wood products have seen tariffs in 
193 Paolo Guerrieri and Pier Carlo Padoan, 'Neomercantilism and International Economic Stability', 
international Organisation 40 (1), Winter 1986, p.32. 
194 Confidential Report into Trade Liberalisation in Southern Africa, 2004. 
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South Africa reduced and trade !lows increase.,195 What could be surmised from the 
study is that there has not been a significant push in opening up barriers to trade in the 
region. This is partly accounted for by South Africa's mercantilism, and partly a lack 
of supply capacity in the region. 196 Again this reflects the extent to which trade 
liberalisation in South Africa is managed. 
Another comprehensive study by Tekere and Ndlela has noted that South Africa 
maintains import controls on a variety of products, including agriculture and 
manufactured products; used goods; fresh and frozen fish, dairy products, oats and 
maize. 197 Similarly, Davies has suggested that South Africa has applied various forms 
of barriers and non-tariff barriers which acted to exclude products of neighbouring 
countries from South Africa. 198 The contradiction that South Africa's protectionist 
practices bring up lies in the fact that, while domestic stability is important for a 
country like South Africa which seeks to manage sensitivities related to liberalisation 
of its economy and project itself powerfully in global economic relations, it can 
nonetheless be at variance with the political idealism of contributing to regional 
development 
There is an expectation that South Africa should avoid 'short-term thinking' and take 
into consideration political sensitivities in the region and, at times, this would require 
transcending the aspiration of certain elements of domestic capital, especially the 
19~ ibid 
196 See Colin McCarthy, op.cit .. 1998. 
197 Moses Tekere Daniel and Ndlela, Study of the Compatibility of Trade Policies in the Context of 
Current Regional Economic integration Processes: The Case of SADC. Gaborone: SADC, March 
2003, p.31. 
198 Rob Davies, op.cit, p.268. 
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import-competing oncs. I '!'! Domestic capital is not driven by any developmental 
interests both domestically and regionally and oflen lacks political sensitivity. Its 
ovcrarching consideration is not moral sentiment but short-tenn economic gain. 
In mapping out the often incestuous relationship between domestic capital and state 
actors, HeIpman contends that, 'Quite often countries design their trade policies in a 
way that yields to pressure from special interest groups, and trade negotiations at the 
international arena respond similarly.'20o South Africa's approach during the 
negotiations on the SADC Trade Protocol played strongly to domestic groups - and 
was motivated by its domestic growth concerns and anxieties regarding 
competitiveness of its domestic industry. 
This has, however, aggravated political sensitivities in the region, and with potential 
corrosive effect on the margin of political influence that South Africa could hope to 
exert in future. Already four SADC members: Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Malawi 
are simultaneously participating in COMESA FT A arrangement in a move that is 
viewed as a snub to a South African-centred SADC.201 Furthermore, these countries 
are currently negotiating a trading arrangement with the EU (Economic Partnership 
Agreement) under a different regional configuration which does not include any of the 
SACU members. 
IQQ Interview with Southern African Customs Union Executive Secretary, Tswelope1e Moremi, 
Windhoek, Namibia, 13 August 2004. 
200 Elhanan Helpman, 'Politics and Trade Policy', In Richard E. Baldwin, Daniel Cohen and Andre 
Sapir (eds.), Market Integration, Regionalism and the Global Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p.1 06. 
201 Margaret C. Lee, The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa, (London: Lynne 
Rienner), p.2003. 
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5.4.2 Trade Protocol: Issues and Outcomes 
Much of the negotiations for the SADC FT A were characterised by the dominance of 
South Africa's mercantilist interests. It is believed that during the negotiations South 
Africa initially drove a hard bargain in ways that were akin to the manner in which 
developed countries negotiate with developing countries,202 Other countries view it as 
having advanced its domestic interests aggressively, and this was quite evident during 
the negotiations of the textiles and clothing chapter, although later on in the 
negotiations South African negotiators relented and offered some flexibility for least-
developed SAOC members (see discussion below). 
For example, in tabling its textiles and clothing offer - one of the most contentious 
areas of the negotiations - South Africa presented it as a SACU offer even though it 
was never consulted with other SACU countries; and the protectionist nature of the 
proposed offer strongly reflected the interests of South Africa's clothing and textiles 
industries?03 The double-stage transformation rule that South Africa tabled in its offer 
was similar to that contained in its Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement 
(TOCA) with the EU.204 The double-stage transformation in textiles and clothing 
meant that fibre would be manufactured into yam, and yam into cloth - within the 
region - in order to qualifY as originating when entering the South African (or SACU) 
205 
market. 
202 ibid.. p.139. 
203 ibid., p.116. 
204 ihid. 
205 Margaret C. Lee, op. cit .. p.!3!. 
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Other critical isslIes in the negotiations included modalities for tariff reduction and 
tariff structure, customs cooperation and trade facilitation, including standardisation 
of customs certi fication and procedures. However, the most contentious of subjects 
was the one regarding the rules of origin not only in clothing and textles, but across 
various sectors: for example, the requirement for wheat flour is that it should be 
milled within SADC. There are also sector-specific rules for electrical products, 
optical. photographic. and plastic products. 
A brieflook at the nature of rules origin will help to contextualise these tensions. The 
purpose of rules of origin is to authenticate the originating status or 'nationality' of 
traded goods or their composite parts before preferential treatment is accorded. The 
absence of rules of origin could potentially create an incentive for transshipment or 
trade deflection.206 When the protocol negotiations commenced in 1996, SADC rules 
of origin were initially set at the flexible level of 35 percent requirement of local 
content or value addition. 
However, these rules origin were later altered at the insistence of South Africa and 
other SACU member countries who, for reasons that are not difficult to divine, argued 
for complex and much tighter rules. The initial rule which required change of tariff 
heading was replaced by rules that required detailed technical process, much higher 
domestic value-added requirement and lower permitted import content.207 This was 
done without any evidence that existing rules were ineffective and needed to be 
tightened. There are two major reasons advanced by South Africa in particular: the 
:06 Richard E. Baldwin, 'Review of Theoretical Developments on Regional Integration', In Ademola 
Oyejide, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Paul Collier (eds.) (Volume 1), Regional Integration and Trade 
Liberali;ation in Sub-Saharan Africa, (London: Macmillan, 1997). p.38. 
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first is a barely veiled mercantilist one and emphasises the need to curtail trans-
shipment through customs loopholes; and the second is ostensibly utilitarian, and 
views these as instruments to force industrial development in the region. 
While there is a need, in the context of a free trade area, to prevent tariff jumping, 
product-specific and tigh rules of origin are not necessarily the best solution. As the 
case of COMESA demonstrates, less tight rules of origin can encourage intra-regional 
trade (see below). Furthermore, as attractive as may seem, it is difficult to measure the 
extent to which tight rules of origin would attract investment and facilitate industrial 
development. In fact, there is no evidence so far that this has happened in SADC, 
Quite evidently. it is on the back of this seemingly innocuous instrument (rules of 
origin) that protectionist interests gain a foothold. It is difficult to argue against rules 
of origin when they are presented as a force for good and intended to ensure 
substantial transformation and, by implication, to achieve industrial development of 
lesser developed SADC countries. Yet most countries in the region feel that these 
should be made simpler and flexible in order to discipline protectionist impulses.208 
SADC rules of origin also reveal the extent of structural asymmetries that exist within 
the sub-region as well as the influence of particularistic interests in the domestic 
economy - South Africa. There is no doubt that the restrictive rules that exist within 
SADC were designed to protect South Africa's economic interests. As the World 
Bank study indicate, 'Specifying rules of origin on a product by product basis offers 
opportunities for sectoral interests to influence the specification of the rules in a 
207 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), p.65. 
208 This view was expressed by Consultants contracted to the SADC Secretariat to help with 
implementation of the trade protocol. Interviews were held between 23 - 25 July 2004 with consultants 
from The Sen'ices Group (TSG) in Gaborone, Botswana. 
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protectionist wa)'.':O'l These rules also create a burden for customs officials whose 
capacity is already thin. Where there are variations in the rules of origin - in some 
products the requirement would be a simple change of tariff heading; in certain 
products it would be a change oftaritT chapter; and in others it would be specification 
for a particular technical process or requirement for levels of value addition in order 
to qualify for preferential treatment - there is a scope for confusion for customs 
officials. and this can raise the cost oftrade.2IO 
Four years into the existence of the protocol on trade, there is little evidence that these 
rules of origin have served any purpose other than to impede trade flows and protect 
South Africa' s domestic industry .211 There is always the suspicion that these are made 
unnecessarily complex and restrictive in order to protect domestic labour and capital, 
even if this is disadvantageous to non-SACU SADC exports to the South African 
market. As Baldwin argues, ' ... these rules, together with the preferential access 
embodied in a preferential trade agreement, tend to protect producers of intermediate 
materials and components. They may also unintentionally harm the interests of third 
countries.'212 A senior government trade official in South Africa remarked that, 'Of 
course rules of origin are for protectionist reasons ... but that is not the only reason. ,213 
Pamacheche, a former Chief Economist at the SA DC Secretariat noted that, 'Rules of 
origins were primarily targeted at value addition on raw material and to develop 
product specific value chain production in the region.' As he admitted, far from 
achieving their stated objectives, these rules have on a number of sectors impeded 
trade flows. Pamacheche further noted that, 'They are complicated in nature, present 
209 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2005, (Washington DC: World Bank, 2005), p.70. 
210 ibid, p.7D. 
211 Confidential interview with a consultant who was part of one of the review workshops. 
m ibid, p.4D. 
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problems for customs officials and have by and large failed to achieve what they 
. d I . ,~I-l promIse to ac llcve. 
Contentions around rules of origins in SADC FT A negotiations tore into the veil of 
regional solidarity, and revealed the extent to which deep protectionist interests exist 
in South Africa, and regional integration influenced by South Africa's domestic 
considerations. It hardly surprising that the positions of the Congress of South African 
Trade Union's (COSATU) 215 and the South African Chamber of Business 
(SACOB)216 converge on the rules of origin - both largest labour union and business 
assoc iation' s representative respectively. And South Africa's Department of Trade 
and Industry holds similar views on rules of origin. 
Thorough studies by Frank Flatters, using case studies of specific sectors in SADC, 
have questioned the basis upon which the rules of origins in SADC are designed.217 
He argues for example that South Africa's fears could be addressed in other ways than 
using stringent rules. These, as he suggests, could include improving customs 
administration; using a rule of changing tariff heading for some products (e.g. 
2i3 Confidential interview at the Department of Trade and Industry, 13 July 2004, Pretoria, South 
Africa. 
214 Personal Interview with a SA DC Secretariat official on the 23 July 2004. 
m Tanya van Meelis, COSA TU trade policy coordinator made an impassioned defence of sector-
specific rules of origin at a Trade Round-table organised by USAID during 05 - 06 August 2004, 
Sandton Johannesburg. She defended them on the grounds that liberal rules have a potential to wipe off 
domestic industry from competition by countries whose labour regimes are highly relaxed. 
216 In an interview with SACOB Chief Executive Officer, James Lennox, he stated that organised 
business prefer tight and product-specific rules of origin as these are useful for South Africa's customs 
administration to determine the originating status of goods. Interview, 18 August 2004, Johannesburg. 
217 see Frank Flatters, op.cil., 2002; See also Frank Flatters, SADC Rules of Origin: Undermining 
Regional Free Trade, A paper presented at the USAID-funded Trade Policy Workshop, Johannesburg, 
August 2004. 
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milling); or excluding sectors that need protection from tariff offers rather than 
I · I· I fit'·· 21X entangle t 1e entire protoco m eomp ex set 0 ru es 0 orlgms. 
What could be surmised from this complex picture of rules of origin in the region is 
that South Africa has emphasised its domestic interests at the cost of good regional 
relations based on balanced development. This therefore reveals a yawning 
disjuncture between development rhetoric, and what is played out in reality with 
regards to economic relations in the sub-region. While South Africa, a core state in 
the region, should demonstrate positive leadership, other countries bear some 
responsibility in the conduct of their trade relations. To be fair, South Africa is not the 
only country that is engaged in protectionist practices in the region. Indeed, 
nationalistic sentiments are ubiquitous in regional trade relations, and this is, to a 
larger degree, historically rooted (see Chapter 3). 
5.4.3 Asymmetry Principle and Flexibility in the SADC Trade Protocol 
Apart from the complicated rules of origin, the structure of tariff commitments in 
SADC is also quite complex. As noted by the WTO Secretariat Report for 2003 
SACU Trade Policy Revew, 'SADC members made "differentiated offers" to non-
SACU SADC countries plus Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, and 
"general offers" to South Africa.219 There is a tariff reduction commitment made by 
SACU countries to SADC countries for tariffliberalisation to achieve zero tariffs after 
the first five years of the existence of the protocol, with the exception of 'sensitive' 
218 ibid. 
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products.:20 SADC offers to SACU countries (with the exception of South Africa) are 
front-loaded, meaning that they come into eflcct during the first phase of the 
implementation of the protocol. Offers to South Africa are mid-loaded and back-
loaded (effected mid-way through and at the end of the implementation phase). This 
effectively means delay in tariff reduction for certain categories of products, 
especially A and B (see below). 
On textiles and clothing, South Africa finally agreed to offer an asymmetrical 
arrangement for least-developed SADC members, relenting on its initial insistence on 
double-stage transformation for all SADC countries. This arrangement, which was 
meant to be a developmental gesture, meant that countries such as Malawi, 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (MMTZ) who fall under the least-developed 
country designation would export to South Africa (and SACU) countries duty-free 
using single-staged produced textiles and clothing, subject to quota until 2005 when 
the arrangement would be subject to review. 221 Harvey contends that this arrangement 
' ... merely postpones the possibility of increased efficiency, and would do nothing to 
attract investment in manufacturing capable of exporting to South Africa.,222 
It should be noted that this benign provision came quite late in the negotiations, and 
its benefit, as noted above, is limited only to the least-developed countries in SADC. 
And this came after South Africa had shown inflexibility in its negotiating approach 
219 World Trade Organisation, Trade Policy Review: Southern African Customs Union Report by the 
Secretariat, WTiTPR/SII14. 
220 Ibid. 
m ibid. During the SADC meeting of Ministers of Trade, 09 - 14 August 2005, these countries 
requested that this provision be further extended as they have not as yet reached the required capacity 
to export on the basis of double-stage transformation rule. The possibility for extension will be 
explored after concerned countries (mainly SACU) have consulted with their domestic sectors. 
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towards non-SACU SADC members. It would be churlish to deny that developmental 
sentiment played some part in this asymmetric liberalisation arrangement. However, it 
is doubtful if this arrangement has any long-term value, especially so in view of the 
low-cost competitiveness of China in clothing and textiles. Furthermore, the benefits 
of this arrangement are likely to be diluted by the existence of tight rules of origin in 
other spectors. As Draper observed, what South Africa gives with one hand - in 
offering asymmetric liberalisation - takes with the other by insisting on complex rules 
f .. 223 o ongm. 
Apart from the differential tariff liberalisation schedule noted above, various products 
were also subjected to different liberalisation schedules. Products in category A 
consist of products on which tariffs will be reduced to zero immediately (2000). It 
must be underlined that the products contained under this category, on South Africa's 
tariff phase-down schedule, do not face immediate competition from SADC products. 
Those products that are most important to South Africa: sugar, textiles and clothing 
and automotive industry are either registered as sensitive (and covered under special 
arrangement) or are governed by complex rules of origin. For example, sugar is based 
on quota arrangement and its fullliberalisation will only take full effect in 2013.224 
Category B products are mid-loaded. In this group of products liberalisation would be 
phased in gradually and spread between year one and year five of implementation. In 
year eight, tariffs under this category would be zero-rated. Most products falling 
222 Charles Harvey, Macroeconomic Policy and Trade Integration in Southern Africa, Development 
Policy Research Unit, Working Paper No. 00/39, April 2000, p.6. 
22J A comment made by Peter Draper of SAIIA during a panel discussion at a Trade Round-table 
organised by USAID during 05 - 06 August 2004, Sandton, Johannesburg. 
:!24 2:!4 World Trade Organisation, Trade Policy Review: Southern African Customs Union Report by the 
Secretariat. op.cit. 
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under this category are those yielding high tariff revenues. Products A and B 
constitute 85 percent of products to be liberalised under tariff schedules. Category C 
contains products that are regarded as sensitive. These are further divided into two: a) 
products that \vould be liberalised between 2008 and 20012; b) exclusion list -
products that would not be zero-rated. These are products which are viewed as 
necessary for maintaining public order or for health reasons, in accordance with 
Article 9 of the Protocol on Trade.225 
According to the protocol on trade, sensitive and excluded products are to comprise 
no more than 15 percent of total imports for non-SACU countries and 3 percent for 
SACU.226 Even though the entire arrangement with its underlying principle of 
asymmetry seems to be satisfying the requirement of levelling playing field, in the 
absence of a clear industrial development strategy anchored within national efforts, 
and South Africa's continued protectionist mindset, the region will for a long time 
reflect a 'core-periphery' dynamic with South Africa continuing to benefit 
disproportionately. This could have an aggravating effect on political relations in the 
long-term, denying South Africa the much needed space to play a meaningful 
leadership role in regional relations. 
5.5 The Current State of Integration beyond Rules of Origin 
Apart from the noted difficulties associated with rules of origin, implementing the 
trade protocol has generally been a complex Byzantine task, compounded by 
m Malawi Revenue Authority (?). http://www.sdnp.org.mw/mralcustomssadc.html; see also Margaret 
C. Lee, op.cit., 2003, p.113; and Moses Tekere and Daniel Ndlela, op.cit., 2003, p.9. 
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obfuscating flexibilities and exclusion of certain products. Much of the discussion so 
far has focused the spotlight on South Africa's trade policy practices in the region. It 
is important to highlight that there are deeper problems in the state of integration, and 
these. arguably, originate in the domestic and institutional setting. It will be important 
to reflect on some of these in order to gain a better view of the state of regional 
integration in Southern Africa. 
A number of countries in SADC have indeed found it difficult to implement their 
tariff reduction obligations or even to publish them. For example Malawi delayed 
publication of its 2004 tariff schedules for category B products.227 This was also the 
case with Zimbabwe due to its political and economic crisis. Until July 2004, Zambia 
had announced suspension of the implementation of the protocol due to factors 
beyond its immediate control. Zambia is under an JMF monitored programme to meet 
Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) obligation and has to deal with its fiscal 
difficulties.228 The fiscal rule to which HIPC countries conform as required by the 
IMF, has made it difficult for Zambia to meet its tariff phase-down obligation in 
SA DC as this could have severe implications for revenue generation. 
SADC integration process has also been characterised by inertia and lack of political 
commitment, including poor articulation between the political and the bureaucratic or 
:26 Moses Tekere and Daniel Ndlela, op.cil .. 2003, p.40. 
m Interview with Joshua Setipa, a consultant with the TSG Group, 24 July 2004, Gaborone, 
Botswana, 
228 HIPe Initiative is a scheme that was adopted by rich countries and international financial 
institutions in 1996 after a sustained pressure from civil society. It seeks to help countries that fall 
under the highly indebted category - about 42 of them - to resolve their debt crisis. For these countries 
to qualifY they have to draw up Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPS) setting out how the intend 
using savings from debt relief. The conditionalities they have to meet to reach the decision point 
include fiscal criteria, especially cuts in budget deficits. Hence Zambia had to suspend liberalisation in 
order to stabilise its fiscal position. It had previously been threatened with suspension if it failed to 
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technical processes. Sometimes technical processes take longer to bear fruit and to 
give effect to political decisions. To a larger degree the delays are due to the structural 
nature of SADC economies. with different countries at varying levels of development, 
and some countries expressing concerns regarding the potential loss of revenue and 
absence of alternative sources. The SADC trade protocol's mid-tenn review took 
place during the latter half of 2004 and was meant to infuse momentum in the 
liberalisation process. In reality, the protocol on trade remains a de facto dead 
'29 letter.~ 
This review was essentially designed to be a stock-taking exercise, focusing mainly 
on market access, trade flows, tariff phase-down schedules, and non-tariff barriers, 
and the pattern of trade flows since 2000. It was meant to look at the progress made so 
far in these dimensions and propose ways of fast-tracking liberalisation in the sub-
region.230 At the time of concluding this thesis the final report was not yet released. 
However. there is little doubt about its likely reflection on the state of regional trade 
integration in Southern Africa: that. indeed, this has produced dismal outcomes and 
significant political will and resource support is needed from the political elite if the 
integration process is to be a success. By the time of the review there was very little 
liberalisation that had taken off the ground, and this throws the value of the review 
exercise into question. 
meet some of its obligations. The scheme has often come under intense criticism from civil society 
groups. 
~29 This view is supported by confidential discussions held with trade policy consultants tasked with 
evaluating the trade protocol between 2000 and 2004; Johannesburg, 11 November 2004. 
230 Interview with Kennedy Mbekeani, Senior Research Fellow with Botswana Institute for 
Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA), Gaborone, 24 July 2004. 
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Indeed there is not much to review when there is not much trade activity to have taken 
place. There arc serious doubts expressed about the possibility of meeting the agreed 
upon phase-in targets for the trade protocol. Some trade experts have suggested that 
by the end of the eight year period, a number of countries will not have reached 75 
percent of their tariff reduction commitments; Zimbabwe will only have achieved 
d . f' 'f~ 231 57.7 percent re uctlOn 0 Its tan IS. 
There is a plethora of other factors worth examining that have also, in large measure, 
stalled effective implementation. First, there are difficulties associated with 'behind-
the-border trade issues'. including trade facilitation and non-tariff measures. Non-
tariff barriers have been one of the hindrances to cross-border flow of goods in 
SADC. Even though there are current measures underway, including pre-border 
clearance and other transit issues at the border, training of officials in risk 
management, harmonisation of computer systems, development of single clearance 
document and standards and quality innovations, to correct trade facilitation 
bottlenecks, difficulties still abound and progress has been on the whole very slow.232 
Secondly, and related to the above, in many instances in the customs, the new tariff 
rates that accord with the trade protocol have not been implemented. The customs 
officials are still working on the basis of old MFN rates. This highlights acute 
inefficiencies in customs administration and the erratic information flow between 
policy makers and customs officials. For some countries, for example Namibia, before 
any tariff change can be effected it has to go through the national legislative process, 
1JI Moses Tekere Daniel Ndlela, op.cit .. p.39. 
m Interview with Lovemore Babangida, former Trade Facilitation Advisor with the USAID Regional 
Integration Centre in Botswana, Gaborone, 23 July 2004. 
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and this could take almost a year.c'3 By the time this gets legislated gains would have 
been lost. for example through high transaction costs and time wastage. 
There arc also issues related to standards. South Africa insists on the South African 
Bureau of Standards (SASS) qualifications even though in most SADC countries 
there is a lack of requisite infrastructure to comply with some of these. Consequently 
this, wittingly or unwittingly, creates significant barriers to trade. While on the 
surface standards are necessary to safeguard consumer interests, and help to stem 
health and safety risks, these could be arbitrarily deployed for protectionist reasons.234 
This is not to suggest that South Africa engages in such practices as there has not yet 
been any rigorous research done in this area. In fact, South Africa denies that it uses 
standards for protectionist purposes, stressing their importance for safeguarding of 
consumer safety.2J5 
There are a number of other countries that have, in varying degrees, adopted measures 
that are seen as wholly unhelpful to regional integration and the long-term vitality of 
their own economies. Other examples include the difficulties that the insistence of 
translation of rules of origin certificates from Portuguese to English create for 
Mozambican authorities in terms of cost and time lag of transporting their goods 
through the border post; or, Zambia's restrictions on Zimbabwean milk, insisting that 
it can only quality to enter Zambia's market if it is labelled in the local Zambian 
236 language. 
2'3 Interview with Nokukure Murangi, Deputy Director, International Trade, Department of Trade, 
Windhoek, Namibia. 
234 Confidential interview with a consultant working on regional integration. 
23' Interview with Tshediso Matona, op.cit. 
:36 Lovemore Babangida, op.cit. 
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There arc many other examples of both tarin' and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) which 
inordinately ratchet up the cost of doing trade to the detriment of region's 
development and grovv1h. South Africa has in some eases also found itself facing the 
backlash of its own protectionism. In early 2004 Botswana banned the importation of 
brown bread and fresh milk from South Africa allegedly to protect its infant 
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mdustry. 
Thirdly. and more substantively, countries in the region are facing difficulties related 
to lack of competitive industries, small markets and lack of product diversification, 
inadequate infrastructure, lack of proper regulatory mechanisms, underdeveloped 
capital markets. lack of modern technology and skilled human resources. These 
factors are, in varying degrees, obstacles to intra-regional trade expansion. Their 
improvement is essential if the region is to generate the needed capacity and policy 
instruments to increase trade activity. Indeed, the absence of these dimensions 
represents a disconcerting short-coming. 
Fourth, high dependence on traditional European markets is another reality afflicting 
SADC countries. If anything, this dependence, based mainly on exports of primary 
products, undermines the long-term vitality of SADC countries and hinders forward 
and backward linkages in production. Evidently, this is also unlikely to contribute 
much in deepening intra-regional integration on the basis of complementarities or in 
dynamic products. For example, Botswana has a high dependence at 76 percent; 
Zambia sells 28 percent of its exportables to the EU; for Malawi and Mozambique the 
217 Joshua Setipa, op.cil. 
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figure is 39 percent.~,g South Africa's exports to the EU represent about 30 percent of 
"''I its total cxports.-' 
Michael Porter has suggested that reliance on the traditional developed markets by 
African countries creates an impediment to the development process as much of this 
trade is on the basis of natural comparative advantage (cheap labour and natural 
"40 
resources).- He notes for example that: 
'This whole business of trading with advanced countries based on 
inherited competitive advantages makes developing countries very 
vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations and very vulnerable to 
macroeconomic shocks, and we see this over and over again' .241 
Some African scholars have also argued that it is unsustainable in the long run for 
Southern Africa to overly rely on primary products and concentrate on one geographic 
area - the EU - if it is to achieve sustained growth and development, and 
meaningfully integrate into the global economy.242 Indeed an investment strategy 
targeted at export diversification activities, as well as clear developmental strategies at 
the domestic level aimed at macro- and micro-economic coordination and 
~J8 See John D. Lewis, Shennan Robinson and Karen Thierfelder, 'Free Trade Agreement and the 
SADC Economies', African Region /'forking Paper Series, No.27. World Bank, 2002. 
www.worldbank.org 
~JQ Economic Commission on Africa, Economic Report on Africa: Trading Performance and Progress. 
Addis Ababa: Economic Commission on Africa, 2002, p.58. 
~40 Porter Michael, A presentation in UNCT AD symposium: Regional Integration and the Global 
Economy. Geneva: UNCT AD Publications, October 2000, p.99. 
241 ibid. p.IOO. 
24~ See SKB Asante, op.cit.; Fantu Cheru, op.cit., pp.122-152. 
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infrastructurc devclopmcnt IS highlighted as a sine quo non of regional 
"-1.' dcvelopmcnt.- , 
Fifth. a number of SADC countrics depend on tariff revenues for national income. 
Although this is unlikely to present difliculties in the short to medium term since most 
countries have back-loaded their liberalisation schedule of sensitive products, it 
however deserves attention if full commitment towards regional integration is to be 
achieved as revenue questions are likely to arise in future. In one of the SADe 
Secretariat discussion papers it is estimated that currently the impact of trade 
liberalisation in the region on fiscal revenue is quite small and only 7.2 percent of 
b .. I . f~ d 244 mem er countries tota Imports are a Jecte . 
Even though this appears negligible, a number of countries continue to hide behind 
loss of revenue to delay liberalisation. This could be acute in latter phases of trade 
liberalisation as most products are back-loaded. Table 5.1 below shows the extent of 
member countries' dependence on import duties for government revenue. Amongst 
SADe countries, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia are the most dependent. 
There is as yet not much contention in the sub-region over revenue losses, although 
this is likely to be a recurring theme if tariff phase down proceeds after the 2004 mid-
term review. 
24) Fantu Chern, op.cil .. pp.126-133. 
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Tahle 5.2: Dependence on import Duty Revenues: 
,-- ----~---00 of !.!ovcrnment revenue % of government revenue 
from all import dutIes from tariffs on imports from 
SADC 
1-------:--
Malawi 15.9 8.0 
Mauritius 31.9 5.8 
Mozambique 15.9 5.4 
SACU· 0.4 
Tanzania 13.2 1.1 
Zambia 14.0 9.2 
Zimbabwe 16.7 7.0 
Source: Adapted from Tekere and Ndlela (2003). 
In addressing revenue concerns, in the short to medium-term, measures such as 
innovating institutional capacity of revenue services, innovations in domestic tax 
structure, for example shifting towards value added tax (V A T), and improving the tax 
collection system have been mooted as some of the possible solutions.245 
Unsurprisingly, fiscal restructuring has been the Achilles' heel of Africa's post-
colonial state building project. The state elite inherited institutions that were not 
properly designed for efficient tax systems and revenue collection.246 This is 
compounded by lack of administrative or institutional capacity to effectively carry out 
this function. Thus building strong institutions and capacitating revenue authorities 
are seen as important policy goals that could help deal with the problem of tariff 
244 SADC discussion paper 2000, mimeo . 
• Data was not available for revenue from all import duties. See Kirk and Stem, 2002 for the break-
down of SACU figures - showing a much higher figure for Swaziland and Lesotho. 
2.~ Interview with Joshua Setipa, Op.cil. 
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'·17 
rcvcnuc dcpcndcncc.-
Most crucially. a long-tcrm solution is to be found in structural transformation of 
thcsc cconomies. including production diversification. Countries such as Mauritius - a 
traditionally mono-culture economy - are said to be exploring possibilities of 
establishing business process outsourcing, e.g. call centres as part of diversifying 
away from textiles industry?IS Furthermore, Mauritius realises that the textiles and 
clothing route is a dead-end in the face of Asia's competitiveness. Financial services 
have also emerged as an important avenue to diversifying away from primary 
production dependence. 
Apart from the isolated cases of Mauritius and to a very limited extent, Botswana, 
most of the sub-region outside of South Africa is struggling to break out of the glut of 
underdevelopment. Hence Some African scholars have strongly highlighted the need 
for a development-oriented approach to integration in the region.249 This also seeks to 
caution against following uncritically the linear approach exemplified by the 
European Union as this - even though attractive - may not necessarily accord with 
developmental challenges in the region. 
A simplistic embrace of trade without any resonance with real developmental 
challenges and supply-side constraints of various member states is unlikely to be 
helpful in the long term. Indeed, if regionalism has no resonance to intractable 
240 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control., 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp.116-126. 
247 Interview with Joshua Setipa, op.cit. 
248 Joshua Setipa, op.cit. 
249 See Asante SKB, op.cit. 
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developmental challenges at the domestic level and fails to empower countries that 
feel a sense of vulnerability and shock it would be difficult to receive strong SUppOlt 
among state clites. For South Africa this could be framed in much grander terms: to 
create surticient regional support for its foreign economic objectives, for example, at 
the multilateral level, while at the same time orienting the incentive structure strongly 
towards export-oriented sectors. 
Even though benefits such as specialisation, creation of larger markets, attraction of 
investment, and stimulation of competition are often associated with regional 
integration, it is unlikely that these will come about as a result of purely market-led 
integration, but through a sequencing of a host of policies directed at achieving 
economic development in the broadest sense, and gaining better benefits in pursuing 
global integration. Dealing with supply-side issues and anchoring regionalism firmly 
on domestic social goals, especially the need to create well-functioning markets and 
delivering on developmental objectives, remain an important challenge. 
Using macro-economic policies to deal with structural constraints as well as to build 
the institutional capacities of governments may create a more conducive environment 
for trade development in the regional context.250 Similarly, the Economic Commission 
for Africa places a premium on the importance of macro-economic stability, public 
investment in infrastructure and human capital, and policies that provide adequate 
incentives for investment in the export sector251 in creating viable conditions for better 
supply response; and this is critical for the success of regional economic integration in 
"jO The UNCT AD report places strong emphasis on macro-economic environment and institution 
building in stimulating domestic supply response, see UNCT AD op.cit., 2003, p.47. 
::jl Economic Commission for Africa, op.cit., 2004, p.125. 
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Southern Africa. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at the extent to which South Africa's regional strategy is shaped 
by domestic growth and competitive strategic consideration. Although South Africa is 
articulating its regional strategy in view of its own structural challenges, its behaviour 
cannot be said to be 'captured' by domestic groups, rather it has a strategic orientation 
and seeks global positioning. The anchorage of South Africa's foreign economic 
strategy in its domestic policies also reflects mutual proclivities of state actors and 
domestic capital towards global integration. 
For South Africa. the sub-region is part of an overall drive to firmly lock into global 
economic relations and project influence at that level. In the larger scheme of things, 
pride of place is accorded to global markets rather than the regional market. As much 
as South Africa is committed towards economic development in the region -
demonstrating both a sense of idealism as well as an understanding of the importance 
of regional development for South Africa's continued growth - South Africa sees a 
higher stake as lying with global economic relations beyond the region. The 
preoccupation with its domestic growth concerns constrains South Africa's political 
influence in the region. This is the theme that will be discussed in the next chapter, 
which will look at the dynamics of regional interactions in the context of multilateral 
trade negotiations. 
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It needs to be stressed though South Africa's rhetoric towards balanced development 
and mutual benefit in regional relations have not always been matched by concrete 
commitments. The prevailing mercantilist mindset amongst state elites, especially in 
the Department of Trade and Industry, hardly augurs well for creating maximal 
benefits for the entire sub-region. As this thesis observed, South Africa's market 
remains protected in important sectors, making it difficult for the countries in the 
region to take full advantage of regional integration to access this lucrative market. 
This is not to discount the objective fact that there are serious supply-side constraints 
in the majority of SADC countries. 
There is no doubt that for most countries in the sub-region South Africa remains a 
potential market to penetrate. If anything, this consideration is what locks countries 
into the project of regional integration even though this does not immediately translate 
to full commitment and yields less optimal benefits. While on the one hand it would 
seem that state actors are also under an ideological spell of market-led integration, 
viewing it as holding prospects in the long run to generate growth for the regional 
economy via enlarged market and economies of scale; on the other hand there is half-
heartedness about making actual political commitment to the project, especially when 
benefits seemingly take longer to yield. 
As shown in this chapter there has not been much movement in the direction of 
'deeper" regional integration. Instead, there is an extension of domestic protectionism 
at the regional level. Furthermore, SADC is struggling to define itself in relation to 
the process of globalisation and how its member countries can leverage it to deal with 
their developmental challenges. South Africa is an exception in this regard. It views 
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the region through the lenses of its domestic growth constraints and developmental 
challenges. and sees it as an instrument to add weight on its articulation in global 
economic rdations. The latter dimension is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: South Africa's Multilateral Trade Strategy 
The previous chapter looked at the state of integration in Southern Africa, examining 
in particular some of the dif1iculties by member states in advancing the trade agenda. 
The chapter highlightcd the nco-mercantilist mindset embedded in South Africa's 
regional strategy and the tensions that this generates in the sub-region. Thus it is 
argued that South Africa's behaviour, in its regional trade approach, carries the 
potential to complicate political relations as well. As will be shown in this chapter, 
difficult relations between South Africa and its regional neighbours, compounded by 
structural differences between the economies of the two, have indeed began to 
manifest even at the muItilaterallevel. 
Indeed, there exists an acute tension between South Africa's domestic developmental 
strategy and how it seeks to achieve it in the long term, in particular through global 
positioning on the one hand, and regional assertion through trade relations on the one 
hand. This disjuncture was starkly visible in South Africa's efforts to construct a 
coordinated and a common regional platform for multilateral trade negotiations before 
the launch of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
That South Africa's regional strategy lacks an articulation of norms that firmly weld 
its own agenda and interests with those of its neighbouring SADC countries, presents 
a much starker problem when it comes to formulating a common regional perspective 
to engage at the multilateral trade level. This is especially so in view of the fact that 
the SADC Protocol on Trade does not distinctly make any provisions for negotiating 
on a common platform. Although politically it makes sense to do so in order to 
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counterbalance developed countries negotiating power, the fact that it is a free trade 
agrecment and not a customs union makes it difficult to institutionalise bloc 
negotiations. Doing so would require a solid, and legitimated leadership by a regional 
core state ~ South Africa. 
However, there exists a gap between South Africa and the majority of countries in 
SADe that has not been properly bridged at the normative level since the demise of 
apartheid in the early 1990s. As argued in Chapter 3, the apartheid state had failed to 
build a regional hegemonic order on the basis of consensus in the region. According 
to Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders 
in secondary nations. Elites in secondary nations buy into and internalize the norms 
that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the 
hegemon's notion of international order.' 1 The state in South Africa has not yet 
developed a solid consensual normative platform through which to articulate its 
., 
regional and multilateral trade interests.~ Nonetheless, in a loose form, SADC is part 
of the Africa Group negotiating coalition in the WTO (see below). 
In unpacking South Africa's strategies at the multilateral trade level, this chapter will 
make a connection with the themes already discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, 
highlighting some of the domestic and global forces that have come to shape state 
strategies in regional and global levels. This chapter will also explore the evolution of 
South Africa's multilateral trade strategies post-Uruguay Round, in particular from 
I John G. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan. 'Socialization and hegemonic power', International 
Organi:alion. Volume 44 (3), Summer 1990, p.283. They further argue that there are two ways in 
which power can be exercised by dominant nations: through manipulating material incentives; and by 
altering the substantive beliefs of leaders in other nations. This argument was an important innovation 
to approaches that emphasise structural sources of hegemony associated with classical realist paradigm. 
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Scattle to the Doha Round. Of critical impol1ance here is the political management of 
relationships \\ ith regional partners in Southern Africa in particular, and in the Africa 
Group in general. The tensions existing between South Africa and the region are 
discussed. focusing on two crucial dimensions: South Africa's wider ambitions in 
global economic relations; and intra-regional power asymmetries and different sets of 
priorities at the multilateral trade level. 
6.1 South Africa in the Multilateral Trading System 
During the finalisation of the GATT negotiations in 1993, the old apartheid regime 
was still in power and its bureaucrats were very active in trade negotiations, especially 
in the process of negotiating South Africa's accession offer to the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). Despite the fact that by this stage the ANC officials 
and COSA TU (the trade union ally of the ANC) members had started getting involved 
in economic policy determination through the National Economic Forum (see Chapter 
4), the prevailing view on how to position South Africa in global economic relations 
still reflected the preferences of the business community and the old political class. 
Some of the reasons for this are explored in Chapter 4. 
The reality then was that the ANC and its alliance partners were new in economic 
policy making, and had limited technical expertise to shape government's policy 
towards global economic relations, particularly the WTO. The prevailing global 
context was that dominated by neo-liberalism and shaped by the systemic crisis linked 
2 See also Maxi Schoeman and Chris Alden, 'The Hegemon That Wasn't: South Africa's Foreign 
Policy Towards Zimbabwe', Strategic Review q( Southern Africa, 25: I (2003). 
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to world recession and onset of debt in developing countries (see Chapters 1 and 3). 
The determination of South Africa's future economic trajectory therefore took placc 
against a background of domestic economic crisis. Global integration was thus viewed 
as a best possible route to dealing with domestic structural crisis. One of the senior 
government officials that were part of the initial processes to develop South Africa's 
trade strategies, Bahle Sibisi, remarked: 
'According to the old guard who were negotiating South Africa's offer 
to GATT, South Africa belonged to the 'developed' and 'most civilised' 
parts of the world and as such should be integrated into them. As a 
result, the commitments that South Africa took in the Uruguay Round 
were broadly concomitant to a developed country status. South Africa's 
terms of accession to the WTO are as a developed rather than a 
d I . ,3 eve opmg country. 
This choice of dealing with global level processes was cast in stone and could not be 
re-scripted; and, given the structure of South Africa's economy and the surrounding 
sub-region, this represented a contradiction that would find its way into South 
Africa's various trade engagements: with its regional partners in SADC; with the 
European Union for a free trade agreement; and in subsequent round of multilateral 
trade negotiations (in particular Doha). This also constituted one of the challenges that 
the new government would have to contend with in its relations both with the 
developed and developing countries. On the positive side, this dynamic has imbued 
3 Interview with Bahle Sibisi, former Deputy Director-General: Enterprise and Industry Division, 
Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa; interview held on 24 September 2004, Johannesburg. 
251 
South ;\ frica with an image of a bridge-builder between the dcveloping and thc 
dcvclopcd countries. prcferring 'reformist' strategies in multilateral relations.4 
HO\\c\'cr. thc ANC elite is generally self-conscious of its bias towards dcveloping 
countries. and how it is pcrccived in its rclations with them. The fact that South Africa 
is widely regarded as a de facto leader in the African continent and carries a burden of 
responsibility to articulate the interests of developing countries arguably position it as 
part of developing countries. However, the contradictory nature of its economy -
reflecting dualism - with some of its parts well developed and sophisticated and some 
resembling the rest of the continent (see Chapter 4), makes it difficult for South 
Africa to relate effectively with regional partners. 
There is little doubt, therefore, that the dichotomous character of South Africa's 
economy and social structure informed the different levels of ambition and interests it 
would articulate in the multilateral trading system. In explaining South Africa's 
positioning in the WTO, some commentators have argued that South Africa could be 
characterised as a middle power.5 This thesis parts with approaches that emphasise 
4 See Philip Nel, Ian Taylor and Janis van der Westhuizen, 'Reformist Initiatives and South Africa's 
Multilateral Diplomacy: A Framework for Understanding', In Philip Nel, Ian Taylor and Janis van der 
Westhuizen (eds.), South Africa's Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Change: The Limits of 
Reformism, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). The authors discuss South Africa's multilateral diplomacy 
between 1994 and 2000, suggesting that South Africa has played a bridge-building role in multilateral 
relations, that it has punched above its weight on a global scale, and that its strategy can broadly be 
characterised as reformist in the sense that it does not seek a complete overhaul of the existing global 
order. 
5 Middle powers have been defined as good multilateralists or international citizens that that have the 
national will to act in a responsible fashion. See Andrew F. Cooper (ed.), Niche Diplomacy, (London: 
Macmillan. 1997), p.6; or they are viewed as actors that tend to be 'involved in a wide range of 
diplomatic matters, usually extending beyond their regional boundaries', Kim Richard Nossal and 
Richard Stubbs, 'Mahathir's Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?' in Andrew F. Cooper (ed.), 
Siche Diplomacy, (London: Macmillan, 1997), p149; See also Janis van der Westhuizen, 'South 
Africa's emergence as a middle power', Third /'Vorld Quarterly, Volume 19 (3), 1998, pp.435-455. He 
argues that 'The middle-power concept is a useful analytic tool with which to gauge South Africa's 
international behaviour.' This completely ignores self-interest in strategic environment at both regional 
and international levels. 
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South Africa's middle-power dimension, in that these do not fully account for South 
Africa's core interests in regional and multilateral trade relations. Instead they suggest 
that there are some countries - who could be called 'middle-powers' - that are imbued 
with traits that condition them to simply act as 'good international citizens' or 
multilateralists, as if they are incapable of responding according to domestic interests 
which have nothing to do with good 'international citizenship'. The empirical evidence 
as highlighted in Chapter 5 suggests that South Africa has not always been a good 
neighbour on trade issues, and its interests at the multilateral level are not congenial 
with those that exist in SADC and much of Africa. 
Even though South Africa is a keen multilateralist, its regional and multilateral trade 
activities are best explained by examining the structure of its domestic economy and 
the strategic competitive interests of state actors anchored in a particular fonn of 
state-society relations (see Chapter 4). South Africa's interests are concomitant to the 
structural features of its economy relative to the rest of the region, and are tied to 
specific sectors which it seeks to place on the competitive trajectory in global 
markets. And this, at times, conflicts with being a good neighbour or a good 
international citizen. 
In this regard, South Afrca has had to playa delicate balancing role between the 
parochial interests of specific economic actors in the domestic economy - especially 
import-competiting sectors, as discussed in Chapter 5 - and the the developmental 
interests of the region. As Bahle Sibisi remarked: 
253 
· w~ ar~ by far a more complex country than many other countries in 
th~ region. and \\ ith a sophisticated economy. At the same time South 
Africa has sought to be part of advocates and proponents that champion 
the int~rests of developing countries in the WTO.,6 
Similar remarks \vere offered by the former head of OTI's international trade division 
and later head of South Africa's delegation to the WTO, Faizel Ismail. He highlighted 
that: 
'The dual character of South Africa's economy has enabled it to relate 
effectively with the developing world as it understands the challenges of 
development. On the other hand parts of its economy are well 
developed and sophisticated. The latter aspect enables it to interact with 
the advanced sectors of the global economy.,7 
As argued in this thesis, having a dual character and, indeed, experiencing internal 
tensions in the domestic social structure does not necessarily enable a country to 
relate effectively with countries that express different dimensions of its economic 
structure. As shown in Chapter 5, and as will be elaborated further later, South Africa 
has not had an easy time in relating meaningfully with the developmental challenges 
faced by the SAOC region both in the context of intra-regional trade arrangements 
and multilateral trade negotiations. Reconciling its interests with those of the region 
remains an interminable challenge, and the one that South Africa would have to be 
6 Interview with Bahle Sibisi, former Deputy Director-General: Enterprise and Industry Division, 
Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa; interview held on 24 September 2004, Johannesburg. 
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constantly conscious of in its regional and global economic relations. The following 
section will explore the evolution of South Africa's multilateral trade strategies from 
the Uruguay Round to Seattle Ministerial. 
6.2 From Uruguay Round to Seattle Ministerial 
The Uruguay Round was significant in many ways - apart from the fact that it was a 
Round 'launched and led by the US.'8 After an intermittent period of deflation in 
multilateralism due to the slow progress in the negotiations, the Uruguay Round 
culminated in the establishment of the WTO in 1995 - arguably the most salient 
institutional expression of multilateralism and global regulatory forms. For most 
developing countries, especially African countries, this was the first time that they 
were participating in international trade negotiations. 
Although the outcomes of the Uruguay Round did not lead to far-reaching 
liberalisation of trade. it brought in new sectors under the discipline of multilateral 
trade negotiations.9 The Round was an important rupture in the multilateral trading 
system and laid it on firm institutional ground in the form of the WTO. The new 
sectors that were added to the GATT include: the Agreement on Agriculture, the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment 
7 Interview with Faizel Ismail, Pennanent Head of South Africa's delegation to the WTO, 25 May 
2004, Switzerland. Geneva. 
8 Sylvia Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System: Who's On First?, (Chicago: University of Press, 
1997), p.23 7. 
9 Merlinda D. Ingco and Alan L. Winters, 'Agriculture and the trade negotiations: a 
synopsis'. In Merlinda D. Ingco and Alan L. Winters (eds.), Agriculture and the New 
Trade Agenda, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.16-17. 
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Measun:s (TRIMS). and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). 
In addition. a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was also created to 
regulate services in many instances parallel to the GATT. This was predicated on the 
notion that services were "the future", in view of continuing decline in manufacturing 
in the developed economies, especially in the US.IO Other innovations to the GATT 
system included the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism and a trade policy 
monitoring mechanism called Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), aimed at at 
encouraging member countries to reform their trade, investment and other regulatory 
regimes. 
Another important development on textiles and clothing, the Multi-fibre Agreement 
(MF A). a protectionist instrument which for a long time fell outside GATT's purview, 
was for the first time brought under the discipline of multilateral trade. It was set to 
come to an end 10 years (1 January 2005) after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
The MFA was an anomaly in the multilateral trading system. As Das notes, ' ... [MFA] 
was clearly a discriminatory arrangement and against the fundamental principle of the 
GATT.,II There is no doubt that the MFA has had harmful consequences of 
undercutting the competitiveness of developing countries whose comparative 
advantage lay mostly in labour-intensive sectors. 
10 See Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr, Alan Tonelson and Robert W. Jerome, 'GATT's demise is an 
opportunity for a new US. economic strategy', Harvard Business Review, March-April 1991, pp.132-
133. 
II Dilip K. Das, 'Trade and Global Integration', CSGR Working Paper No. 120/03, June 2003, p.IO, 
www.csgr.org 
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0.2.1 Imhalallces alllie Uruguay Round and Agriculture Liheralisation 
The imbalances of the Uruguay outcomes lay in the fact that the North-South 
bargaining that was a feature of the Round saw developing countries making 
concessions in new areas that were of economic interests to developed countries -
intellectual property, TRIMS, and services - in return for what they hoped would be 
substantial liberalisation in agriculture and textiles trade. 12 As Baldwin suggests, the 
gains made by developing countries in these two sectors were not comparable to those 
made by developed countries in trade in services and the TRIPs agreements. 13 
Similarly, Wyn Grant suggests that there were few gains for developing countries. 14 
By ignoring the importance of the African countries at Uruguay, developed countries 
had created a relentless backlash from these countries to the multilateral trading 
system, as they became a lot more critical of it. 
Furthermore, although although the Agreement on Agriculture brought agriculture 
into international trade negotiations, also made provisions for the continuation of 
subsidies for developed countries, with a provision for gradual erosion of these in the 
future, while developing countries that had no such subsidies in the first place could 
not introduce them to shore up their economies. 15 Josling and Hathaway note for 
example that, 'The special agricultural safeguard has protected developed-country 
Ie Michael J. Finger and Julio J. Nogues, 'Unbalanced Uruguay Outcome: The New Areas in Future 
WTO Negotiations', The World Economy, Volume25 (3) March 2002, p.322. 
IJ Richard E. Baldwin, 'Key Challenges facing the WTO', In Mike Moore (ed.), Doha and Beyond: 
The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.50. 
14 Wyn Grant, op.cil .. p.98. 
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farmers from import surges but has not been widely available to developing 
countries. '10 
At the Uruguay Round. 61 out of71 developing countries notified that they offered no 
domestic support that were subject to reduction commitments; and this notification 
restricted these countries' use of support measures in the future. 17 This therefore 
precluded them from using of subsidies in future. This remains one of the sensitive 
areas in the current Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. For example, if a 
need were to arise in future for countries to offer domestic support this would only be 
permitted within the threshold (de minimis percentage) of 10 percent of the value of 
d . d 18 the pro uctlon concerne . 
Developed countries on the other hand are less encumbered by such strictures: they 
are believed to have inflated their reports on values of their domestic support, 
allowing them more space to maintain up to 80 percent of their domestic support. 19 
Similarly with export subsidies, those countries that reported large export subsidies -
and these are to be found mostly in OEeD countries - were allowed greater latitude; 
but countries that reported zero-subsidies - mostly developing countries - had a 
15 ibid.. p.92; Mills Soko, 'The Political Economy of African Trade in the Twenty-First Century', In 
Dominic Kelly and Wyn Grant (eds.), The Politics of International Trade in the Twenty-First Century, 
(Basingstoke: Pal grave, 2005. p.275. 
16 Tim Josling and Dale Hathaway, op.cit .. p.2. 
17 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Preparing for Future 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: issues and Research Needs from a Development Perspective, 
(Geneva: UNCT AD, 1999), p.6 I -62. 
18 ibid. p.39. 
19 UNCT AD, Preparingfor Future Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Issues and Research Needs from a 
Development Perspective, (Geneva: UNCT AD, 1999), p.62. 
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limited scope for manoeuvrc.20 A decade after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
rich countries still continue to ofter subsidies to their domestic farmers. 
Rather than completely breaking the back of agricultural protectionism, the Uruguay 
Round merely established a framework for the long-term reform of the sector through 
the Agreement on Agriculture.21 Indeed, agriculture Iiberalisation remains a 
contentious issue, and is at the centre of the current Doha negotiations. The Common 
Agricultural Policy is remarked to be making up half of the EU's US$95.7 billion 
budget.22 
Agriculture has always been exempted from the GATT MFN principle under Article 
XI. This Article gave countries' ... the right to establish import quotas as an instrument 
to protect domestic agricultural production'; and under Article XVI the right to 
subsidise export of agricultural products was made lega1.23 At the end of Uruguay 
round a basis to reform trade in agriculture was established in the form of a mandate 
to begin negotiations before the end of 1999. This mandate, as Wyn Grant points out, 
was given through Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture.24 It contained three 
pillars: market access or border measures, domestic support and export subsidies?5 
20 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), op.cit., p.63. 
21 T.N. Srinivasan, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: From GAlT to the 
Uruguay Round and thefuture, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), p.38. 
22 Mills Soko, op.cit., p.280. 
23 Julio J. Nogues, 'Developing Countries and the Unbalanced Multilateral Trading System: Some 
Elements for a New Negotiating Agenda', In UNIDO Publication, Gearing for a New Development 
Agenda, (Vienna: UNIDO, 2001), p.61. 
24 Wyn Grant, op.cit. 
25 Richard E. Mshomba, Africa in the Global Economy, (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 
p.99. 
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Although SADC countries made significant commitments during the Uruguay, they 
nevertheless bound their tariffs at prohibitive levels, that is, at levels prohibiting 
imports?6 This is said to have reduced the effectiveness of tariffieation.27 With the 
exception of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland - all members of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) - whose bound duties on average were at 
about 70 percent and set to decline to 40 percent over a six year period, most SADC 
countries, including Tanzania, Lesotho, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe bound 
their tariffs at 100 percent or more, covering over 90 percent of products or tariff 
lines28 (see Table 6.1 below). 
26 Richard Mshomba, op.cit .. p.l03. 
27 Merlinda D.lngco, op.cit., p,427. 
28 Merlinda D. Ingco, op.cit.; Piritta Sorsa, 'Sub-Saharan African Own Commitments in the Uruguay 
Round - Myth or Reality?, World Economy, Volume 19, 1996 (3), p.292; African Development Bank, 
'Africa in the Global Trading System', African Development Report 2004, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004). 
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Table 6.1: lJruguay Round Bound Tariff Rates in Agriculture: 
Country 
Angola 
Botswana 
ORe 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
A vera/.:e Bound Tariff Rate (%) 
80 
40 
30 
200 
124 
120 
100 
40 
40 
40 
120 
124 
146 
Source: Adapted from USAID Study, 2003 
The rush towards participation in the Uruguay Round by African countries was, in 
part, motivated by the marginal position these countries occupied in the world 
economy, as well as their worsening economic conditions under an increasingly 
global ising world. Participation was therefore seen as necessary in ameliorating the 
developmental blight that characterised African countries in the 1980s and 1990s (see 
Chapter 1). In essence, motivated by the promise of impending prosperity 
accompanying globalisation, African countries saw their participation in the Uruguay 
Round as an opportunity to catch some of the promised benefits of global integration 
and address their developmental challenges. 
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As Stephen I laggard notes, the external constraints compelled developing countries to 
integrate themselves in the GATT.29 These constraints include economic shocks, an 
expanding conditionality norm, growing bilateralism and changes in the multilateral 
system.30 This also coincided with the period in which developing countries were 
undertaking significant shift from lSI to export-led growth as a result of the 
exhaustion of the lSI strategy in growing the domestic economy, and the 
demonstration effect of the Asian Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs) (see 
Chapter I). 
6.2.2 AJymmetries of Power in Trade Negotiations 
Prestowitz, Tonelson and Jerome aptly pointed out that, 'International agreements can 
only codify power realities, they cannot substitute for them. The nation whose views 
prevail in such negotiations will not be the nation whose views are objectively ... '31 
Developing countries, African countries especially, did not play much of a 
meaningful role during the Round as they were new to international bargains and had 
limited experience and negotiating capacity (see discussion below). Moreover, their 
trade profile was much lower compared to developed economies. Accordingly, the 
outcomes of the round very much reflected asymmetries of capabilities. That Sub-
Saharan African countries submitted less than 3 percent of all the written proposals 
29 Stephan Haggard, Developing Nations and the Politics o/GlobaIIntegration, (Washington D.C: The 
Brookings Institutions, 1995), pA5. 
30 ibid 
31 Claude V. Prestowitz, Jr, Alan Tonelson, and Robert W. Jerome, op.cit .. pp.134-135. 
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and comments that circulated during the Uruguay Round was further reflection of 
these power assymetrics.32 
According to Finger and Schuler, these countries' ... lacked the capacity to engage 
substantively on the wide range of issues Uruguay Round embraced.,33 This 
asymmetry has continued well beyond the Uruguay Round to be a salient feature of 
North-South relationship in the current global trading system. As Rajesh et al 
observed, 'Asymmetry in negotiating power and capacity remains a fundamental 
h .. f h .34 C aractenstlc 0 t e system. 
South Africa also took a dim view of the outcomes of the Uruguay Round, and in its 
assessment it regarded them as having failed to go far enough in addressing the 
imbalances existing in the world trading system between developing and developed. 35 
It was therefore keen to see a new round launched where developing countries could 
have an opportunity for redress and hopefully regain the ground lost during the 
Uruguay Round. 
In South Africa's view the Seattle Ministerial Conference that took place 5 years after 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round represented such an opportunity. As is well 
known, this ministerial stalled, and threw into perplexity the credibility of the 
multilateral trading system. This also deferred the hopes of many developing 
32 Michael J. Finger and Philip Schuler, 'Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The 
Development Challenge', World Economy, Volume 23 (4), April 2000, p.512. 
33 ibid. 
34 Rajesh Chadha, Bernard Hoekman, Will Martin, Ademola Oyejide, Marie Pangestu, Diana Tussie 
and Jamel Zarowk, 'Developing Countries and the next Round ofWTO Negotiation', World Economy 
Volume 23 (4), April 2000, p.433. 
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countries, including South Africa, who had expected to make important advances in 
correcting what they regarded as a raw deal that emerged from the Uruguay Round. 
Indeed, when another opportunity presented itself during the Ministerial Conference 
in Doha in November 200 I, South Africa worked hard to ensure that the Seattle 
failure was not to be repeated, and that a new round is launched. 
It is worth reiterating that South Africa's pro-Round stance was motivated by the 
reforms that were underway in its domestic economy and the developmental context 
within which these were unfolding. The structure of South Africa's domestic 
economy, in particular the re-orientation towards value-added manufactured exports, 
elevated the importance of export promotion and market access issues in its external 
or foreign economic strategy (see chapter 4). This cemented the relationship between 
the pursuit of multilateralism and domestic interventions targeted at promoting 
domestic economic growth and industry competitiveness on the one hand, and 
supplemented with equity policies on the other hand. This is one of the main themes 
of this thesis. 
It is therefore not difficult to discern South Africa's strategic interests in pursuing 
multilateralism in trade, as well as seeking to address some of the imbalances that 
existed in the Uruguay Agreements. It has very little to do with pursuing middle-
powermanship and all to do with strategic interests in the domestic economy. 
35 Xavier Carim. Report on the 3rd WTO Ministerial Conference at Seattle: Assessment, Implications 
and Prospects for Future Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The Department of Trade and Industry, 
South Africa, 20 January 2000. 
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6.3 From Seattle to Doha: South Africa and the new Round of Negotiations 
The Seattle Ministerial that took place in November-December 1999 was expected to 
pave the way for negotiations to develop a framework or modalities for agricultural 
liberalisation. But developed economies had their own set of agenda that they wanted 
to achieve through the round. As a result differences were so acute that the possibility 
of failure could not have been easily averted. 
Consequently, the Seattle ministerial conference failed to launch the much touted 
'millennium round', and this was to the disappointment of many developing 
countries, especially middle-income exporting countries like South Africa who had 
hoped to advance their market access interests. Failure to launch the negotiations was 
due to a number of developments, including disagreements over agriculture 
liberalisation, especially between the US and the EU, intellectual property rights, and 
whether the Round should be 'broad' or 'narrow'. The tensions at Seattle intensified 
between the EU and the US.36 As Mike Moore, the former WTO Director-General 
observed, ' ... the differences across the Atlantic and North/South were too large to 
b 'd ,37 n ge. 
The failure to launch the negotiations at Seattle was a set back for some developing 
countries, and played into protectionist interests of steel, textile and clothing sectors in 
the US; agricultural sectors in the EU, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and Norway. 
The Seattle failure afforded these countries an extended breathing space from 
36 Sheila Page, 'Developing Countries in GATTIWTO Negotiations', Overseas Development Institute 
Working Paper, October 2001, www.odi.org.uk 
37 Mike Moore, op.cit., 2003, p.98. 
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liberalising their agricultural markets - an area which is of export interest to most 
developing counties?8 
In South Africa's view, developing countries were the main losers at Seattle as the 
failure to launch a new round denied them an opportunity to use it to address their 
developmental concerns, including those to do with agriculture, TRIPS measures and 
clearer provisions on Special and Differential Treatment. On the other hand, at Seattle 
African countries and NGOs demonstrated for the first time that they were an 
important force to be reckoned with in global economic policy making, and could not 
be easily taken for granted. 39 
In the aftermath of this failure, South Africa emerged as one of the ardent advocates 
for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. To be sure, South Africa was not 
alone in this exercise. Indeed, a few middle-income countries, including Brazil and 
Egypt (although Egypt later became half-hearted), put up a great deal of work to 
ensure that a consensus was struck on launching the new round. South Africa believed 
that it was in the context of a new, 'broad-based' round that its interests, and those of 
its African countries, could be addressed. On this score, South Africa's position 
coalesced with those of the developed countries, in particular the EU and the US, who 
wanted to see a new round lauched. 
One of the challenges South Africa faced was that most African countries had less 
appetite for the new round, more so in view of the ambiguity hovering above Uruguay 
Round 'Implementation Issues'. Implementation issues were a spectre that had come 
38 Xavier Carim, op.cit. 
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to haunt the Doha round. There were a host of other issues that developing countries 
raised as precondition for supporting the round: including special and differential 
treatment, and technical assistance and capacity building. 
Even though an enthusiast for the launch of a new Round, it was not completely lost 
to South Africa that, after having countenanced the mortifying outcomes at the end of 
Uruguay, and losing an opportunity to make inroads during the Seattle Ministerial, 
most developing countries were seized with a sense of disenchantment with the 
multilateral trading system. Their confidence and trust in the WTO was somewhat 
eroded. Breaking this reticence - and delivering Africa's support for the round - was 
going to require an extra-ordinary effort on the part of South Africa. 
Thus South Africa's campaign for the round was built around the 'development' 
theme within a broad-based agenda. Yet, it is not clear what was meant by 
development and how South Africa intended promoting this within the WTO. Some 
prominent economists who have keenly followed global trade developments are 
somewhat puzzled by the imputation of 'development' in the Doha Round, and 
consider it a 'pleasing rhetoric. ,40 
Indeed, there does not seem to be any collective understanding across different actors 
in the WTO of what is meant by a development round, raising suspicions that this was 
just a sweetener to ensure that the required support for the launch of the round was 
garnered, especially from Africa countries and India. Nonetheless, the Doha Round 
39 ibid 
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was launched with a view that' ... there would be a substantial focus on development 
.41 concerns .... 
From the outset, most African countries expressed scepticism. They realised that 
launching the Round would only ensure that the wheel of global trade continues to 
move at a faster pace than they would be able to catch up and that their developmental 
challenges would be placed on the back burner. By its very design, constructed on the 
edifice of power asymmetries, the WTO is incapable of advancing a developmental 
agenda. Indeed, as Finger and Schuler argue, 'WTO regulations reflect little 
awareness of development problems ... ,42 
6.4 South Africa's Perspective on the WTO Negotiations Post-Seattle 
From the outset, when it was evident that the global trade talks would begin at Doha, 
African countries constituted themselves into a coalition in order to counter-balance 
the preponderance of developed economies, especially the EU, the US and Japan, and 
ensure that their interests are sufficiently addressed. The foundation of this coalition 
had already been laid at Seattle Ministerial, and was partly responsible for the 
Ministerial failure. The unfinished business of the Uruguay Round, including 
Implementation Issues were at the heart of African countries' negotiating positions. 
Implementation Issues therefore constituted a down-payment that had to be advanced 
before African countries would give consent to opening a new round of negotiations. 
40 Jagdish Bhagwati, 'Trading for development: how to assist poor countries', In Mike Moore (ed.), 
Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p.115. 
41 Kym Anderson, op.cit., p.2. 
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By late 2005 these issues were still not fully addressed, and this is despite the fact 
they are one of the key demands of African countries, and were a precondition for 
their support for the launch of the Doha Round. 
6.4. J Implementation Issues 
For African countries, implementation issues and the finalisation of mandated 
negotiations on agriculture were preconditions for the launch of a new round; and for 
them these were substantive development issues. Implementation Issues for example 
included a number of areas which developing countries were not fully satisfied with 
and needed to be re-visited to ensure re-balancing of the Uruguay outcomes. 
Some of these were with respect to TRIPs Agreement on Public Health issues, which 
was seen as hindering developing countries from taking action, for example, via 
parallel importation and compulsory licensing to access cheaper medicine for 
treatment of HIV / AIDS, TB and Malaria; TRIMS Agreement, which was viewed by 
developing countries as having the potential to encroach into the domestic policy 
space and constrain government from undertaking development policy measures or 
imposing regulations on Transnational Corporations (TNCs). According to Finger the 
implementation burden for developing countries 'would cost each country some 150 
million dollars, more than a full year's development budget in many of the least 
developed countries. ,43 
42 Michael J. Finger and Julio J. Nogues, op.cit .. p.511. 
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The other areas of implementation demanded by African countries were with regards 
to strengthening of trade remedies, especially anti-dumping measures to limit the 
arbitrary use of these by developed countries against developing countries' imports; 
reopening of the subsidies agreement to broaden non-actionable subsidies for 
developing countries, for example, where these are geared towards support for 
industrialisation, diversification, and the manufacture of high technology and value-
added goods; implementation of the Marrakech Ministerial Decision in favour of 
LDCs and Net-Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs); standards (SPS and 
TBT measures) requirements, and customs valuation requirements, for which 
developing countries had no available infrastructure or resources to develop. 
Also, the majority of African countries, and this is also the case for most of SADC 
countries, had found it difficult to implement their obligations arising from the 
Uruguay Round due to insufficient technical capacity and weak domestic institutions, 
including regulatory mechanisms to facilitate implementation. Because of the added 
financial and administrative burden required in the implementation of these rules, 
these tended to conflict with developmental priorities in these countries. As noted by 
Michael Finger, 'Developing countries took on an implementation burden for which 
they did not get equivalent value in return. ,44 
The linkage between implementation issues and developmental concerns is made all 
the more clearer by Rajesh et al who cast doubt at the developmental value of 
43 Michael J. Finger, 'Implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements: Problems for Developing 
Countries', World Economy, Volume 24 (9), September 2001, p.l 100. 
44 Michael J. Finger, op.cit .. p.l097. 
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implementation issues and the 'one-size-fits all' approach of the WTO.45 They further 
observe that, 'It is not at all clear from a development perspective that the resources 
required for implementation of some WTO agreements, whatever the amount might 
be, would not be better used to build schools or improve infrastructure.'46 As 
Ademola contends, 'For the low-income countries, poverty alleviation has become the 
central objective of developmental strategy.'47 
Indeed, as Finger and Schuler argue, WTO regulations are less sensitive to the 
developmental concerns of developing countries and demonstrate' .. .little appreciation 
of the capacities of the least developed countries to carry out the functions of the SPS, 
customs valuation, intellectual property etc. regulation addresses.'48 This lack of 
capacity is made all the more difficult by smaller delegation that these countries have 
in the Geneva Mission, and sustaining these also requires financial commitments. 
SADC countries that have representatives in the Geneva Mission tend to overload 
them with responsibilities related to other Geneva-based international organisations 
such as UNCTAD, International Labour Organisation, World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WlPO) and other United Nations related agencies. It is not rare to find a 
SADC Geneva-based official covering all the multilateral organisations and attending 
meeting dealing with different issues in one day.49 There are also poor linkages and 
coordination between national capitals and Geneva Missions. This effectively means 
there is also no domestic coordination mechanism to develop a country's position on 
45 Rajesh Chadha et ai, op.cit., p.433. 
46 ibid. 
47 Ademola T. Oyejide, 'Development dimensions in multilateral trade negotiations', In Mike Moore 
(ed.), Doha and Beyond: The Future of the Multilateral Trading System, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p.69. 
48 Michael J. Finger and Philip Schuler, op.cit .. p.5Il. 
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WTO issues. Furthermore, due to domestic institutional weaknesses and reasons 
already alluded to above, thc majority of African negotiators tcnd to have have a 
limited technical grasp of the details of WTO negotiations as most of them are fairly 
new to the multilateral trade scene. 
6.4.2 South Africa's Position on the Launch of Doha Round. 
South Africa's position, though sympathetic to its African partners, was different and, 
on the whole, far more enthusiastic about launching a new round of negotiations. 
South Africa's preference for a broad-based round was in part motivated by strategic 
calculation of what could be possible given such diversity of players in the 
multilateral trading system; and in part by South Africa's institutional capability and 
readiness to engage on the 'new generation issues' in the WTO, including the so-
called Singapore Issues (competition, investment, transparency in government, and 
trade facilitation). South Africa's view is that developing countries have more chances 
of gaining concessions when negotiations have a wider scope for trade-offs on a 
number of a areas in a broader agenda: from agriculture, services, industrial products, 
and new issues. 
In its key negotiating positions, South Africa expressed a clear preference for 
multilateralism as a principle and as an instrument for dealing with the challenges of 
globalisation. It contended that muItilateralism, pursued through a strengthened and 
rules-based WTO mechanism is ' ... an appropriate institutional policy response to 
globalisation', and that it is through this instrument that developing countries' 
49 Based on observations during field work in Geneva in May 2004. 
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interests can be fully addressed.50 According to this View, far from constraining 
developing countries, multilateralism disciplines power plays, creates fairness and 
could ensure equitable outcomes. 
Linked to the previous point, South Africa's approach to the WTO was also informed 
by a particular interpretation of globalisation process - a middle-ground view, which 
sees globalisation as largely a neutral force that countries can harness to their benefit. 
Alec Erwin, South Africa's former Minister of Trade and Industry, who could be 
regarded as one of the mid-wives of the Doha Round remarked that, 'Globalisation is 
not an ideological construct, but rather describes real changes in the world economy, 
and that it describes a more intense, but not unique, global interaction.'51 
The view of globalisation and multilateral ism as neutral and a force that could be 
harnessed for the benefit of developing countries cast a spell on South Africa's state 
actors for some time. This view is one-sided in its interpretation of globalisation, and 
underestimates the power of ideas, prevalence of particularistic interests in 
negotiating context, and the role of capabilities in shaping the underlying foundations 
of the contemporary global structures and outcomes of economic interactions between 
various actors endowed with differential capabilities. Furthermore, it naively misreads 
the real intentions of developed economies in engaging in North-South bargains at the 
multilateral trade level. 
50 The Department of Trade and Industry, Note on South Africa's Approach to the WTO and Key 
Elements of a Negotiating Position, December 2000, DTI, Pretoria. 
51 TIPS-IGD WTO, Proceedings of a Consultative Symposium, The Multilateral Trading System and 
the Road 10 Doaha: Challenges for South Africa, 7-8 August 200 I, Pretoria. 
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However, the approach South Africa adopted towards the structures of global 
governance - that of engagement rather than dc-linking - is understandable, precisely 
because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to effect change, even if 
incrementally, in global processes while shouting from the margins. Engaging in the 
current global processes on the basis of a principled view to participate in shaping 
outcomes could well be a better option than, say, withdrawing from multilateral 
processes. However, this does not guarantee better outcomes. The reality of 
international negotiations often stands in stark contrast with the idealism represented 
by principled multilateral ism. 
Regarding the launch of the new round, South Africa considered two crucial factors. 
The first was with regards to the adverse effect a failure to lauch the Round could 
have on the credibility of the WTO as an institution. Second, failing to launch a round 
would have serious implications on the confidence countries have in the principle of 
multilateralism and the institution that is supposed to represent this principle to act as 
a counterforce against unilateral ism and bilateralism. 
As Xavier Carim, South Africa's former Head of Delegation to the WTO during 
Seattle Ministerial noted, 'A strong WTO is essential to effective management of the 
globalising world economy and as a bulwark against unilateralism.'52 Hence, in 
seeking to launch a new round these two factors were uppermost in the appeal by 
developed countries - and a fraction of developing countries, South Africa included, 
that were in support of the new round - for a consensus to start the negotiations. 
Masked under the expressed rhetoric of promoting multilateral ism and defending the 
52 Xavier Carim, op.cit. 
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WTO, there are also interests that are linked to the ongoing domestic transformation 
of economic landscape in South Africa (see Chapter 4). 
6.4.3 Delivering African Support: The Burden of Regional 'Leadership 
South Africa, given its 'regional power' status, was expected by developed countries 
to deliver the African support for the Round. The confidence placed on South Africa's 
ability to deliver SADC and the Africa Group was based on the view that South 
Africa is a core state in the sub-region, with enlightened view of the global system, 
and would be able to use its clout to persuade its regional partners. This view was 
oblivious to the fact that there was no sufficient consensual normative ground upon 
which South Africa's leadership in the region was based. This also ignored the intra-
regional tensions in which South Africa was often at the centre, and the constraints 
South Africa faced as a result of historical socio-political dynamics in the region (see 
Chapter 3), as well as the structural asymmetries in the region's economies (see 
Chapter 5). 
Evidently, South Africa's political influence was grossly misread or the country was 
pushed far too much to expend political capital in order to prove its regional clout to 
the EU and the US. It had to perform. As one Geneva-based diplomat commented, 
Pascal Lamy and Robert Zoelick (EU and US former trade negotiators respectively) 
• ... see South Africa as a pragmatic and reasonable country in the WTO and they 
differentiate it from the rest ofthe Africa Group.,53 
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Also, according to Jawara and Kwa, the US and EU strategy in the run up to thc Doha 
Round was to use strong countries within other WTO groupings - for example South 
Africa in the Africa Group - to gain wider support for the round. 54 Mike Moore's (the 
formcr WTO Director General) effusive praise of countries like South Africa is more 
telling. He remarked that: 
'Developing countries like South Africa are in the forefront of 
countries defining the parameters of the WTO's future work programme 
- their ministers, ambassadors and officials are among the most 
effective and influential trade-policy practitioners in the world today. ,55 
6.5 South Africa's Negotiating Position in the Doha Round 
In discussing South Africa's negotiating position, this section will only highlight 
those areas where there were clear or potential tensions with other SADC/ Africa 
Group countries. The scope of South Africa's negotiating position is too wide to be 
examined here, and would need a study of its own. As noted earlier, South Africa's 
negotiating positions ahead of the Doha Ministerial reflected a more ambitious set of 
objectives. It centred mainly on issues of market access in agriculture and industrial 
products. 
53 Confidential telephonic Interview, 6 December 2004. 
54 Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, op.cit. 
55 Mike Moore, op.cit., 2003, p.l72. 
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65.1 ,)'oulh A./;·ica 's Regional Consultations 
South Africa consulted extensively in its quest to see the Doha Round launched. The 
consultation process was multi-track, filtering information between the developed, 
like-minded developing, and the African countries. It took place both at the political 
and senior officials' level. South Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, 
took a keen interest in getting the round launched and was at the forefront of the 
consultation processes with a wide range of players involved, in particular with 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy of the EC on the one hand, and SADC Ministers of Trade 
on the other. 56 
South Africa also consulted regularly with countries such as Brazil, India and Nigeria, 
and in South Africa's view these would form a solid axis of South-South alliance 
during the Round. Indeed, these became the nucleus of the G20+ coalition in the run 
up to the Cancun Ministerial in September 2003.57 The challenge for South Africa in 
the run up to the Doha Ministerial was to reconcile its more ambitious objectives with 
the more limited and defensive objectives of its partners in SADC and the wider 
Africa Group. South Africa was therefore prepared to consider, as part of the Doha 
negotiating package, issues that were of key interests to the developed countries, and 
at the same time keenly aware of the difficulties that were posed by the African 
countries for the Ministerial. 
56 Confidential Note 'State of Play A' 
57 This group was established in the run up to the Cancun Ministerial in September 2003. It is led by 
Brazil and comprises of: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Egypt, EI Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Phillippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. See www.wto.org 
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As Jawara and Kwa argue, 'South Africa's negotiating stance was to trade off the 
'new issues' against implementation issues, and technical and other assistance' .58 At 
the broader level, South Africa's position put emphasis on industrial restructuring in 
developed economies in a way that facilitates relocation of production and investment 
to developing countries in areas where these countries have comparative advantages. 
South Africa has maintained consistency in articulating this view, even post-Doha 
Ministerial. In the pre-Doha consultations, South Africa faced several hurdles in 
constructing a common approach based on its view of global economic relations and 
multilateral trading system. 
Intensive interactions between Pascal Lamy of the EU and Alec Erwin went well into 
few weeks before the start of the Doha Ministerial Conference, trying to find a 
solution to bring African countries on board in support of the round. Key African 
countries that were targeted include those belonging to SADC, Kenya, Egypt and 
Nigeria.59 Indeed, the Nigerian Minister of Trade Mustafa Bello, representing the 
Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)6o coalition group of preference-dependent 
countries, spoke favourably for the launch of the new round during the Doha 
Ministeria1.61 
18 Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, op.cit., p.l68. 
59 Confidential note (Erwin-Lamy exchange, 14 August 2001). 
60 This group is made up of the fifty-six developing country WTO members, drawn from Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific regions. These countries benefit from a non-reciprocal preference scheme 
offered by the EU. 
61 Mike Moore, op.cit., 2003, pp.I3I-I32. 
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6.5.2 Contentious Negotiating Areas: South A./rica-SADCIAjrica Group 
One area where there was a marked difference between South Africa and its regional 
counterparts concerned agricultural market access. For South Africa, agriculture was 
one of the key pillars in its negotiating position, and considering the country's 
membership of the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters,62 this sector was going to 
be at the heart of South Africa's negotiating agenda during the Doha Round. 
Agricultural sector is important for South Africa economic development agenda - it is 
linked to the 'Black Economic Empowerment' and land distribution programme - and 
also has ' ... strong economic and employment linkages with other sectors of the 
economy .. .'63 In this regard, South Africa's main demand in the negotiations is 
improved market access opportunities, including the reduction and eventual 
elimination of domestic support and export subsidies in the developed North, in 
particular the EU. However, in respect of developing countries, South Africa's 
position is that the WTO should provide necessary flexibilities for developing 
countries to enable them to address developmental challenges. 
The final phasing out of domestic support and export subsidies in OECD markets is 
likely to stimulate massive growth in agricultural production in developing countries 
that have a comparative advantage in this area. In this connection, South Africa's 
approach very much dovetails, if not reflective of, the Cairns Group position. The 
62 Members of the Cairns Group include Argentine, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, The Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand and Uruguay. 
63 SACU's Trade Policy Review, 'South Africa', Annexure to the Report by the WTO Secretariat, 
WTffPRlSI114/ZAF. 
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Cairns Group consists of major agricultural exporters, including both the developed 
and developing countries. 
The group was established just before the start of the Uruguay Round in 1986 and is 
led mainly by Australia, New Zealand and Canada. It must be noted that, although 
this group was from its beginnings a pro-Iiberalisation group, it did not have much 
sympathies for developing countries' concerns. South Africa joined the Cairns Group 
in 1998 with its membership accession sponsored by New Zealand.64 As Grant notes, 
'The net exporters had a clear preference for better access to developed country 
markets and therefore tended to align themselves with the Cairns Group. ,65 
African countries do not take a favourable view of South Africa's participation in this 
group, and perceive South Africa to be a conduit for Cairn Group's positions in the 
Africa Group - another WTO coalition group to which South Africa (and SADC 
countries) is also a member. According to one African trade diplomat from a SADC 
country, 'South Africa tends to articulate its positions hiding behind the Cairns group 
and would try to convince African countries that the preference margins are viewed as 
discriminatory and should be disavowed.'66 South Africa's position on EU preferences 
therefore tends to be ambiguous, leaning heavily on the position of the Cairns Group 
rather than African countries, most of which want to retain these for reasons linked to 
income earning and to manage their domestic industrial restructuring, for example in 
fM .. 67 the case 0 auntlUs. 
64 Ian Taylor, Stuck in the Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Relations, (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 200 I). 
65 Wyn Grant, op. cit. , p.lOO. 
66 Confidential interview with a member of the Africa Group in Geneva, 23 May 2004. 
67 Interview with Tshepo Mogotsi, First Counsellor, Botswanan Mission in Geneva, 24 May 2004. 
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6.5.3 S'ADc/Africa Group and the Preference Scheme 
Differently from South Africa"s production base, Africa's exports are heavily 
concentrated in a few products - minerals and agriculture - and are destined to the EU 
markets (see Chapter 5). African countries who participate in the Cotonou preferential 
trade scheme benefit in terms of the various protocols built into the scheme: sugar, 
beef, and textiles. This scheme is offered by the EU to its former colonies in Africa, 
the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), and is based on the provision of duty-free, 
quota-based access of certain products from these countries.68 South Africa is the only 
country in the SADC region that does not benefit from preferences. Its terms of 
accession to the WTO were as a developed rather than as a developing country. It can 
only improve its domestic output via enhanced market access with specific focus on 
tariff reduction and elimination of non-tariff barriers. 
The various product items (sugar, beef and textiles) covered by the Cotonou 
preferential scheme - from which South Africa does not benefit - guaranteed export 
quotas at a fixed price (as well as above world price) to EU markets.69 Most SADC 
countries do not face major tariff barriers in developed markets as import tariffs in 
these markets are already very low owing to the trade preference system extended to 
them. These preferences include those agreed under the Lome Convention and now 
incorporated under the EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement signed in 2000; 
68 Kym Anderson, op.cit .. p.l J. 
69 African Development Bank, 'Africa in the Global Trading System', African Development Report 
2004, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.152; Kym Anderson, op.cit .• pp.lI-12. 
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'Everything But Arms' (ESA) introduced by the EU in 2001; and AGOA extended by 
the US in March 2000. 
For most of African countries, the battle ground in the multilateral trade negotiations 
lies not in the area of market access via tariff reduction, but more in the preservation 
of their preference scheme. Faizel Ismail notes for example that, 'It has long been 
established that for many developing countries, especially the most marginalized, 
increased market access will not contribute significantly to export driven growth.'70 
This is largely due to supply-side constraints and reliance on one or two commodities 
(see Chapter 5). It has been suggested that adjustment assistance by developed 
countries or international institutions could perhaps go a long way in addressing the 
special concerns of these countries.7l 
Special preferences extended by the EU to these countries are by their very nature and 
design discriminatory: they discriminate against those who are not benefiting from 
them and grant competitive advantage to those who are covered by them. Some 
economists contend that this scheme harms' ... many other equally poor but non-ACP 
developing countries' and is an ' .. .inefficient way of transferring welfare to poor 
countries.' 72 This is also a critical fault-line between South Africa and the rest of the 
SADC region in regards to market access. 
70 Faizel Ismail. op.cit .. 2004. 
71 See Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Glob ali sat ion. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); ibid 
72 Kym Anderson, op.cit .. p.12. 
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South Africa views the system of preferences as 'a recipe for stagnation in the global 
economy' and a 'perverse new imperialism ... [that] stares us in the face.'73 South 
Africa, which is an agricultural exporter, has sharp ditTerences with Mauritius, a 
preference dependent country and food importer, over agriculture liberalisation.74 As 
suggested previously, market access is a cornerstone of South Africa's negotiating 
position, but of lesser short-term importance and urgency for the majority of SADC 
countries. 
The ACP (including most of SADC) countries, as a group, are less vocal against the 
EU's protectionist policies because of the benefits they derive in the form of high 
domestic prices in the EU for their otherwise less competitive products. This also 
gnaws away the strong bargaining platform that developing countries could muster in 
the multilateral trade negotiations if the question of preferences was not in existence. 
Multilateral trade negotiations, in particular progress on market access, threaten to 
erode these preferences in the long-term. The privileged access to EU markets 
currently enjoyed by most African countries via preferences is a short-term benefit for 
them, but creates disadvantages for middle-income exporters who want to compete in 
the same markets. As a result of these preferences, SADC countries, which are also 
part of the Africa Group, are negotiating from a defensive position. 
This defensive position, argues Draper and Khumalo, seeks privilege access to key 
northern markets, mainly agricultural commodity exports to the EU market, and 
73 A confidential exchange (LDS-TM), op.cit .. 
74 Common Market for East and Southern African countries (COMESA), African Influence in the 
World Trade Organisation, (Lusaka: COMESA, 2002), p.25. 
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maintaining the preference system; and this is at the expense of middle-income 
countries such as South Africa, Brazil and India.75 It also disadvantages Banana 
producers in Latin America as it surfeits ACP countries with tariff preferences while 
raising barriers for developing countries in Latin America, and thereby artificially 
undercutting their competitiveness.76 
Evidently, South Africa's interests remain irreconcilable with those of other SADC 
countries that benefit from preferences. Thus South Africa will always have 
difficulties in building a solid consensus on multilateral trade positions in the SADC 
region. For example, preferent-dependent SADC countries like Mauritius are more 
interested in preserving their quotas and preference margins in the EU market, and 
would refuse to support any position in the Africa Group which goes against their 
. 77 
short-term mterest. 
Essentially, agricultural market access is not a key concern for such countries. There 
is no doubt that if African countries remain locked into this dependency relationship 
they stand to lose in the long-term when MFN tariff rates come down and agricultural 
trade barriers finally unravel in the EU, especially in view of the the accession of 10 
former Eastern Europen countries to the European Union on I May 2004, making the 
long term viability of subsidies unsustainable. 
75 Peter Draper and Nkululeko, Friend or Foe? South Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in the World 
Trading System, SABA Trade Policy Working Paper No.3, 2004. www.saiia.org.za 
76 'Banana producers go to WTO over EU dispute', Financial Times, 7 March 2005. 
77 Mauritius in particular is known to be very rigid on preferences. Confidential Interview with a 
member of the WTO Africa Group in Geneva, 27 May 2004, Switzerland, Geneva 
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Building on the broader overview of South Africa's position in relation to the m~jority 
of African countries. and how the role of subsidies further complicates the emergence 
of a common position, the following section will look at the processes undertaken by 
South Africa to build a common agenda in the SADC sub-region and beyond. 
6.6 South Africa and SADe/Africa Group on the Road to Doha 
Even though SADC does not carry a mandate to negotiate at the multilateral trade 
level on behalf of its members, countries have, in the past, made some efforts to 
coordinate their positions. SADC countries are active participants in the Africa Group 
(which is mainly made up of 53 Sub-Saharan countries that are members of the 
African Union) since Seattle Ministerial, and the level of activity has increased since 
the launch of the Doha Ministerial. In the run up to the Doha Ministerial Conference, 
SADC senior officials and ministers of trade and industry met to exchange views and 
search for a common ground. SADC countries' concerns, and this excludes South 
Africa, were broadly similar to those of the other members of the Africa Group with 
whom they share similar structural features. 
In spite of the differences that existed between most SADC countries and South 
Africa, especially in the area of preferences and Singapore Issues, South Africa took it 
upon itself to consult extensively with SADC countries, both at the Ministerial and 
Senior Officials' (including Geneva-based officials) level to develop a common 
position. Alec Erwin, South Africa's then Minister of Trade pointed out to Pascal 
Lamy that' ... a unified African position was better than having to negotiate solely on 
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the basis of our specific national interest.,78 This was both a political imperative given 
South Africa's position in the region vis-a-vis its partners (see Chapter 5). This could 
also have becn a tactical approach that would make South Africa's room for 
manoeuvre appear narrower than was really the case.79 
South Africa participated in, and hosted, a number of meetings in an attempt to finally 
thrash an acceptable common basis for approaching the Doha Ministerial, and its 
major goal was to get African countries to sign up to the Round. This was also 
important for South Africa for different reasons: It would enhance its stature as a 
major force and a deal broker in the multilateral trade negotiations. The following 
were some of the meetings that took place amongst African countries ahead of the 
Doha Ministerial: 
• SADC/COMESA Trade Ministers Meeting in Cairo, Egypt, July 2001. 
• African Ministers of Trade and Industry, held under the Aegis of the OAo -
held in September 2001, Abuja; 
• SADC joint meting of Ministers of Trade and of Agriculture - early 
September 2001, Mauritius; 
• Informal Ministerial Meeting of about 15 key countries - 1 September 2001, 
Mexico; 
• Commonwealth Heads of Government and State, early October 2001, 
Australia; 
78 Confidential exchange (AE-PL), 14 August 2001. 
79 This fits in with Robert Putnam's conceptualisation of two-level games in international bargains. See 
Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', In Peter B. 
Evans, Harold K. Jacobsen Robert D. Putnam (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics, (8erkely: University ofCaiifomia Press, 1993). 
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• Senior Officials' meeting in September 2001 in Centurion, South Africa. 
Three countries in SADC were particularly averse to the idea of supporting the launch 
for a new round: Zimbabwe, Namibia and Tanzania. These countries tended to 
contradict contradict South Africa's views on the likely shape of a common 
negotiating position within SADC. 80 These political tensions were reflective of much 
bigger difficulties South Africa had in working closely with its regional partners. This 
was partly caused by negative perceptions that are historically rooted; and partly 
caused by perceptions of South Africa's regional agenda in the post-apartheid era (see 
Chapter 5). 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe belonged to the radical group of 'like-minded' countries led 
by India; and Tanzania was also a leading country in the group of least developed 
countries (LDCs) and an important member of the ACP group which relies on trade 
preferences, and approaches multilateral trade negotiations from a defensive 
perspective. Regional tensions manifested themselves in the first senior officials' 
meeting held in Harare in May 2001. To South Africa's disappointment, this meeting 
never really made much progress; it even failed to quorate.81 
The meeting where there was a considerable degree of progress made was the SADC 
Ministers of Trade meeting hosted by South Africa in Centurion, on the 20 July 2001. 
For the first time, SADC Ministers demonstrated support for some of the areas that 
constituted South Africa's position, especially those calling for a ' ... fundamental 
80 CD-TN report (confidential internal document), May 200l. 
81 This was recorded in a confidential report of the DTI. 
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agenda that includes implementation issues, agriculture, serVices, and industrial 
tari fTs. ,82 
The word 'Round' was avoided in the agreed wording on the draft negotiating text. 
Also, the overall shape of the position that came out of this meeting reflected the 
diversity of SADC - developing countries, least developing countries, small 
economies, and land-locked and island countries - and had an edge of a compromise 
to it. It was on the more general issues, rather than on specifics, that SADC countries 
could agree a common position. More specific issues, including firm commitment 
towards launching a round were bracketed - indicating lack of consensus. 
Further agreement on the Singapore Issues could not be achieved and discussion on 
these issues was further deferred to a meeting that was to be held in Mauritius on the 
3 September 2001, less than two months before the Doha Ministerial. South Africa's 
position as previously indicated was strongly advocating for a broad-based Round that 
would also include Singapore Issues. By the time the round was launched at Doha 
there was still no agreement on key issues within the SA DC/ Africa Group. 
Most SADC countries, especially those opposed to the launch of the Round had a 
much lower level of ambition in the multilateral trading system as they were 
beneficiaries of the EU preference scheme. SADC's position in the multilateral trade 
negotiations lacked any positive propositions and was mainly defensive. These 
countries did not perceive much benefit to be gained from launching global trade 
82 Confidential Report (RC and RC), 29-31 July 200 I. 
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talks. If anything, this threatened to unravel their special relationship with the EU 
established through preferential concessions. 
Hence one of SADC/ Africa Group's critical demands or preconditions for considering 
the round was a waiver for the ACP/EU Partnership Agreement which would still 
allow them to benefit from preferences for an agreed period of time. And this demand 
was potentially dangerous to the multilateral trading system as it allowed the EU 
some space to exploit the legitimate fears of the ACP countries concerning their plight 
if subsidies are eliminated. Effectively this offered the EU an excuse to further delay 
agricultural liberalisation. 
A common agreement amongst SADC countries was struck on a few broad set of 
issues: implementation issues with emphasis on special and differential treatment; 
standards and technical barriers; TRIPS Agreement and public health; TRIMS 
Agreement; technical assistance and capacity building; and full commitment to 
support LDCs and net-food importing developing countries. The other area where a 
broad but inconclusive agreement was made was with regards to industrial tariffs. The 
SADC position was that negotiations in this area should be targeted at addressing 
tariff peaks and escalation in order to ensure production and export diversification. 
This position was to be later developed after the launch of the Doha Round, as part of 
the Africa Group position that was consolidated in Kigali, Rwanda from the 27 - 38 
May 2004 (see below). 
On Industrial tariffs or Non-Agricultural Market Access, South Africa had an 
offensive agenda. Its position called for the reduction and elimination of tariff peaks 
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and escalation on products of export interest to developing countries. This was made 
all the more important for South Africa and a number of developing countries as the 
EU protected its processing industries, thereby hampering the development of 
processing industries in developing countries. 
Indeed, the Doha Work Programme added negotiations on Non-Agricultural Market 
Access. The key wording that paved the way for the negotiations was captured in 
paragraph 16 of the Doha Work Programme, which stated that:83 
'We agree to negotiation which shall aim, by modalities to be agreed, to 
reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or 
elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as 
non-tariff barriers in particular products of export interest to developing 
countries. ' 
According to an UN CT AD study, most tariff peaks are in agriculture and 'Most post-
Uruguay Round tariffs escalate between raw and semi-finished as well as between 
semi-finished and finished products.'84 Developed countries, even though they bound 
most of their non-agricultural tariffs, they retain higher tariffs for products that are in 
labour intensive sectors, and for which most developing countries have a comparative 
advantage. These sectors include textiles and clothing, leather and footwear, fish and 
fish products; and these also have tariff escalation and peaks.85 
83 World Trade Organisation, Doha Declarations, Paragraph 16, (WTO: Geneva, 2001). 
84 UNCT AD, Economic Development in Africa: Trade Performance and Commodity Dependence, 
(Geneva: United Nations, 2003), pp.22-23. 
85 Marc Bacchetta and Bijit Bora, 'Industrial Tariff Liberalization and the Doha Development Agenda', 
WTO Working Paper, (Geneva: WTO, 2004). www.wto.org 
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As pointed out in Chapter 4, part of South Africa's shift in trade and industrial 
strategies is to gradually diversify away from traditional exports such as agriculture 
and mining, and facilitate backward linkages in order to add value in its exports. As 
noted in Chapter 4, agro-processing is one of the 'strategic' sectors in the South 
African economy. 
Industrial development in the direction preferred by South Africa and poor countries 
that have weak backward linkages is in part hindered by high tariffs on processed 
goods and sharp variation between tariffs charged on raw materials and those charged 
on the finished goods. These tariff peaks and escalations are most frequent on 
agricultural products. According to South Africa's pre-Doha negotiating paper: 
'Although tariff escalation has decreased as a result of the Uruguay Round, 
rising tariffs from raw materials to intermediate products and sometimes 
peaking for finished industrial products restrict export opportunities and 
hampers vertical diversification and industrialization in developing 
countries. ,86 
Even after the launch of the round of negotiations at Doha, South Africa continued to 
target tariff peaks and escalation and sought a more radical approach to tariff 
reduction in non-agricultural (especially industrial) products in the developed 
countries. It should also be noted that developing countries also retain high tariffs in 
86 Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa's Negotiating Approach to the WTO: Elements and 
Principles, Internal Documents, DTI, 2000. 
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industrial products.R7 However, South Africa's view is that those that are found in 
developing countries are excusable because, 'We [developing countries] arc late 
developers and are still in the process of industrialising our economies and building 
our competitivcness.'x8 South Africa further argued that tariff liberalisation in this 
area should be on an asymmetrical basis89, and that 95 percent of industrial tariffs be 
bound.90 
It is clear from the above that market access considerations, linked to South Africa's 
industrial strategy and overall developmental focus, primarily drives South Africa's 
engagement and shapes its negotiating agenda in the multilateral trading system. 
However, given the diversity of the South African economy and the fact that some of 
its features exhibit 'First World' characteristics, its interests and positions are 
therefore bound to diverge with those of its neighbouring SADC countries who 
remain largely poor, with heavy reliance on primary products (see Chapter 5). 
For South Africa, market access is an important element of a strategy to address 
domestic developmental concerns. In a letter addressed to Brazil's President Lula da 
Silva, President Mbeki remarked that, 'It is a mater of common cause between us that 
development cannot be achieved without an equitable and effective international 
trading system that also facilitates flows of investment from developed to developing 
countries (emphasis mine).'91 Clearly, at the heart of South Africa's negotiating 
agenda at Doha Ministerial (and this continues to be the case) were market access 
87 Marc Bacchetta and Bijit Bora, op.cit. 
88 Faizel Ismail, South Africa's Statement to the Trade Negotiating Council (INC). 04 - 05 December 
2002. 
89 ibid 
90 Faizellsmail. South Africa's Statement to the Trade Negotiating Council, 14 July 2003. 
91 A confidential exchange (LDS-TM), op.cit. 
292 
issues, especially In agriculture and industrial tariffs - as already alluded to 
previously. 
SADC/Africa Group position on industrial tariffs became clearer after the launch of 
the Doha Round. Prior to that their positions were in the form of broad statements 
against tariff peaks and escalation for products of export interests to developing 
countries. Furthermore, their preparedness to engage in industrial tariff negotiations 
was conditional upon guarantees for increased market access for exports of African 
countries, and an elaboration of special and differential treatment provision (S&D).92 
Unlike South Africa, their position was defensive. 
Even after the Doha Ministerial, when the negotiations were already launched, most 
of SADC/Africa Group's position on industrial tariff and tariff peaks was linked to 
the need to safeguard the interests of preference receiving countries. The document in 
which this position was captured was called the Kigali Declaration after the African 
Minister's meeting in Kigali in May 2004. The document expressed concerns for the 
potential of de-industrialisation as a result of industrial tariff liberalisation; alluded to 
the need for 'policy space and flexibility' to allow African countries to undertake 
industrial policy measures; restated the need for the application of S&D provision, 
especially the principle of 'less than full reciprocity'; and made a call for the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers in developed countries. 93 
92 OAU African Economic Community, 'Inputs from the WTO African Group for Agenda Item 6 of the 
Experts Segment of the 4th Ordinary Session of the OAU/AEC Conference of Ministers of Trade -
Preparations for the 4th Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization', Permanent Delegation 
of the Organi=ation of African Unity in Geneva, 14 September 2001, Geneva. 
93 African Union, Kigali Declaration on the Doha Work Programme', op.cit. 
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It is important to note that SADC position on the Doha negotiations was not in any 
way grounded on the terms of intra-regional relations, and did not take into 
consideration the progress (or lack thereof) of regional integration. Given the 
diniculties existing at the intra-regional level, as discussed in the previous chapter, it 
is clear that there were very weak grounds for South Africa to hope for a common 
position. 
Moreover, the existing asymmetries between South Africa and the rest of the sub-
region, with diverse set of interests obtaining from the structural character of the 
domestic economy, ensured that the common position that emerged was a tenuous 
one. Essentially, regional relations constituted a weak basis for multilateral 
cooperation. Reasons for this had much to do with perceptions around South Africa, 
especially its approach towards the protocol on trade, as discussed extensively in 
Chapter 5. 
6.7 The Launch of the Doha Round 
The Doha Round was finally launched in November 2001. This was after major 
coalitions that were arrayed against the launch, for example the Like-Minded Group 
(LMG)94 - a radical group of developing members led by India - were slowly 
unraveling, and there existed a possibility to persuade African countries to also lend 
their full support to the round. India, the acclaimed leader of the 'like-minded group' 
was aware that it was increasingly getting isolated. After persuasion by the EU and 
Q4 This group includes Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
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the US it softened its radical opposition.95 Another key player in this group, Malaysia, 
also relaxed its previously radical position and became more inclined towards the new 
round. 
Indeed, as it became the case throughout the five days of the Ministerial, a vigorous 
offensive was mounted to get all developing countries to support the launch of the 
round. South Africa, the US and the EC were at the forefront of this offensive. South 
Africa was one of the four developing countries - referred to as the 'friends of the 
chair' - that were selected to facilitate discussions on the six main negotiating topics.96 
South Africa's Alec Erwin was responsible for leading discussions on rule-making in 
the WTO. 
Mid-way through the Doha Ministerial, key African countries like Kenya (then ACP 
Group Chair) and Nigeria (then Africa Group chair) also relaxed their positions, 
especially when it was clear that the Cotonou waiver was close to being adopted. This 
ACP waiver was initially opposed by Latin American banana producing countries as 
well as Philippines and Thailand in Asia, who also wanted preferential access to the 
EC market for their tuna.97 
Even though the position of the Africa Group was slowly edging close to accepting 
the launch of the Round, it was difficult to resolve the status of the Singapore Issues. 
And it became clear that if there was to be a progress, these contentious issues would 
have to be set aside from the negotiations. South Africa's position at the Doha 
9~ Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, op.cit .. pp.108-112. 
96 ibid.. pp.89-90. 
97 ibid.. p.99. 
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Ministerial was that negotiations on these areas should be linked to 'genuine market 
. . I .98 
access In agncu ture.· 
A comprOlTIlse position which was acceptable to the EC and other proponents 
including South Korea and Japan was the postponement of the Singapore Issues to the 
fifth Ministerial Conference to be held at Cancun in September 2004 (see below). 
There were also still some ambiguities around the treatment of implementation issues, 
which African countries had been highlighting since the failure of Seattle Ministerial. 
According to the Doha Work Programme these were to be 'decided as a matter of 
priority by December 2002. ,99 
It was in the 'green room', before the last day of the Ministerial where a full 
consensus on launching the round finally emerged; and in this meeting South Africa 
made an impassioned appeal for developing countries to support the launch of the 
negotiations, arguing that it was in their overwhelming interest to do SO.100 Thus, 
coupled with the pressure applied by the EU and US, South Africa could claim some 
victory in delivering the SADCIAfrica Group to support the Doha Round. However, 
other strong factors were at play, for example the granting of the ACP/Cotonou 
waiver. Negotiations were finally launched on the 14 November 2001 with the 
deadline for their conclusion set for December 2004. 
This deadline was not met; and it is widely expected that these negotiations will not 
be concluded before 2006. The Doha Work Programme that was adopted incorporated 
98 Faizel Ismail, Statement by South Africa to the Senior Official's Meetting hosted by Japan, 26 July 
2003. 
99 See Doha Work Programme, op.cit., Paragraph 12; and Faizellsmail, op.cit, 26 July 2003 .. 
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a number of issues that were raised by SADC/Afriea Group, but left the status of 
implementation issues unclear. With regards to implementation, the draft declaration 
divided these into t\\/O groups: the first concern issues that could be resolved 
immediately; and those which require more work.l0l 
The Doha Work Programme included amongst others: Implementation-Related Issues 
and Concerns; Agriculture; Services; Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA); 
WTO Rules; Trade, Debt and Finance; Trade and Transfer of Technology; Technical 
Cooperation and Capacity Building; TRIPS; Trade and Investment; Trade and 
Competition Policy; Transparency in Government Procurement; Trade Facilitation. 
On the last four issues (Singapore Issues) the actual wording was vague, suggesting 
that negotiations would be reviewed after the Cancun meeting, subject to 'explicit 
,102 
consensus. 
6.8 Conclusion: Cancun and Beyond 
Even though ultimately the SADCIAfrica Group threw its weight behind the launch of 
the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations in November 2001, albeit with some 
scepticism, with South Africa having done a lot of work to bring them on board, it 
was ultimately the preference waiver that delivered this group. Negotiating positions 
between South Africa and its SADC partners are still wide apart and are likely to be 
so as long as there are acute structural dissimilarities between the two, and intra-
regional trade relations are tense. South Africa has continued to pursue its ambitious 
100 Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, op.cit., p.l07. 
101 'Text a slap in the face for African countries', Business Day, 08 November 2001. 
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positions beyond the Doha Ministerial, aligning itself with other middle-income 
countries like Brazil and India. The establishment of the G20+ in the run up to 
Cancun clearly set South Africa apart from most of its African partners. 103 
6.8.1 From Cancun to the July Package 
Most of the deadlines that were set in the Doha Work Programme in November 200] 
were missed. These include deadlines for areas such as 'Implementation Issues'. It 
was left up to the Cancun Ministerial in September 2003 to conclude these. The 
Cancun Ministerial suffered a similar fate to the Seattle Ministerial as it failed to 
make progress on issues of key interests to developing countries. The collapse of the 
Cancun Ministerial Conference was triggered by the insistence of the EU, South 
Korea and Japan (all agricultural protectionists) that negotiations on 'Singapore 
Issues' be launched immediately, incensing developing countries who hitherto were 
opposed to the inclusion of these topics on the negotiations agenda. 
In Bhagwati's observation, a number of factors combined to ground Cancun talks and 
these include: 104 the EU's insistence for inclusion of the four 'Singapore' issues until 
the last minute when it indicated that it is prepared to forego the contentious two -
Investment and Competition - and discuss only trade facilitation and government 
102 World Trade Organisation, Doha Declaration, op.cit .. 
103 For a good overview of the emergence of the G20 and various coalition groups in the WTO, see 
Amrita Narlika and Diana Tussie, 'The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and Their 
Evolving Coalitions in the WTO', The World Economy, Volume 27 (7), July 2004, pp.947-966. 
104 Jagdish Bhagwati, 'Don't Cry for Cancun', Foreign Affairs Journal, January/February, 2004, p.SS. 
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procurement. Bhagwati suggests that it was clear these were not that very important to 
the EU. lOS 
Secondly, South Korea and Japan would not yield ground on the Singapore issues and 
wanted to see them form part of the negotiations agenda. Thirdly, the four West 
African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, made what to the US 
appeared as unreasonable demands: they wanted compensation losses they suffered in 
their agricultural earnings, which were to the tune of between US$250 miIlion and 
US$1 billion. The refusal of the US to make concessions on US cotton subsidies 
aggravated the tensions, leading to a walk out by Africa and Caribbean countries in a 
show of solidarity, and this finally brought down the talks. \06 
Even though the EU had indicated preparedness to withdraw the Singapore Issues, 
with the exception of trade facilitation, this offer was made very late, and by then 
tensions had already thickened. South Korea and Japan were not prepared to shift 
their positions; and the ACP group was not prepared to even consider negotiations on 
trade facilitation as this was not linked to progress in agricultural negotiations. lo7 
Failure by the US to respond positively to the plea of four West African countries 
(Mali, Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso) for the elimination of US cotton subsidies, 
amounting to $3bn-$4bn a year, which depresses cotton prices, made progress in 
Cancun elusive. I08 However, according to Narlika and Tussie, agriculture was at the 
105 ibid. 
106 ibid. 
107 Alec Erwin. 'Developing countries were held to ransom in Cancun', Financial Times. 30 September 
2004. 
108 'Talks unravel over cotton', Financial Times, 16 September 2003. 
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heart of the difficulties experienced in Cancun. 109 They argue that '[even] if 
Singapore Issues had been resolved on the last day ... consensus would still have been 
unlikely due to the G20's dissatisfaction with the various drafts that still made 
.. I' . I ,110 mmlma commItments on agncu ture. 
The positive development in the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial was the 
emergence of a formidable coalition group of developing countries - G20+ Group -
led by India, Brazil, China and South Africa. It also prompted the establishment of a 
diverse set of other coalition groups including the G90 Group (comprising least 
developed countries, ACP countries and those belonging to the Africa Group). The 
emergence of these groups proved a testament to growing activity of developing 
countries in the multilateral trading system, accentuation of North-South tensions over 
trade and development issues, and South's determination to collectively contest the 
existing power architecture in the system. 
Paving the way to finally break the impasse and generating momentum for 
negotiations, the EU and the US brokered a deal on agriculture that would form part 
of the negotiations framework to be finalised in July 2004. Part of the compromise 
and confidence building mechanism was the dropping of the Singapore issues, with 
the exception of trade facilitation, from the Doha Work Programme. 
This culminated into the 'July Package' setting out a framework and guidelines for 
negotiations in agriculture (encapsulating domestic support, export competition and 
market access); market access for non-agricultural products; support for the sectoral 
109 Amrita Narlika and Diana Tussie, op.cit., p.953. 
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initiative on dealing with cotton subsidies; special and differential treatment for 
developing countries (with July 2005 set as a deadline for a decision); implementation 
issues, special developmental concerns related to food security, rural development, 
sustaining livelihoods; preferences, and net-food imports; trade in services; guidelines 
on negotiating trade faci litation. 11 I By the time of the General Council at the end of 
July 2005, no outlines of a likely deal had emerged, and this has cast a shadow on the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference scheduled to take place in December 2005. 
The 'July Package' reflected an agreement on the exclusion of Singapore issues (with 
the exception of trade facilitation) from the Doha Work Programme. On trade 
facilitation, negotiations are to take into consideration implementation capacities of 
developing countries and support in the form of technical assistance will be extended 
in order to facilitate implementation. Implementation is coupled to technical 
assistance and infrastructure development support. Even though the Ee agreed to drop 
the Singapore issues, this was more of a pyrrhic victory for African countries as these 
issues are part of the EC's negotiating agenda for regional economic partnership 
agreements with ACP countries. 
To conclude, as the discussion demonstrated, even though South Africa is a keen 
multilateralist, its regional and multilateral trade activities are best explained by 
examining the structure of its domestic economy and the strategic competitive 
interests of state actors anchored in a particular form of state-society relations (see 
Chapter 4). South Africa's interests are concomitant to the structural features of its 
110 ibid 
III World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme: Draft General Council Decision of 31 July 
2004, WT/GCIWI535. www.wto.org 
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economy relative to the rest of thc region, and are ticd to specific sectors which it 
seeks to place on the competitive trajectory in global markets. 
South Africa's pro-Round stance was considerably shaped by domestic economic 
reforms, the need to ensure growth in the economy, as well as by the imperatives of 
social development. The new developmental trajectory in South Africa emphasises re-
orientation of the economy away from import substitution towards value-added 
manufactured exports, with export promotion and market access issues as the 
cornerstone of the external strategy, 
The tensions between South Africa and most countries in the SA DC sub-region in 
constructing a common platform reflected intra-regional tensions, and the fact that 
South Africa was overly preoccupied with neo-mercantilist interests and had failed to 
articulate norms that tie its long-term interests with those of the region. Furthermore, 
at the multilateral level, South Africa's positions have had little do with perfecting a 
middle-power role, and everything to do with its growth and development interests. 
Participating in multilateral structures was, in the first place, motivated by the need to 
lock-in domestic economic reforms and to address its developmental challenges (see 
Chapter 4). The next chapter concludes the discussions in this thesis, pulls together 
the main arguments, and identifies areas for further research. 
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Summary and Restatement of the thesis 
This chapter pulls together themes explored in the thesis, re-states the central 
argument and proposes areas for further research. The key concern of this thesis has 
been with the relationship between domestic, regional and global level processes, and 
how state actors use regionalism as a response to the challenges posed by 
globalisation. These levels are treated as inter-related and, at various points, influence 
each other. While there are variations in how globalisation affects different countries, 
given the differential capabilities that countries are endowed with, it is quite evident 
that there are sets of strategies that core states in 'developing' regions are 
appropriating and utilising strategically to for political reasons, especially to 
maximise benefits for the domestic economy. 
Much of the focus was on South Africa - the regional 'core' state - and this was in 
order to observe strategic competitive impulses underlying the domestic economy. 
This dynamic is also discussed in the context of South Africa's transition from 
apartheid to democracy and non-racial order - a development which also coincided 
with the emergence of global neo-liberal orthodoxy. This, quite clearly, placed state 
actors in an unenviable position as they had to address the socio-economic legacy 
bequeathed by the apartheid system on the one hand, and contend with the challenges 
posed by globalisation on the other. The latter forces have placed enormous pressure 
on developing countries to restructure their institutional and policy architecture. 
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In locating this case study within the broader African context and some of the 
challenges that the sub-continent experienced in the early 1980s, we began by 
examining the forces that shape Sub-Saharan Africa's political economy during this 
period and how regionalism gradually acquired an externally oriented form as 
opposed to the closed regionalism of the 1960s and 1980s. As this research pointed 
out, the 1980s were indeed a difficult period for the continent as it was increasingly 
pushed to the margins of the world economy, and its underdevelopment deepened. 
Hence, as highlighted in Chapter 1, the 1980s and 1990s period came to be 
characterised by most African scholars as a 'lost decade'. This manifested itself in the 
declining average GNP per capita, deteriorating terms of trade, decline in the share of 
world trade, increase in poverty rates, and generally poor economic performance. 
Even within the Southern African region, as Chapters 3 and 5 sought to demonstrate, 
different countries experienced the effects of external forces differently, depending on 
their institutional capacities and productive forces that were at their disposal. Indeed, 
much of the region was negatively affected, and had since struggled to recover from 
the economic malaise of this period. As noted earlier, the continued evolution of 
globalisation, accompanied by a strong ideological current in the shape of neo-liberal 
policy discourse, had forced substantive policy shifts at the domestic level. More 
profoundly, this development has also meant a shift from dirigiste approaches to 
economic planning towards emphasis on the greater role of the markets. As shown in 
Chapter I, various studies undertaken by the World Bank in the mid-1980s and early 
1990s confirmed the dominant position of the neo-liberal ideology and its force as a 
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new developmental framework that developing countries had to follow or be left out 
of the train of prosperity. 
In this regard, the new face of regionalism in developing countries was going to look 
outward rather than inward. Sub-Saharan Africa had to catch on very quickly or risk 
being locked into a state of perpetual marginalisation. However, outward-oriented 
global integration was going to face serious hurdles. First, the majority of African 
countries lacked the requisite institutional capacity to manage integration into global 
economic relations. Second, they lacked internal markets, and their production supply 
was (and still is) generally weak and incapable of responding to global demands in 
manufacturing. Third, lSI strategies had either not been implemented properly in a 
manner that also builds export capacity similar to East Asian countries, or simply 
failed because of preoccupation with shielding domestic industry from foreign 
competition, thereby encouraging rent-seeking and inefficiencies in production. This 
historical legacy of domestic policy failure and systemic challenges still haunts the 
continent today. 
Southern Africa, as part of the Sub-Saharan sub-continent, was not immune to these 
challenges. Moreover, it had a unique set of challenges to contend with. These were 
related to the existence of the apartheid social milieu in South Africa and the 
problems that this created for most countries' economies and social structures in the 
sub-region. Thus, essentially, regionalism emerged as a politically inspired 
mechanism to deal with immediate challenges posed by South Africa. Its emergence 
also coincided with the world economic crisis, which further weakened Africa's 
economies. At the heart of regionalism was the need to create a bulwark against 
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apartheid South Africa, and to encourage economic self-sufficiency. This has since 
shifted towards emphasis on global integration; and, internally on food security and 
development. 
SADCC was an organisational mechanism to establish political solidarity and to 
encourage greater political and economic cooperation amongst Southern African 
countries, and ultimately to isolate South Africa. As noted in this thesis, although this 
initiative lacked the needed weight to dislodge South Africa and deepen economic 
cooperation, this helped to lay the basis for future integration in the sub-region. When 
the apartheid system finally unravelled due to a combination of internal pressure, 
growing internal discontent, and the economic weakness of the apartheid system, state 
actors faced different sets of challenges - to integrate into the global economy and 
deal with domestic developmental challenges. 
The Southern African Development Community, a forerunner to SADCC, was a new 
institutional mechanism to facilitate this deeper level of cooperation amongst state 
actors in the sub-region, and to ensure meaningful integration into the global 
economy. It was expected that South Africa, then a member of SA DC, would play an 
important role as an engine of growth in the sub-region, and help to facilitate the 
integration ofthe region into the global economy. 
When the political new changes entered into force in South Africa, the elite was 
confronted with four crucial challenges: a) overcoming the gigantic legacy of 
apartheid that presented itself in the form of social disarticulation and racial 
inequalities in economic ownership and opportunities; b) reversing the steep decline 
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of the economy, including unemployment; c) nonnalising relations with the region; d) 
positioning itself in relation to the developments associated with globalisation. This 
also meant that South Africa would have to engage in a very difficult balancing act-
in relating with the region and global economic relations. This balancing act would 
not necessarily be easy to manage. 
This thesis argued that in dealing with these challenges, South Africa opted for a 
strategy that placed strong emphasis on integrating the country into global markets. In 
so doing, it hoped to deal with the internal contradictions in its domestic scene. While 
South Africa expressed a political rhetoric of regional development, it gave priority 
to the domestic level, in particular to the need to enhance national economic 
competitiveness in the long-tenn. In this sense, the region was viewed as a subset of a 
broader strategy to global integration. 
While at a broader level South Africa's diplomatic strategy was favourably disposed 
towards Africa's development, it is important to remember that, in the context of 
apartheid's social milieu, South Africa viewed its regional strategy as a means to 
project a positive foreign policy abroad. The intention was to gain international 
respectability as a regional power, while preserving white dominance at home. But the 
manner in which this was done created tensions in the sub-region. Moreover, given 
the existence of apartheid in South Africa this made it difficult for the country to gain 
acceptance in the region and in the international community. 
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7.2 Theoretical Issues: Studying Regionalisms 
The examination of the relationship between South Africa - a core state in the sub-
region - and the entire Southern Africa has raised interesting theoretical questions 
regarding studying regions in the context of contemporary globalisation. While this 
thesis has leant heavily on state actors' behaviour in regional and multilateral 
processes, it acknowledged that state-driven processes are not the only signifiers of 
new forms of regionalism. There are many other actors that are involved in the 
construction of regions both at the formal and informal levels. Regionalism itself 
assumes different shapes depending on different understandings of what constitutes 
collective challenges by actors involved. These challenges, though they may initially 
emanate from the domestic scene, are not necessarily limited to state activities. Thus 
at the conceptual level, and as theorised by New Regionalism(s) Approach (NRA), 
new regionalism transcends state-level processes. 
However, given the incompleteness of the NRA research agenda, this thesis proposed 
that a number of sub-sets of theories or explanatory tools be further developed within 
the NRA research agenda in order to further tighten it and ensure its preciseness. 
Other sub-sets could for example include informal regionalism approach - observing 
informal processes or initiatives that might well be characterised as expressing 
regionalisation in an unconventional fashion, for example processes that involve 
informal cross-border trade networks (see discussion below). 
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There are other commentators who have also proposed regulatory rexionalism -
which looks mainly at the precise nature of the relationship between regional trade 
agreements and the multilateral trading system, examining the extent to which the 
former complies with, and goes beyond the provisions of the latter. This also 
transcends the old stepping-stonelbuilding bloc metaphor. 
Such varied characterisations of regionalism would also ensure that there is a greater 
articulation between theory and the empirical. This needs not be understood to mean 
that a perfect fit should be achieved between the two. It is important though that care 
be taken to employ theoretical tools in ways that cast better light on the case studies 
observed, rather than merely impose a theory irrespective of the conditions obtaining 
in the case study. Furthermore, theory should not be so overly rigid that it fails to 
accommodate variations or unique variables in case studies. 
For the case study used in this thesis - South Africa and Southern Africa - applying a 
strategic competitive explanatory framework that builds on new regionalism 
approaches as well as drawing from a wider set of theories that are concerned with the 
'competition state', industrial policies and strategic trade approaches casts a better 
light on the chosen empirical case study. In the current context of domestic 
transformation in South Africa, where there is a shift from macro-economic 
stabilisation achieved during the first five years of democratic transition towards 
micro-economic reforms and industrial policies, creating linkages between the above-
mentioned theoretical approaches brings more clarity on the relationship between the 
domestic, regional and global level processes. 
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The choice of explanatory framework also guides what should and should not fall 
under its rubric. As such, this also explains why this thesis left out processes related to 
migration and security (see below). There are many other processes that this thesis 
could have chosen to look at, which arc important in understanding regionalist 
processes in Southern Africa. These include the relationship between security (both 
intra- and inter-state resource or ethnic conflicts) and· trade in a regional context; 
migration trends; informal trade networks which are prevalent in most countries in the 
sub-region due to either absence of domestic markets or difficulties in reaching them, 
and poor institutional mechanisms to properly manage cross-border transaction flows; 
or failure of the state, characterised by commercial or trading activities undertaken 
through underhand means by insurgents or criminals, sometimes working hand in 
hand with 'state' officials. These could not be discussed fully within the limited scope 
of this thesis, but are important areas for further research (see below). 
From the outset, the objective of this thesis is set out as examining formal, 
institutional and inter-state processes in the context of the relationship between 
regionalism and globalisation. This understanding should enable us to identify 
competitive forces that are generated by the relationship between the domestic, 
regional and global level processes. There is no doubt that the areas highlighted above 
- that is, those falling outside of formal processes - need to be given attention in both 
academic and policy discourses in studying the linkages between development, 
regionalism and globalisation. Hence it becomes important to evolve a subset of 
analytic approaches building on the New Regionalism Approach. 
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7.3 Research Case and Methodological Issues 
This research was guided by a central thesis that is framed around the extent to which 
South Africa manages to use regional and multilateral trade strategies to address its 
domestic developmental concerns and build capacity for effective articulation at the 
global level. These developmental concerns, at the domestic level, encompass both 
social equity objectives and strategic competitive needs of domestic capital. In 
essence, state actors seek to shift the incentive structure in the domestic sphere in 
favour of domestic industries that are regarded as 'strategic' for international 
competitiveness. 
This approach, as discussed in Chapter 4, is balanced with social equity measures 
directed at those actors that are likely to be vulnerable (for example trade unions or 
less competitive industries), and who could potentially constitute counter-tendencies 
against 'strategic goals' pursued by the state. It is in this sense that South Africa's 
external strategies can be regarded as expressing a limited form of 'embedded 
liberalism'. This, however, complicates relations between South Africa and the rest of 
the sub-region as the country structures neo-mercantilist trade relations with its 
neighbours. 
Given the structural diversity that exists between South Africa and most of the sub-
region, it is clear that South Africa would always take a lion's share of the benefits of 
trade relations. Given that this was evident from the outset, what then must have 
motivated other countries to enter into trade relations with South Africa? It is not very 
difficult to see the logic: the motive force for such relations was to access South 
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Africa's larger market. However, the reality was bleaker. South Africa was overly 
concerned with considerations of its domestic economy and the need for strategic 
competitiveness. So, it opted for neo-mercantilist relations with its relatively less 
developed regional partners. This, as explored in Chapter 5, was manifest in various 
forms of non-tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions, tariff peaks and escalations, and 
complex rules of origin. 
South Africa's approach to regional relations aggravated tensions in SADC. This led 
to some countries preferring to integrate closely with COMESA, possibly signalling 
that they will not countenance South Africa's dominance. Furthermore, as is made 
clear in Chapter 6 in the discussion on regional negotiating positions in the run up to 
the Doha ministerial conference, the tenuous ground on which intra-regional relations 
were constructed was bound to come apart. South Africa failed in its attempt to 
persuade its regional partners to support its positions in the WTO, although the 
country could claim some credit in mobilising African support for the launch of the 
round. 
Failure to muster a common ground on specific negotiating issues could be attributed 
to structural differences, tense intra-regional relations, and the absence of a 
consensual normative platform to structure enduring relations on the basis of a 
common view of challenges posed by globalisation. In any case, such an 
understanding is prefigured by countries' economic structure and their perception of 
power relations in the global system, and more specifically multilateral trading 
system. 
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It is against this background that a crucial paradox in South Africa's regional and 
multilateral trade strategies appears: while its rhetoric is framed in a language that 
emphasises mutual benefit and consensus, South Africa's strategic objective is, in 
fundamental respects, shaped by its domestic realties; and these diverge with those of 
other Southern African countries. South Africa's interests are, in reality, not firmly 
welded with those of its regional partners. 
The difficulties experienced by South Africa in persuading its regional partners at the 
WTO showed the extent to which intra-regional relations lacked solidity. South Africa 
was only concerned with its domestic context, and to some degree with the welfare of 
its partners in SACU, which includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
These countries are de facto covered by South Africa's industrial development 
strategy and their trade policies reflect those of South Africa. 
This thesis sought to capture the strategic dimension of regionalism and the dynamic 
tensions between this phenomenon and the globalisation process. This process is not 
uniform, and the relationship between regionalism and globalisation is not always 
straightforward. Its specific nature has to be understood by looking at various 
countries and regions' experiences. It is evident that countries and regions are 
different, and there are unique challenges that they contend with in trying to reconcile 
domestic challenges and those posed by global level processes. Their response would, 
as such, reflect the diversity of their history, social structure, institutional capabilities 
and political objectives. 
313 
Having explored these questions, by looking at the case of South AfTica and Southern 
Africa, it would also be important to highlight what this research has identified as 
areas that should be given attention in future research on regions. It should be noted 
that this study does not claim to have exhausted all the important questions 
concerning regionalism. It was not its intention to do so. Indeed, it is still too early to 
understand fully the impact of globalisation in developing countries and how the 
instrument of regionalism seeks to respond to this. It is hoped that this research has 
been able to, at least, contribute to the ongoing debates in this area and has given 
pointers to future areas of research. 
7.4 Areas/or Future Research 
There are a number of questions raised by this study. Some questions that we would 
have seen fit to address, but could not, are highlighted below as providing starting 
points for future research. The focused scope of this research made it difficult to 
reflect indepth on these. Areas identified for further research include the role that 
SACU is likely to play in future as a platform for the elaboration of South Africa's 
foreign economic strategy. This is linked to the ongoing restructuring of the domestic 
economy in South Africa, pressure for reforms in SACU economies, and the 
imperative of regulatory compliance with the multilateral trading system. 
Furthermore, the failure of SADC - both institutionally and politically - to drive the 
trade integration agenda opens up important questions regarding SACU expansion. 
The other equally important question regards an area which has not received much 
attention in the literature on trade and development, concerning the relationship 
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between security and regional trade: whether regional trade integration can be used as 
an instrument to reduce conflicts; and what role, if any, do trade relations play in 
fuelling or reducing intra-state and inter-state conflicts. This is particularly apposite in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Africa in particular, which has lived through intra-
and inter-state conflicts for many decades. 
7.4.1 SACU Expansion Possibilities 
There is evidence that South Africa is re-defining its foreign economic strategy within 
the context of SACU. Instead of viewing SADC as a centre-piece of its external 
strategy, SACU is emerging as a platform of choice for South Africa. This is for 
reasons already alluded to: the closely knit integration within the customs union, as 
well as the fact that SADC has had limited success in pursuing regional trade 
integration. Moreover, in its current form SADC provides little room for South Africa 
to pursue its foreign economic objectives. There are indeed intimations that South 
Africa has been encouraging SACU expansion that would possibly absorb some of the 
current SADC and COMESA members. 
More importantly, external actors such as the EU and the US have shown a great deal 
of interest in the region. The US via its Africa Growth Opportunity (AGOA) Act 
introduced in 2000; and the EU through its Economic Partnership Agreement 
negotiated with a group of SADC countries seek to play an active role in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Externally driven competitive liberalisation in the region poses a serious threat 
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to South Africa's quest for regional influence.) One pessimistic way oflooking at this 
would be to suggest that the political battle for policy determination in the region is 
likely to be won by external powers - the EU and the US - given the competitive 
advantage possessed by these two actors. 
However, on the optimistic side, this 'outside-in' pressure may act to foster a closer 
relationship amongst regional actors and highlight their collective challenges in a very 
sharp way. These developments would likely drive South Africa into a more 
proactive, and perhaps benign, mode in relating with its regional partners as failing to 
do so may witness its 'sphere of influence' usurped by external actors. This is one of 
the important areas for future research in the region, and it fits neatly with the analytic 
framework of strategic competitive regionalism. 
There is no doubt that South Africa's quest to expand SACU from the current five 
members will not come easily. A customs union is more complex than a Free Trade 
Agreement. It is difficult to administer as it has to evolve a common evaluation 
system; common customs procedures; common nomenclature for tariff heading; and 
harmonisation of the tariff structure. Also, the reality of adjustment costs will have to 
be borne in mind when making a decision to move into a customs union. Moreover, in 
a customs union countries are required to cede sovereignty over trade policy 
determination to a supranational structure; and this goes to the heart of the challenges 
with the current regional integration schemes in Southern Africa or indeed Africa. 
) See Clark J. Leith and John Whalley, 'Competitive LiberaIisation and a US-SACU FTA', In Jeffrey 
Schott, Free Trade Agreements: US Strategies and Priorities, (Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics, 2004). 
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It can hardly be surprIsmg therefore that South Africa would be looking at 
encouraging the expansion of SACU as part of consolidating its competitive grip in 
the region vis-iI-vis external actors. Indeed, SACU presents an important opportunity 
for South Africa to play an effective leadership role in the region. Already, SACU 
members negotiate external trade deals as a bloc, with South Africa playing a de facIo 
leadership role. It is believed that countries like Mozambique, Zambia and Mauritius 
have been encouraged, reportedly by South Africa, to consider joining SACU.2 After 
conducting a feasibility study, Mauritius concluded that it will not be in its best 
interest to do so as its economy is not closely integrated with those ofSACU.3 
Mozambique has also commissioned a study to ascertain the benefits of participating 
in SACU. On the surface, Mozambique should naturally become part of SACU as its 
economy is highly integrated with South Africa's. Ironically, it could well be that this 
close integration could blunt the appetite for joining SACU as Mozambique already 
has enhanced access to the South African market and sees no additional benefits from 
joining SACU. 
Despite the generally positive tone of the report produced by a consultancy group on 
Mozambique'S participation in SACU, the country has yet to make its position clear.4 
With regards to Zambia, there is a great deal of confusion as the country hosts, and is 
a member of COMESA which also advances towards a customs union. It is not clear 
how Zambia is considering its future, what kind of policy questions it is exploring, 
2 Based on a draft confidential report prepared for Mozambique's Minister of Trade by a consultancy 
group. August 2004. 
3 Based on confidential interview held with a senior government official at the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Mozambique, Maputo, 09 November 2004. 
4 Based on a draft confidential report prepared for Mozambique's Minister of Trade by a consultancy 
group. August 2004. 
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and what would eventually influence its decision. Many countries in the region would 
certainly wait on the wings to see how the SACU processes unfold in the next few 
years, and whether or not it would be a right step to join in. 
What is becoming clearer though is that SACU's expansion, anchored in South 
Africa's dominance, has strategic importance for the country, especially in view of the 
competitive liberalisation strategies by the EU and the US in Southern Africa. SACU 
would thus provide a powerful leverage for South Africa strategic competitiveness, 
and provide a platform for the achievement of its major foreign economic policy 
objectives.5 However, there are problems within SACU. 
One of them relates to the fact that some countries, like Lesotho and Swaziland, are 
heavily dependent on revenues, and admission of new members could erode this 
revenue stream. The other problem relates to the trade and development agreement 
that South Africa signed with the EU to liberalise its internal markets by 2012. Other 
SACU countries, by virtue of having a common external tariff, are likely to face EU 
import surge in 2012 and beyond, when SACU internal market has been fully 
liberalised for the EU. In addition, this is also the deadline for SADC's full 
liberalisation. This liberalisation is way ahead of the 2020 target for full reciprocal 
liberalisation under the Cotonou Agreeemt signed betetween the EU and ACP 
countires. This could be a very fruitful area for future research. 
5 This draws on Andrew Hurrell's discussion of rule-constrained hegemonic order in the context of the 
balance of incentives within NAFT A where the acceptance of US objectives is traded for security of 
access to the US economy, See Andrew Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective', In Louise 
Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and 
International Order, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.51. 
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7.4.2 Regional Trade and Security 
The relationship between regional trade and security, especially taking into 
consideration the prevalence of informal trade, is also another area that is 
underdeveloped in academic literature. There is indeed very limited academic 
research on this relationship, and where this has been discussed it has mainly been in 
generalities6, or studies would look narrowly at the relationship between globalisation, 
war economies and informal trade, with little attempt to make a linkage with formal, 
institutional driven processes.7 
This point is also made powerfully by Barbieri when she points out that the study of 
the relationship between trade and conflict in international relations lacks empirical 
investigation, yet this question has significant relevance for both theory and policy.s 
Even though Mansfield and Pevehouse, moving from a liberal trade paradigm, make 
an extensive examination of contending views on the relationship between regional 
trade agreements and conflid, their study does not consider the relationship of this to 
informal trade networks and personal gains derived by elites from conflicts. 
Given the fact that from the outset SADC(C) was established in a climate fuelled by 
security tensions, it would have been expected that there would be volumes of studies 
6 See for example, Edward Mansfield, Power, Trade and War, (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 
1994); John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett, and Michael L. Berbaum, 'Causes of Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organisations, 1885-1992', International Studies Quarterly, 
Volume 47, pp.371-393. 
7 See for example an edited volume by Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), Greed and 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 
8 Katherine Barbieri, 'Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?', 
Journal of Peace Research. Volume 33, No.1, 1996, p.29. 
9 Edward D. Mansfield and John C. Pevehouse, 'Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict', 
International Organization, Volume 54 No.4, Autumn 2000, pp.775-808. 
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examining the relationship between the security dimension and trade relations in a 
more specific contcxt. At the policy level, there is an implicit linkage bctween the 
two. For example, SADC's Organ for Politics, Defence and Security has been an 
important leg alongside the economic integration agenda, and has in fact dominated 
much of the SADC's agenda after 1996.10 
Arguably, one of the motivating factors for South Africa to push for a strong 
economic agenda, driven by trade, was that this could in the long run lead to 
economic development in the region and would limit the scope for security tensions 
that could have a spill-over effect onto its (South Africa's) economy in the form of 
surge of political refugees or economic immigrants. There is no doubt that there were, 
as argued in Chapter 5, also strong considerations for self economic gains, in 
particular to benefit domestic economic agents. But it was all too starkly evident to 
South Africa that questions related to security could be ignored at the cost of 
economic success in the long run. Thus, security and trade could not be viewed in 
isolation from each other. 
Security concerns within SADC were particularly heightened during the Great Lakes 
conflict in 1998, involving at least four SAOC countries: Angola, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Namibia and Zimbabwe, when one SAOC member, the 
ORC, came under attack from Rwanda and Uganda. While SAOC as an institutional 
and legal instrument was, arguably, not involved in this conflict as this was not 
10 The Organ was established in 1996, officially replacing the Front-Line States. The establishment of 
the Organ followed a recommendation of the SADe Workshop on Democracy, Peace, and Security 
held in Windhoek on July 11-16, 1994. 
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formally sanctioned, the organisation was deeply drawn into this quagmire as some of 
the belligerents used its institutional cover as a pretext for engaging in war. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, since the 1970s, during the apartheid government's 
military adventures in Southern Africa, until the early 1990s, the sub-region has been, 
to a considerable extent, a security complex. This means that the sub-region was less 
of a tightly-knit harmonious community than an arrangement to create a security 
balance against South Africa's preponderance." As Chapter 3 illustrated, the focus 
was very much inward-looking, to defend national sovereignty against perceived and 
real external threats. 
The intra-state conflicts in Angola, taking place between 1975 and 2002; and 
Mozambique's intra-state contlict beginning in the early 1970s until the early 1990s-
in both cases fuelled by South Africa and the US - are some of the examples of 
external threats. Indeed, this had a shaping impact on the emergence of the sub-region 
as a security complex. It is important to also highlight the conjunctural reality of Cold 
War that existed then, and in which South Africa played a strategic role. The 
'securitisation' of the region was, to some extent, a critical dimension of the Cold War 
superpower rivalries (this is discussed at length in Chapter 3). Even after the Cold 
War and apartheid had ended, politics and security continued to playa central role in 
SADC's agenda and, at times, overshadowed the trade agenda. The Great Lakes 
contlict that began in 1998 was a reminder for the region of how tenuous its security 
arrangement was. 
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The conception of security in SAOC and in most of Africa has always been generally 
informed by the traditional Realist view that regards state survival as supreme, and in 
which the pursuit of power lies at the core of defining relations between states. 12 By 
implication this de-emphasises, if not invalidates, the place of individuals or non-state 
actors as referent objects for security.13 The notion of 'existential threat' and what 
Buzan and Weaver characterise as ' ... the continued prominence of territoriality in the 
domain of security' has been the obsession of political actors in the region for many 
years. 14 Moving away from this narrow view still remains an important challenge for 
SAOC. 
Thus it becomes important, in the context of 'new regionalism', to examine the 
intersection between trade and security in regional contexts. In the example given 
above, of SAOC countries that were involved in the Great Lakes conflict, it is curious 
to note that at the time of the conflict all these countries - Angola, ORC, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe - belonged to COMESA, another regional 
integration scheme committed to advancing towards a customs union. Also, with the 
exception of Rwanda and Uganda, all of these were, and still are, members of SADC. 
This throws into question the liberal argument positing association between trade 
II For a discussion on the concept of 'Security Complex', see Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions 
and Powers: The Structure of International Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
12 See Tim Dunne and C B. Schmidt, 'Realism'. In John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p.152; Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations, (London: 
PaIgrave, 2001), pp.87-105; Anthony Leysens and Lisa Thompson, 'Emancipating the Dead? Changing 
Notions of Human Security in Southern Africa', In Nana Poku (eds.), Security and Development in 
Southern Africa. (London: Praeger, 2001), p.53; see also Anne Hammerstad, Defending the State or 
Protecting the People? SADC Security Integration at a Crossroads, (South African Institute of 
International Affairs: Johannesburg, 2003), pp.l-36. 
J3 See Gina van Schlkwyk and Jakkie CilIiers, Civil Society and the SADC Security Agenda, A Draft 
Mimeo (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2004), pp.6-10. 
14 Barry Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.ll. 
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(increased interdependence) and peace dividends. l ) According to this view, as 
summarised by Barbieri, economic linkages create disc incentives for conflict. 16 In 
favour of this theory, one could perhaps argue that intra-industry trade in both 
COMESA and SADC remains very low. However, the theory would still not be 
convincing as these organisations and their intentions, presumably, represent long-
term economic incentives for cooperation. 
Beyond the liberal argument which posits a strong relationship between trade 
interdependence and peace dividends among integrating countries there needs to be a 
critical examination of the forces underlying trade and conflict in a regional context. 17 
Some of the important questions such an examination could seek to answer include: 
what type of incentive structure that regional trade agreements should create to limit 
the propensity of actors towards contlict? And where there are conflicts, in spite of 
regional trade agreements, what other variables explain these? 
For example, in the case of the Great Lakes conflict, engulfing a large part of Central 
Africa, mineral resources arguably played an important role, which then brings up the 
dimension of elite strategies, war economies and cross-border informal trade 
networks. 18 Such informal trade networks include, for example, illegal dealings in 
15 See for example Katherine Barbieri, op.cit .• who questions this proposition, noting that there has 
been little evidence advanced supporting this view. As she further suggests, the are other factors that 
have nothing to do with trade that explain the existence or non-existence of conflict. Such factors may, 
for example, be related to issues that have to do with political culture, historical factors or simply the 
management of inter-state relations outside of trade. 
16 ibid. 
17 There are currently policy research initiatives such as the one undertaken by the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IlSD) (Geneva based), Sustainable Development Policy 
Institute (Pakistan based), and South African Institute for International Affairs (South African based) to 
better understand the relationship between regional trade integration and violent conflict. This major 
study is funded by the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC). 
18 See an extensive examination of this phenomenon by Mark Duffield, 'Globalization, Trans-border 
Trade and War Economies', In Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: 
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minerals looted from war zones, illicit drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and 
proscribed wild life products. 19 This informal practice can also take on a global 
dimension where a global division of 'production' in human body parts, centred in 
certain regions, is created - and this could also involve legitimate institutions.20 
Regarding trade relations amongst unequals, Chapter 5 highlighted problems that this 
could create or has created in Southern Africa. Thus, one of the important research 
questions to ask is: where there are asymmetries of power and skewed distribution of 
gains, how can a 'core' state within the region - since it benefits the most from 
economic relations - use its position of advantage positively to equalise benefits or 
off-set losses arising from asymmetrical transactional arrangements? And following 
from this, how can social norms be evolved as bases for creating a sense of common 
identity and purpose (and the core state could playa central role in ensuring the 
legitimation of such social norms)? These are important questions, since it could well 
be that tensions generated by perceptions of unequal power relations and differential 
gains might create a propensity towards regional hostilities and conflict. There are 
many other questions besides the ones pointed above that could be generated as part 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000),p.81. He argues that, 
'Criminalized and conflict-prone trans-border activity is usually connected with the emergence of new 
social and political elites.' In his discussion of the relationship between informal trade networks and 
strategies of the political elite during conflict, focusing particularly on the Great Lakes conflict, 
Mwanasali suggests that informal trade and search for markets is one of the means to achieving 
political goals of the elite as well as economic survival means. And that, 'By linking local markets and 
transboundary networks of production and exchange, the informal economy often provides needed 
outlets for the channelling of critical resources to (and for the benefit of) the warring factions.' 
Musifiky Mwanasali, 'The View from Below', In Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), Greed and 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p.I39. 
19 Mark Duffield, op.cit .. p.76. 
20 An investigation by Nancy Scheeper-Hughes, a medical anthropologist at the University of 
California, Berkely and a co-founder of Organ Watch, uncovered a syndicate of Israeli-led organ 
traffickers with a global reach stretching from China to South Africa, and involves credible and 
registered private clinics. A 'seller' could be from Brazil, the trading company owned by Israeli 
criminals, a buyer from America, and the operation done in Durban, South Africa. See South Africa 
'Buying a Chance to Live: Selling his only 'spare' asset', Sunday Times, 21 August 2005. 
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of establishing a line of enquiry into the relationship between regional trade and 
contlict/peace-building. 
The areas for future research identified in this thesis are not exhaustive. There could 
be other sub-set of areas for future research, derived from those already highlighted 
above. Also, new or synthesised analytic tools to further explore the linkage between 
various dimensions of regionalism could be explored to better explain processes that 
are not often captured by conventional explanatory framework: for example, the 
relationship between contlict, informal trade and formally driven regional processes 
and their link with the wider globalisation processes. This thesis, by looking at 
strategic competitive impulses of core states within 'developing' regions, has sought 
to build on the New Regionalism Approach (NRA) and to open up new avenues of 
research in the area of regionalism and globalisation. Thus, it hopes to make a modest 
contribution to ongoing debates about the nature of contemporary global 
transformations and their relationship with domestic and region-level processes. 
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